How additional is the Clean Development Mechanism?

Analysis of the application of current tools and proposed alternatives

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Climate Action Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Certified Emission Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Compact Fluorescent Lamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂</td>
<td>Carbon Dioxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORSIA</td>
<td>Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Crediting Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Component Project Activity of a PoA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Designated Operational Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>Executive Board of the CDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETS</td>
<td>Emissions Trading Scheme/System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f_NRB</td>
<td>Fraction of non-renewable biomass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Gold Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCM</td>
<td>Joint Crediting Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Light Emitting Diode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Methodologies Panel under the CDM EB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRV</td>
<td>Monitoring, Reporting &amp; Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRB</td>
<td>Non-renewable Biomass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Project Design Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMR</td>
<td>Partnership for Market Readiness (Initiative of the World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoA</td>
<td>Programme of Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCS</td>
<td>Verified Carbon Standard</td>
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</table>
Executive summary

With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which establishes a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development (Article 6.4), it is clear that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol will end. However, in terms of its standards, procedures and institutional arrangements, the CDM certainly forms an important basis for the elaboration and design of future international crediting mechanisms.

While this study provides important insights to improve the CDM up to 2020, the approach taken in this study could also be applied more generally both to assess the environmental integrity of other compliance offset mechanisms, as well as to avoid flaws in the design of new mechanisms being used or established for compliance. Many of the shortcomings identified in this study are inherent to crediting mechanisms in general, not least the considerable uncertainty involved in the assessment of additionality and the information asymmetry between project developers and regulators.

A fundamental feature of both the CDM and the mechanism under Article 6.4 is that they aim to achieve environmental integrity by ensuring that only real, measurable and additional emission reductions are generated. This study analyzes the opportunities and limits of the current CDM framework for ensuring environmental integrity, i.e. that projects are additional and that emission reductions are not overestimated. It looks at the way in which the CDM framework has evolved over time, assesses the likelihood that emission reductions credited under the CDM ensure environmental integrity and provides findings on the overall and project-type-specific environmental integrity of the CDM. In addition, it provides lessons learned and recommendations for improving additionality assessment that can be applied to crediting mechanisms generally, including to mechanisms to be used for compliance under the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), and to mechanisms to be implemented under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

To ensure robust judgements, we have systematically analyzed the determination of additionality, the determination of baseline emissions and other issues that are key for environmental integrity. Towards this goal, we have evaluated those general CDM rules that are particularly relevant for environmental integrity and assessed in the case of specific project types the likelihood that they deliver real, measurable and additional emission reductions. Based on our analysis key findings include the following:

- Most energy-related project types (wind, hydro, waste heat recovery, fossil fuel switch and efficient lighting) are unlikely to be additional, irrespective of whether they involve the increase of renewable energy, energy efficiency improvements or fossil fuel switch.
- Industrial gas projects (HFC-23, adipic acid, nitric acid) are likely to be additional as long as the mitigation is not otherwise promoted or mandated through policies.
- Methane projects (landfill gas, coal mine methane) have a high likelihood of being additional.
- Biomass power projects have a medium likelihood of being additional overall because the assessment of additionality very much depends on the local conditions of individual projects.
- The additionality of the current pipeline of efficient lighting projects using small-scale methodologies is highly unlikely because in many host countries the move away from incandescent bulbs is well underway.
In the case of **cook stove projects**, CDM revenues are often insufficient to cover the project costs and to make the project economically viable. Cook stove projects are also likely to considerably **over-estimate the emission reductions** due to a number of unrealistic assumptions and default values.

Overall, our results suggest that 85% of the projects covered in this analysis and 73% of the potential 2013-2020 Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) supply have a low likelihood that emission reductions are additional and are not over-estimated. Only 2% of the projects and 7% of potential CER supply have a high likelihood of ensuring that emission reductions are additional and are not over-estimated.

Our analysis suggests that the **CDM still has fundamental flaws in terms of overall environmental integrity**. It is likely that the large majority of the projects registered and CERs issued under the CDM are not providing real, measurable and additional emission reductions.

When considering the Paris Framework, the most important change from the Kyoto architecture is that all countries have made mitigation pledges in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). An important implication is that host countries with ambitious and economy-wide mitigation pledges have **incentives to limit international transfers of credits** to activities with a **high likelihood of delivering additional emission reductions**, so that transferred credits do not compromise the host country’s ability to reach their own mitigation targets. A second important implication is that countries should **only transfer emission reductions where this is consistent with their NDC**, implying that baselines may have to be determined in relation to the host country’s mitigation pledges rather than using a ‘counterfactual’ business as usual scenario as a default.

Taking into account this context and the findings of our analysis, we recommend that the role of crediting in future climate policy should be revisited:

- We recommend potential buyers of CERs to limit any **purchase of CERs** to either **existing projects which risk discontinuing GHG abatement** when the incentive from the CDM ceases, such as landfill gas flaring or to new **projects among** the few project types identified that have a **high likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity**.

- Buyers should **accompany purchase of CERs with support for a transition of host countries to broader and more effective climate policies**. In the short-term, where offsetting is used, it should only be on the basis that purchase of CERs does not undermine the ability of host countries to achieve their mitigation pledges.

- Given the inherent shortcomings of crediting mechanisms, we recommend focusing **climate mitigation efforts** on forms of carbon pricing **that do not rely extensively on credits** and on measures such as results-based climate finance that does not result in the transfer of credits or offsetting the purchasing country’s emissions. International crediting mechanisms should play a limited role after 2020, to address specific emission sources in countries that do not have the capacity to implement alternative climate policies.

- To enhance the environmental integrity of international crediting mechanisms such as the CDM and to make them more attractive to both buyers and host countries with ambitious NDCs, we recommend limiting such mechanisms to **project types** that have a **high likelihood of delivering additional emission reductions**. We also recommend reviewing methodologies systematically to address risks of over-crediting, as identified in this report.

- We also recommend provisions that provide strong incentives to the Parties involved to ensure the integrity of international unit transfers. This includes robust accounting provisions to **avoid double counting** of emission reductions, but could also extend to other elements, such as im-
implementation of ambitious mitigation pledges as a prerequisite to participating in international mechanisms.

With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, implementing more effective climate policies becomes key to bringing down emissions quickly on a pathway consistent with well below 2°C. Our findings suggest that crediting approaches should play a time-limited and niche role focusing on those project types for which additionality can be relatively assured. Crediting should serve as a stepping-stone to other, more effective policies to achieve cost-effective mitigation. Continued support to developing countries will be key. We recommend using new innovative sources of climate finance, such as revenues from auctioning of emission trading scheme allowances, rather than crediting for compliance, to support developing countries in implementing their NDCs.

Summary

Aim of the study

With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which establishes a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development (Article 6.4), it is clear that the role of the CDM as a mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol will end. However, in terms of its standards, procedures and institutional arrangements, the CDM certainly forms an important basis for the elaboration and design of future mechanisms for international carbon markets. One key feature of both the CDM and the mechanism under Article 6.4 is that they should generate real and additional emission reductions. In other words, emission reductions that are credited and transferred should not have occurred in the absence of the mechanism and should not be overestimated. This study analyzes the opportunities and limits of the current CDM framework and the way in which it has evolved over time and been applied to concrete projects. It provides findings on the overall and project-type-specific environmental performance of the CDM in the form of estimates of the likelihood that the CDM results in real and additional emission reductions. In addition, it provides lessons and recommendations for improving additionality assessment that can be applied to future crediting mechanisms.

Methodological approach

The main focus of this study is to assess the extent to which the CDM meets its objective to deliver “real, measurable and additional” emission reductions. In order make well-founded judgements about the overall and project-type-specific likelihood of additionality of CDM projects, we systematically analyze CDM rules and how they have been applied to real projects in practice. We examined the rules for 1) additionality assessment, for 2) the determination of baseline emissions and 3) a number of other issues including the length of crediting period, leakage effects, perverse incentives, double counting, non-permanence, monitoring provisions and third party validation and verification. We approach these aspects from two different perspectives: we evaluate 1) general CDM rules that are particularly relevant for the delivery of real, measurable and additional emission reductions and we evaluate 2) specific project types with a view to assessing how likely these project types deliver additional emission reductions. To assess the impacts of our analysis, we further estimate the potential 2013-2020 CER supply from different project types.

Project-types-specific results

Table 1-1 (p. 13) below provides an overview of the findings on environmental integrity based on the detailed analysis of individual project types. Most energy-related project types (wind, hydro, waste heat recovery, fossil fuel switch and efficient lighting) are unlikely to be additional, irrespectively of whether they involve the increase of renewable energy, efficiency improvements or
fossil fuel switch. An important reason why these projects types are unlikely to be additional is that the revenue from the CDM for these project types is small compared to the investment costs and other cost or revenue streams, even if the CER prices would be much higher than today. Moreover, many projects are economically attractive, partially due to cost savings from project implementation (e.g. fossil fuel switch, waste heat recovery) or domestic support schemes (renewable power generation).

### Table 1-1: How additional is the CDM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDM projects</th>
<th>Potential CER supply 2013 to 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HFC-23 abatement from HCFC-22 production</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>Mt CO₂e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Version &lt;6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Version &gt;5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipic acid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>1,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro power</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>1,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass power</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mine methane</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste heat recovery</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook stoves</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.C, AMS II.J</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0046, AM0113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,826</td>
<td>3,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own calculations

**Industrial gas projects** (HFC-23, adipic acid, nitric acid) can generally be considered **likely to be additional** as long as they are not promoted or mandated through policies. They use end-of-pipe-technology to abate emissions and do not generate significant revenues other than CERs. HFC-23 and adipic acid projects triggered strong criticism because of their relatively low abatement costs, which provided perverse incentives and generated huge profits for plant operators. In the case of HFC-23 and nitric acid projects, perverse incentives have been adequately addressed. With regard to **adipic acid** projects, the risks for **carbon leakage have not yet been addressed**.

**Methane projects** (landfill gas, coal mine methane) also have a **high likelihood of being additional**. This is mainly because carbon revenues have, due to the GWP of methane, a relatively large impact on the profitability of these project types. However, both project types face **issues with regard to baseline emissions and perverse incentives** and may thus lead to over-crediting.

**Biomass power** projects have a **medium likelihood of being additional** since their additiornality very much depends on the local conditions of individual projects. In some cases, biomass power can already be competitive with fossil generation while in other cases domestic support schemes provide incentives for increased use of biomass in electricity generation. However, where these conditions are not prevalent, projects **can be additional**, particularly if CER revenues for **methane avoidance can be claimed**. Biomass projects also face other issues, in particular with regard to demonstrating that the **biomass used is renewable**.
The additionality of efficient lighting projects using small-scale methodologies is highly problematic because there were large PoAs in countries in which the move away from incandescent bulbs was well underway. The new methodologies address these problems but they are not mandatory and the small-scale methodologies are, while the remaining small-scale methodology could still allow for automatic additionality for CFL programmes.

For cook stove projects, CDM revenues are often insufficient to cover the project costs and to make the project economically viable. Particularly in urban areas, the additionality of these project types is questionable. Cook stove projects are also likely to considerably over-estimate the emission reductions due to a number of unrealistic assumptions and default values.

Overall environmental assessment

Based on these considerations, we estimate that 85% of the covered projects and 73% of the potential 2013-2020 CER supply have a low likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity (i.e. ensuring that emission reductions are additional and not over-estimated). Only 2% of the projects and 7% of potential CER supply have a high likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity. The remainder, 13% of the projects and 20% of the potential CER supply, involve a medium likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity (Table 1-1, p. 13).

Compared to earlier assessments of the environmental integrity of the CDM, our analysis suggests that the CDM’s performance as a whole has anything but improved, despite improvements of a number of CDM standards. The main reason for this is a shift in the project portfolio towards projects with more questionable additionality. In 2007, CERs from projects that do not have revenues other than CERs made up about two third of the project portfolio, whereas the 2013-2020 CER supply potential of these project types is only less than a quarter. A second reason is that the CDM Executive Board (EB) has not only improved rules but also made simplifications that undermined the integrity. For example, positive lists have been introduced for many technologies, for some of which the additionality is questionable and some of which are promoted or required by policies and regulations in some regions (e.g. efficient lighting). A third reason is that the CDM EB did not take effective means to exclude project types with more questionable additionality. While positive lists have been introduced, project types with more questionable additionality have not been excluded from the CDM. Standardized baselines provide a further avenue to demonstrating additionality but do not reduce the number of projects wrongly claiming additionality. The improvements to the CDM mainly aimed at simplifying requirements and reducing the number of false negatives but did not address the false positives.

The result of our analysis therefore suggests that the CDM has still fundamental flaws in terms of environmental integrity. It is likely that the large majority of the projects registered and CER issued under the CDM are not providing real, measureable and additional emission reductions. Therefore, the experiences gathered so far with the CDM should be used to improve both the CDM rules for the remaining years and to avoid flaws in the design of new market mechanisms being established under the UNFCCC.

Recommendations for improving general additionality rules

For an additionality test to function effectively, it must be able to assess, with high confidence, whether the CDM was the deciding factor for the project investment. However, additionality tests can never fully avoid wrong conclusions. Information asymmetry between project developers and regulators, combined with the economic incentives for project developers to have their project recognised as additional, are a major challenge. We carefully scrutinised the four main approaches used to determine additionality. Our analysis shows that prior consideration is a necessary and important but not sufficient step for ensuring additionality of CDM projects and that this step largely
works as intended. The subjective nature of the investment analysis limits its ability to assess with high confidence whether a project is additional. Especially for project types in which the financial impact of CERs is relatively small compared to variations in other parameters, such as large power projects, doubts remain as to whether investment analysis can provide a strong ‘signal to noise’ ratio. The barrier analysis has lost importance as a stand-alone approach of demonstrating additionality. Non-monetized barriers remain subjective and are often difficult to verify by the DOEs. In general, the common practice analysis can be considered a more objective approach than the barriers or investment analysis due to the fact that information on the sector as a whole is considered rather than specific information of a project only. However, the way in which common practice is currently assessed needs to be substantially reformed to provide a reasonable means of demonstrating additionality; it is important to reflect that market penetration is not for all project types a good proxy for the likelihood of additionality.

Against this background, we recommend that the common practice analysis is given a more prominent role in additionality determination though only after a significant reform:

- The ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of determining common practice should be replaced by sector- or project-type-specific guidance, particularly with regard to distinguishing between different and similar technologies and with regard to the threshold for market penetration.

- The technological potential of a certain technology should also be taken into account in order to avoid that a project is deemed additional although the technological potential is already largely exploited in the respective country.

- The common practice analysis should at least cover the entire country. However, if the absolute number of activities in the host country does not ensure statistical confidence, the scope needs to be extended to other countries.

- As a default, all CDM projects should be included in the common practice analysis, unless a methodology includes different requirements.

We further recommend that the investment analysis is excluded as an approach for demonstrating additionality for projects types in which the ‘signal to noise’ ratio is insufficient to determine additionality with the required confidence. For those project types in which the investment analysis would still be eligible, the project participant must confirm the all information is true and accurate and that the investment analysis is consistent with the one presented to debt or equity funders. The barrier analysis should be abolished entirely as a separate approach in the determination of additionality at project level (though it may be used for determining additionality of project types). Barriers that can be monetized should be addressed in the investment analysis while all other barriers should be addressed in the context of the reformed common practice analysis.

In addition, we recommend improvements to key general CDM rules:

- **Renewal and length of crediting periods:** At the renewal of the crediting period the validity of the baseline scenario should be assessed for CDM project types for which the baseline is the ‘continuation of the current practice’ or if changes such as retrofits could also be implemented in the baseline scenario at a later stage. Crediting periods of project types or sectors that are highly dynamic or complex should be limited to one single crediting period. Moreover, generally abolishing the renewal of crediting periods while allowing a somewhat longer single crediting period for project types that require a continuous stream of CER revenues to continue operation may be considered.

- **Positive Lists:** The review of validity should also be extended to project types covered by the microscale additionality tool. In addition, positive lists must address the impact of na-
tional policies and measures to support low emission technologies (so-called E- policies). To maintain environmental integrity of the CDM overall, positive lists should be accompanied by negative lists.

- **Standardized baselines**: Once established in a country, their use should be made mandatory and all CDM facilities should be included in the peer group used for the establishment of standardized baselines.

- **Consideration of domestic policies (E+/E-)**: The risk of undermining environmental integrity by over-crediting emission reductions is likely to be larger than the creation of perverse incentives for not establishing E- policies. Therefore, adopted policies and regulations reducing GHG emissions (E-) should be included when setting or reviewing crediting baselines while policies that increase GHG emissions (E+) should be discouraged by being excluded from the crediting baseline where possible.

- **Suppressed demand**: An expert process should be established to balance the risks of over-crediting with the potential increased development benefits. In addition, the application of suppressed demand could be restricted to countries where development needs are highest and the potential for over-crediting is the smallest.

**Recommendations to improve project type specific rules**

**Industrial gas projects**: Adipic acid production is a highly globalised industry and all plants are very similar in structure and technology. Therefore, a global benchmark of 30 kg/t applied to all plants would prevent carbon leakage, considerably reduce rents for plant operators, and allow the methodology to be simplified by eliminating the calculation of the N₂O formation rate. After issues related to perverse incentives have been successfully addressed through ambitious benchmarks, HFC-23 and nitric acid projects would provide for a high degree of environmental integrity. However, industrial gas projects provide for low-cost mitigation options. These emission sources could therefore also be addressed through domestic policies, such as regulations, or by including the emission sources in domestic or regional ETS, and help countries achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. Parties to the Montreal Protocol are also considering regulating HFC emissions. We therefore recommend that HFC-23 projects are not eligible under the CDM.

**Energy-related project types**: We recommend that these project types should, in principle, no longer be eligible under the CDM. However, in least developed countries, some project types, particularly wind and small-scale hydropower plants, may still face considerable technological and/or cost barriers. These project types may thus remain eligible in least developed countries. In cases in which biomass power generation is not competitive with fossil generation technologies, CER revenues can have a significant impact on the profitability of a project, particularly if credits for methane avoidance are claimed as well. We therefore recommend that only biomass power projects avoiding methane emissions remain eligible under the CDM, provided that the corresponding provisions in the applicable methodologies are revised appropriately.

With regard to demand-side energy efficiency project types with distributed sources – cook stoves and efficient lighting – we have identified concerns which question their overall environmental integrity. However, if cook stove methodologies were revised considerably, including more appropriate values for the fraction of non-renewable biomass and if approaches for determining the penetration rate of efficient lighting technologies were made mandatory for all new projects and CPAs while the older methodologies are withdrawn, we recommend that these project types should remain eligible.
Methane projects: Landfill gas and coal mine methane projects are likely to be additional. However, there are concerns in terms of over-crediting, which should be addressed through improvements of the respective methodologies, particularly by introducing region-specific soil oxidations factors and requesting DOEs to verify that landfiling practices are not changed. With regard to landfill gas, we recommend that this project type only be eligible in countries that have policies in place to transition to more sustainable waste management practices.

**Implication for the future use of international carbon markets**

The CDM has provided many benefits. It has brought innovative technologies and financial transfers to developing countries, helped identify untapped mitigation opportunities, contributed to technology transfer, may have facilitated leapfrogging the establishment of extensive fossil energy infrastructures and created knowledge, institutions, and infrastructure that can facilitate further action on climate change. Some projects provided significant sustainable development co-benefits. Despite these benefits, after well over a decade of gathering considerable experience, the enduring limitations of GHG crediting mechanisms are apparent.

Firstly and most notably, the elusiveness of additionality for all but a limited set of project types is very difficult, if not impossible, to address. Information asymmetry between project participants and regulators remains a considerable challenge. This challenge is difficult to address through improvements of rules. Secondly, international crediting mechanisms involve an inherent and unsolvable dilemma: either they might create perverse incentives for policy makers in host countries not to implement policies or regulations to address GHG emissions – since this would reduce the potential for international crediting – or they credit activities that are not additional because they are implemented due to policies or regulations. Thirdly, for many project types, the uncertainty of emission reductions is considerable. Our analysis shows that risks for over-crediting or perverse incentives for project owners to inflate emission reductions have only partially been addressed. It is also highly uncertain for how long projects will reduce emissions, as they might anyhow be implemented at a later stage without incentives from a crediting mechanism – an issue that is not addressed at all under current CDM rules. A further overarching shortcoming of crediting mechanisms is that they do not make all polluters pay but rather they make them subsidize the reduction of emissions. Most of these shortcomings are inherent to using crediting mechanisms, which questions the effectiveness of international crediting mechanisms as a key policy tool for climate mitigation.

The future role of crediting mechanisms should therefore be revisited in the light of the Paris Agreement. Several elements of the CDM could be used when implementing the mechanism established under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement or when implementing (bilateral) crediting mechanisms under Article 6.2. However, the context for using crediting mechanisms has fundamentally changed. The most important change to the Kyoto architecture is that all countries have to submit NDCs that include mitigation pledges or actions. The Paris Agreement therefore requires countries to adjust their reported GHG emissions for international transfers of mitigation outcomes, in order to avoid double counting of emission reductions. This implies that the baseline, and therefore additionality, may be determined in relation to the mitigation pledges rather than using a ‘counterfactual’ scenario as under the CDM, and that countries could only transfer emission reductions that were beyond what they had pledged under their NDC. A second important implication relates to the incentives for host countries to ensure integrity. Host countries with ambitious and economy-wide mitigation pledges would have incentives to ensure that international transfers of credits are limited to activities with a high likelihood of delivering additional emission reductions. However, our analysis showed that only a few project types in the current CDM project portfolio have a high likelihood of providing additional emission reductions, whereas the environmental integrity is questionable and uncertain for most project types. In combination, this suggests that the
future supply of credits may mainly come either from emission sources not covered by mitigation pledges or from countries with weak mitigation pledges. In both cases, host countries would not have incentives to ensure integrity and credits lacking environmental integrity could increase global GHG emissions.

At the same time, demand for international credits is also uncertain. Only a few countries have indicated that they intend to use international credits to achieve their mitigation pledges. An important source of demand could come from the market-based approach pursued under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and possibly from an approach pursued under the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For these demand sources, avoiding double counting with emission reductions under NDCs will be a challenge that is similar to that of avoiding double counting between countries. A number of institutions are exploring the use of crediting mechanisms as a vehicle to disburse results-based climate finance without actually transferring any emission reduction units. This way of using crediting mechanisms could be more attractive to developing countries; they would not need to add exported credits to their reported GHG emissions, as long as the credits are not used by donors towards achieving mitigation pledges. The implications of non-additional credits are also different: they would not directly affect global GHG emissions, but could lead to a less effective use of climate finance. However, donors of climate finance aim to ensure that their funds be used for actions that would not go ahead without their support. Given the considerable shortcomings with the approaches for assessing additionality, we recommend that donors should not rely on current CDM rules in assessing the additionality of projects considered for funding.

Taking into account this context and the findings of our analysis, we recommend that the role of crediting in future climate policy should be revisited:

- We recommend potential buyers of CERs to limit any purchase of CERs to either existing projects that are at risk of stopping GHG abatement or the few project types that have a high likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity. Continued purchase of CERs should be accompanied with a plan and support to host countries to transition to broader and more effective climate policies. We further recommend to pursue the purchase and cancellation of CERs as a form of results-based climate finance rather than using CERs for compliance towards meeting mitigation targets.

- Given the inherent shortcomings of crediting mechanisms, we recommend focusing climate mitigation efforts on forms of carbon pricing that do not rely extensively on credits, and on measures such as results-based climate finance that do not necessarily serve to offset other emissions. International crediting mechanisms should play a limited role after 2020, to address specific emission sources in countries that do not have the capacity to implement broader climate policies.

- To enhance the integrity of international crediting mechanisms such as the CDM and to make them more attractive to both buyers and host countries with ambitious NDCs, we recommend limiting such mechanisms to project types that have a high likelihood of delivering additional emission reductions. We recommend reviewing methodologies systematically to address risks of over-crediting, as identified in this report. We further recommend revisiting the current approaches for additionality, with a view to abandoning subjective approaches and adopting more standardized approaches. We also recommend curtailing the length of the crediting periods with no renewal.

- Given the high integrity risks of crediting mechanisms, we recommend provisions that provide strong incentives to the Parties involved to ensure integrity of international unit transfers. This includes robust accounting provisions to avoid double counting of emission re-
ductions, but could also extend to other elements, such as **ambitious mitigation pledges** as a prerequisite to participating in international mechanisms.

In conclusion, we believe that the CDM has had a very important role to play, in particular in countries that were not yet in a position to implement domestic climate policies. However, our assessment confirms, alongside other evaluations, the strong shortcomings inherent to crediting mechanisms. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, implementing more effective climate policies becomes key to bringing down emissions quickly on a pathway consistent with well below 2°C. Our findings suggest that **crediting approaches** should play a **time-limited and niche-specific role** in which additionality can be relatively assured, and the mechanism can serve as stepping-stone to other, more effective policies to achieve cost-effective mitigation. In doing so, continued support to developing countries will be key. We recommend using new innovative sources of finance, such as revenues from auctioning of ETS allowances, rather than international crediting mechanisms, to support developing countries in implementing their NDCs.
1. Introduction

With almost 7,700 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and almost 300 programmes of activities (PoAs) registered and more than 1.6 billion Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) issued, the CDM has developed into an important component of the global carbon market. However, its role in the future remains uncertain. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which establishes a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development (Article 6.4), it is clear that the role of the CDM as a mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol will end, most likely soon after 2020.

However, in terms of its standards, procedures and institutional arrangements, the CDM forms certainly an important base for the elaboration and design of future mechanisms for international carbon markets. The mechanism established under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement includes several provisions that are similar to the CDM. Parties also decided that the rules, modalities and procedures of the new mechanism should be adopted on the basis of the “experience gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms”. Moreover, experiences gained from the CDM can also be used for the development of domestic baseline and credit policies both in developed and developing countries.

One key feature of both the mechanism under the Paris Agreement (Article 6.4) and domestic baseline and credit policies is that they should generate real and additional emission reductions, in other words: the credited and transferred emission reductions should not have occurred in the absence of the mechanism and or policy. The ability to deliver such a result depends heavily on having a reasonably effective way to assess additionality both for specific project types and on an aggregate basis, and to set a baseline such that the number of credits issued does, in total, not exceed actual reductions.

Demonstrating additionality and setting baselines are the areas in which the most concerns have been raised with the CDM, in particular regarding the investment, barrier and common practice analysis and the assessment of prior consideration. Given its counterfactual nature, asymmetries of information regarding costs, financing, barriers and local project conditions, and signal-to-noise issue, it has been difficult to implement a reliable method for assessing additionality and setting baselines. Other factors that also affect the overall mitigation outcome are the length of the crediting period used, how leakage concerns are dealt with and whether any perverse incentives are addressed, among others.

The difficulties with these traditional approaches have resulted in further refinement and revision of these approaches as well as the introduction of several alternative approaches to setting of baselines and testing additionality. Examples include the use of default values, performance benchmarks or penetration rates and discounting approaches. More fundamental changes include the use of highly standardized baselines and additionality tests at the sectoral level. It remains to be seen whether the methodological difficulties with highly standardized approaches can be solved to make them operational, and whether they will result in a lower likelihood of non-additional credits being issued.

The additionality of CDM projects has been assessed in the past in several general and project-specific studies. Much of the research was conducted before the improvement of rules and the introduction of new approaches, such as standardized baselines. This study aims to assess whether and how these changes have affected the quality of CDM projects, focusing on the project portfolio available in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and taking due account of the improvements implemented over time.
In order to make well-founded judgements about the overall and project-type-specific likelihood of additionality of CDM projects, a systematic assessment is required of the CDM rules and how they have been applied to real projects in practice. A similar exercise should be carried out for the different reforms suggested to the existing rules. This study therefore analyzes the opportunities and limits of the current CDM framework and the way in which it has evolved over time and been applied to concrete projects. It provides robust and quantified conclusions on the overall and project-type-specific environmental performance of the CDM in the form of estimates of the likelihood that the CDM results in real and additional emission reductions.

2. Methodological approach

2.1. General research approach

The main focus of this study is to assess the extent to which the CDM meets its objective stipulated in Article 12.5(c) of the Kyoto Protocol to deliver “real, measurable and additional” emission reductions. Based on the findings, concrete recommendations are made for further reform of the CDM and implications for the future role of the CDM are discussed.

There are two principal challenges to evaluating the ability of the CDM to deliver additional emission reductions: the inherent uncertainty of a counter-factual baseline and the uncertainty and bias associated with project and baseline data. Therefore, any assessment of the extent of non-additional or otherwise under- or over-credited CDM activity can therefore only provide rough and directional estimates. Project design documents (PDDs) and monitoring reports provide substantial data and assumptions. However, these data and assumptions are often limited (they may not cover all relevant activity, especially non-CDM activity) and can involve considerable judgment by parties that have an interest in the outcome (e.g. selecting among alternative projections of future fuel prices) made for the purpose of meeting CDM requirements.

We examine the three main aspects as regards whether the CDM delivers additional emission reductions:

1. **Additionality assessment**: The assessment of additionality refers to the question of whether a project was implemented due to the CDM. Additionality is the most important prerequisite to providing an emissions benefit. If a project would have been implemented in the absence of the CDM incentives, the emission reductions would have occurred anyway. If a Party uses non-additional CERs rather than reducing its own emissions to meet its emission reduction commitments, global GHG emissions would be higher than they would have otherwise been. Because errors in additionally determination affect the validity of an entire project’s CERs, additionality assessment forms the main focus of this study.

2. **Determination of baseline emissions**: A second important aspect is how the baseline emissions are determined. Determining baseline emissions is associated with considerable uncertainty. A crediting baseline that is above the emissions that would most likely occur in the absence of the project can lead to significant over-crediting. Vice versa, ambitious baselines that are below the emissions that would most likely occur in the absence of the project, can result in under-crediting.

3. **Other issues**: A number of other issues are important to deliver additional emission reductions, including:
   - the length of crediting period,
   - criteria for the renewal of the crediting period,
approaches for determining indirect emission effects, such as leakage effects,
the way in which perverse incentives for both project developers and policy makers are
addressed,
the extent to which double counting of emission reductions within the mechanism and
with other mechanisms and pledges is avoided,
whether potential non-permanence of emission reductions is sufficiently addressed,
whether monitoring provisions are appropriate, and
the effectiveness of the regulatory framework for third party validation and verification.

We also touch upon these issues, in particular when they raise concerns with regard to the integrity
of the CDM. They do not, however, form the focus of this study.

In our examination, we approach these aspects from two different perspectives:

- **General CDM rules**: In Chapter 3, we evaluate approaches for determining general CDM
  additionality rules that are particularly relevant for the delivery of real, measurable and addi-
tional emission reductions. This includes an assessment of innovative and potentially more
  objective approaches for setting baselines and determining additionality and an analysis of
  whether and how these approaches could improve the determination of additionality under
  the CDM.

- **Specific project types**: In Chapter 4, we evaluate specific project types with a view to as-
essessing how likely these project types deliver additional emission reductions. A separate
evaluation by project type is important as the likelihood of additional emission reductions
can differ significantly among project types. This evaluation covers the major project types
contributing to a large share of the emission reductions in the CDM portfolio.

Drawing on findings from Chapters 3 and 4, we provide an overall assessment of the additionality
of the CDM project portfolio in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we provide a summary of key recommend-
dations for further reform of the CDM. Finally, we discuss the implications for the future use of the
CDM in Chapter 7.

The study employs several analytical methodologies and approaches:

- **Literature analysis** forms the basis for our evaluation of general CDM rules, specific pro-
  ject types, and innovative approaches towards baseline setting and additionality assess-
  ment.

- **Qualitative assessment of relevant CDM rules** with a view to their ability for ensuring ad-
  ditional emission reductions. We identify potential shortcomings in the current rules and
  propose options for addressing them.

- **Empirical, quantitative evaluation of how the CDM rules are applied** through analysis
  of a representative random sample of projects. The analysis will be based on information in
  PDDs and validation reports and, where necessary, also monitoring and verification reports.
The projects will be identified through stratified random sampling, aiming to ensure repre-
sentativeness of host countries and project types. This empirical analysis aims to identify
possible shortcomings in the application of general CDM rules. The information and data to
be evaluated is specific for each of the identified general CDM rules and the questions
identified. The methodological approach of the empirical evaluation is further specified in
Section 2.2 below.

- **Economic assessment** of the feasibility of different project types is another important
  building block of the study. The economic assessment is conducted for the evaluation of
specific project types in Chapter 4. The methodological approach of the empirical evaluation is further specified in Section 2.3 below.

- **Sectoral analysis** of the market situation for specific project types to assess whether the technology has often already been implemented without the CDM and whether an observed market uptake occurs due to the CDM. The sectoral analysis is conducted for the evaluation of specific project types in Chapter 4. The methodological approaches are further specified in the corresponding sections.

We use the CDM rules and the CDM project portfolio as of 1 January 2014 as the basis for the assessment.

To assess the impacts of our analysis, we further estimate the potential 2013-2020 CER supply for different project types. The method used to estimate the potential CER volume is described in Section 2.3.

### 2.2. Empirical evaluation of CDM projects

The assessment of key CDM rules for additionality demonstration in Chapter 3 is based on an in-depth evaluation of PDDs, validation reports, etc. of randomly selected CDM projects. The project samples were randomly drawn from the so-called CDM project pipeline as of 1 January 2014 (UNEP DTU 2014). This pipeline is a compilation of certain information and data provided in the project design document (PDD) of each CDM project. For this assessment, only registered CDM projects were taken into account as the PDDs usually undergo significant changes during the validation period. To ensure representativeness, the samples were stratified by the following characteristics and strata:

- **Location (host country/region)**
  - China
  - India
  - Asia & Pacific
  - Brazil
  - Latin America
  - Rest of the World
- **Technology**
  - Industry (HFC-23, N₂O, cement, energy efficiency, energy distribution, etc.)
  - Electricity generation from hydro
  - Electricity generation from wind
  - Electricity generation from renewable energy (solar, tidal, etc.)
  - Other renewable energy (biomass, geothermal, mixed renewable energy, etc.)
  - Waste sector (landfill gas, methane avoidance, etc.)
  - Other (afforestation, reforestation, agriculture, transport, etc.)
- **Scale**
  - Large-scale projects
  - Small-scale projects
- **Time (registration year)**
  - Pre 2010
  - In 2010 or 2011
  - Post 2011.

The in-depth assessment of project samples was conducted for the key additionality determination rules: investment analysis (Section 3.2), barrier analysis (Section 3.3) and common practice analy-
sis (Section 3.3). For each of these rules a separate sample of 30 randomly selected CDM projects was drawn.

Since the CDM project pipeline did not include information about which option of additionality determination was applied in the PDD, we had to conduct a two-step sampling: In the first step, we drew a representative sample of 300 projects. For each of the projects of this sample we identified which additionality determination rules were applied so that we could use this sample as population for the second sampling step in which we drew the samples for each of the additionality determination rules.\(^1\)

2.3. Estimation of the potential CER supply

We estimate the potential CER supply\(^2\) for the purpose of assessing the overall integrity of the CDM based on our findings for specific project types or specific additionality tests. The potential CER supply is estimated mainly on the basis of the CDM pipeline as of 1 January 2014 (UNEP DTU 2014). Moreover, we included additional information from a similar pipeline which is provided by IGES (2014). All CDM projects which were registered by 1 January 2014 are taken into account (7,418). In the case of industrial gas projects (HFC-23, adipic acid, nitric acid), some baseline and monitoring methodologies were significantly revised, which has a major impact on the potential CER supply in the second and third crediting periods. For these projects, we use specific bottom-up estimates derived from project-specific information (Schneider & Cames 2014).

We distinguish the CER supply potential considering the duration of the commitment periods under the Kyoto Protocol:

- from credit start to the end of 2012,
- from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2020 and
- from the beginning of 2021 to the end of the crediting periods (CP).

Our study is focused on the period of 2013 to 2020.

Figures for the period from credit start to the end of 2012 reflect the actual CER issuance rather than the potential supply (UNFCCC 2015a). For the latter two periods, we take into account the issuance success rate provided in the CDM pipeline and adjust the expected CER supply accordingly. For some projects, more CERs were issued than projected while for most of the CDM projects less CERs were issued. Several projects had not issued any CERs (4,913). For those projects we assume either the average issuance rate for the respective project type or – if no CERs have been issued for that project type so far – the overall average of the issuance success rate. Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the potential CER supply.

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\(^1\) A more detailed description of the sampling approach, the code used for drawing the samples and the reference numbers of the projects drawn into each of the samples can be found in Section 8.1 of the Annex.

\(^2\) The actual CER supply depends on various conditions of the global carbon market and particularly on price expectations. However, also under normal market conditions, price forecasts are very uncertain. Under post-2012 market conditions, prices are even more uncertain. We therefore only estimate the potential CER supply which is derived from information in PDDs and other project specific or general documents but ignore any interaction with the global carbon market. At price levels of less than $1/CER, the estimated volumes will not be achieved in practice.
How additional is the CDM?

The average adjustment factor is -22% though it ranges from -4% for N₂O projects to some -67% for transport projects. The adjusted CER supply for the period of 2013 to 2020 amounts to almost 5.7 billion CERs, almost 4 times the volume issued for the first crediting period.

Figure 2-2 illustrates where the potential CER supply stems from. Obviously China was and will remain the largest potential supplier of CERs. Almost two thirds (64.5%) of the potential CER supply in 2013 to 2020 are expected to be provided by Chinese CDM projects. In terms of project types, the large majority of supply stems from industry (32.0%), hydro (29.4%) and wind (24.6%) projects. Not surprisingly, the large majority (91.3%) of CERs stems from large scale projects while the breakdown in terms of registration period is more even: 31.8% stems from projects registered before 2010, 26.3% from projects registered in 2010 and 2011 while 41.8% of the potential CER supply in the period of 2013 to 2020 can be generated from CDM projects registered after 2011.
In Chapter 4 we analyze the extent to which the likelihood of projects and CERs being additional depends on the project type. We look at 12 different project types, which together cover a broad range of activities and technologies. In terms of CER supply, these 12 project types amount to 85% of the potential supply in the period of 2013 to 2020 (Table 2-1). The largest supply potential is provided by hydro and wind power projects (29.4% and 24.6%, respectively). Industrial gas projects amount to almost 15% of the supply potential while biomass power, landfill gas, waste heat recovery and fossil fuel switch projects could each generate some 3-4% of the supply potential. Compared to these projects types the supply potential of cook stoves (0.04%) and efficient lighting (0.07%) are almost negligible. However, since these project types are often included in government purchase programs or voluntary offset schemes and since their share among projects registered after 2012 is significant, we consider it worthwhile to examine these two project types in greater depth and to assess their likelihood of being additional and of generating additional CERs.
Table 2-1: Potential CER supply by project type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Type</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>2013 to 2020</th>
<th>2021 to end of CP</th>
<th>Total Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFC-23 abatement from HCFC-22 production</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipic acid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro power</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>2,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>1,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass power</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mine methane</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste heat recovery</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook stoves</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not covered</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,418</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>5,671</td>
<td>6,596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNEP DTU 2014, IGES 2014, UNFCCC 2015a, Schneider & Cames 2014, authors’ own calculations

The first Programme of Activities (PoA) was registered in July 2009. From then until the end of 2013, 243 PoAs were registered in total, the large majority of them in 2012 (193). While cook stoves and efficient lighting account for only a small share in the CDM project pipeline, they are quite relevant in the context of PoAs. By the end of 2013, they account together for a quarter of the registered PoAs. Table 2-2 provides a breakdown of the potential CER supply from PoAs by project types.

Table 2-2: Potential CER supply from PoAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Type</th>
<th>No. of programs</th>
<th>2013 to 2020</th>
<th>2021 to end of CP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hydro power</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mine methane</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook stoves</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not covered</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNEP DTU 2014, UNFCCC 2015b, authors’ own calculations

The main difference of PoAs compared to projects bundles is that PoAs can – once registered – be extended over time by an unlimited number of so-called component project activities (CPA). An estimate of the CER supply potential is thus less reliable than the estimate for the project pipeline.
However, taking into account all CPAs included in PoAs by the end of 2013, the potential CER supply can roughly be estimated, though it is obvious that the actual supply could be much higher. PoA volumes are much more difficult to estimate, because a PoA might be registered with only one CPA that has 1,000 tCO₂ per year emissions reductions but which may ultimately include CPAs that reduce hundreds of thousands of tCO₂ per year.

Noting these limitations, all PoAs could supply some 0.16 billion CERs in total in the period of 2013 to 2020. The final volume of these PoAs could be many times this amount. Almost a third (31.4%) of this supply would be provided by cook stove or efficient lighting PoAs. CERs from renewable power generation programmes amount to 14% of the supply potential of PoAs. Interestingly, almost half of the PoAs do not fall into the project type categories which together account for 85% of the potential CER supply from CDM projects. This supports the hypothesis that PoAs address project categories or technologies that cannot be adequately addressed by individual CDM projects.

2.4. Economic assessment of CER impact

The demonstration of additionality has been a key issue in the CDM since the beginning of the Kyoto mechanisms (Chapter 3). While most researchers agree that there is no simple and objective approach to determining additionality, several authors argue that the impact of CER revenues on the economic feasibility of projects is an important indicator for the likelihood for projects to be additional (for example Sutter 2003, Schneider 2007, Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012). This builds on the assumption that project proponents are more likely to implement a project due to the CDM if CER revenues have a significant impact on the economic performance of the project. While other benefits from the CDM (e.g. the public relation aspect of registering a project under the UNFCCC) may in some cases help projects to go ahead that would not be implemented in the absence of the CDM, the economic benefit of CER revenues may be considered the main driver to implement CDM projects on a larger scale.

A high economic benefit resulting from CER revenues does not guarantee additionality, because some projects may already be economically viable without CER revenues and may only become more profitable with the CDM. However, low CER revenues are an indicator of a lower likelihood that the project is additional, because with low CER revenues it also becomes more likely that the project would be implemented in the absence of the CDM.

In 2005, the CDM Executive Board (EB) decided that, in order to be additional, projects have to demonstrate that they are economically unattractive; however, they are not required to demonstrate that with CER revenues they would become economically viable. Schneider (2007) highlighted that this leads to the situation in which projects with very low CER revenues can prove additionality even though the CER revenues contribute only marginally to closing the profitability gap.

It is difficult to define a minimum required level of contribution from CER revenues that is needed to trigger an investment decision. An important concept in this context is the signal-to-noise ratio issue for investment analysis, as mentioned by, for example, Spalding-Fecher et al. (2012): The generally high variability and uncertainty of key parameters that determine the profitability of a mitigation project is often considerably higher than the expected economic benefit of CERs. If the economic impact of the CERs is lower than key uncertainties in the investment analysis, it is rather unlikely that the registration under the CER was the conclusive trigger for the investment and, hence, it is likely that the project is non-additional.
**Table 2-3: Impact of CER revenues on the profitability of different project types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Projects with available IRR information</th>
<th>Average IRR without CER revenues</th>
<th>Average IRR with CER revenues</th>
<th>Average IRR difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biomass energy</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal bed/mine methane</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE own generation</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE supply side</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methane avoidance</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind</td>
<td>UNEP-DTU</td>
<td>2,162</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IGES</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** UNEP-DTU 2014, IGES 2014, authors’ own calculations
Information on the impact of CER revenues on economic profitability is available from different sources. Table 2-3 and Figure 2-3 show the impact based on data included in project design documents and as documented in the databases by UNEP DTU (2014) and IGES (2014). In addition, Lütken (2012) has analyzed the annual CER revenues in relation to the capital investment and observed for some project types a (very) limited impact stemming from CER revenues. Spalding-Fecher et al. (2012) analyze the impact of CER revenues on the project IRR for different project types in the IGES database. They conclude that the CER impact on the project IRR is the lowest for renewables including hydro and wind (increase of IRR by 2-3%), fuel switch (4%), and supply-side efficiency (5%). They also provide an overview of more studies analysing the impact of CER revenues for different project types. The relatively low impact of CER revenues compared to other cash flows that are relevant for investment decisions is shown for energy efficiency projects below (Box 2-1).

Overall, the available information shows that the impact of CER revenues on the economic performance of projects varies considerably between project types:

- **Non-CO₂ projects**, such as industrial gas abatement, manure management, waste water treatment, landfill gas utilisation and coal mine methane capture, are characterised by a medium to high impact of CER revenues. For several of these project types, CER revenues increase the IRR by more than 10 percentage points, and for coal mine methane projects even by more than 25 percentage points. For these project types, the CER revenues clearly make a difference, which indicates a higher likelihood of additionality.
How additional is the CDM?

- CO₂ projects in renewable energy such as wind and hydro projects are characterised by a relatively low impact of CER revenues: for wind power, the IRR increases by about 2.5% to 3%, for hydropower by about 3% to 4%, and for solar by about 1% to 1.5%. According to Lütken (2012), the annual CER revenues in relation to investment costs (median) amounted to 1.84% for wind and 3.5% for hydro. Given the typical uncertainties surrounding costs and load factor in renewable projects, this level of CER contributions seems relatively low to justify that the project would not have been implemented in the absence of the CDM. Therefore, in many cases, the additionality of projects within these types may seem rather unlikely (though in some cases it may not be ruled out that additional CER revenues of +3.5% may be the decisive factor rendering a project attractive – though it may not be possible to prove this in an objective way). In addition, many renewable energy projects – in particular hydropower – show a relatively high economic performance without CER revenues (e.g. an IRR of nearly 8% for hydropower without CER revenues), compared to non-CO₂ projects (e.g. landfill gas, coal mine methane and methane avoidance with an IRR of about 2% to 4% without CER revenues).

- CO₂ projects in fuel switch, energy efficiency, and waste heat utilisation are typically characterised by relatively low investment costs. Thus, CER revenues are higher compared to investment costs (5% for waste heat and 20% for fuel switch – median value). The impact of CER revenues on the internal rate of return is about 3 to 8 percentage points. However, in this project type, fuel prices are the decisive element determining its profitability. Box 2-1 compares the impact of typical fuel costs and CER revenues for energy efficiency projects. Our analysis indicates that CER revenues tend to have a low impact on project profitability. In addition, these project types show a relatively good economic performance without CER revenues, compared to non-CO₂ projects.

Lütken’s analysis was based on a CER price of €12. Our analysis in Table 2-3 and Spalding-Fetcher’s build on PDD data with similar CER price assumptions. With today’s much lower CER prices, the low impact of CER revenues on CO₂ projects and therefore their high risk of non-additionality is further aggravated.

In conclusion, non-CO₂ projects are characterised by a medium-to-high impact of CER revenues and a relatively low economic performance without CER revenues, while for most CO₂ project types the impact of CER revenues is much smaller and the performance without CER revenues higher. Overall, this indicates that on average non-CO₂ projects have a higher likelihood of additionality.
Box 2-1: An analysis of the impact of CER revenues for energy efficiency projects

Another way of assessing the relevance of CER revenues in investment decisions is to compare them to other important revenues or savings in the investment analysis. For instance, for energy efficiency projects to become profitable, they have to (i) save sufficient costs for fossil fuels and (ii) earn sufficient CERs to pay back the investment costs for new equipment improving the energy efficiency. Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-4 illustrate the order of magnitude of fuel cost savings in relation to one tonne of CO\textsubscript{2} reduced or CERs generated in the case of projects saving natural gas, light fuel oil and steam coal. For instance, if an installation implements new equipment that reduces the specific consumption of natural gas and the related GHG emissions by one tonne of CO\textsubscript{2}, then the related reduction in fuel costs in 2010 would amount to approx. 150 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} (at OECD average prices in 2010). For light fuel oil, the fuel cost reduction amounts to over 250 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} and for steam coal, the savings still amount to 37 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} (in 2010). With this, it becomes obvious that the impact of fuel cost savings on the project cash flow is much higher than contribution from CER revenues.

Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-4 also show the development of average (and min. and max.) OECD prices over time, which illustrates the high variability of energy prices since 1996. Average specific energy prices have fluctuated in the order of 20 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} (steam coal) to 200 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} (light fuel oil). Also compared to the historic fuel price variability, typical CER revenues are low to negligible compared to fuel cost savings.

Please note that because of limitations in data availability, the figures are based on fuel prices in OECD countries, which in many cases also include taxes and may not be representative for all developing countries. In particular, in some developed and developing countries fossil fuel subsidies are very high. In these cases, because of the low prices, the fuel cost savings are low and may be on a similarly low level as the contribution from CER revenues to the positive project cash flow. However, in such a low price situation, the total positive cash flow may in any case be far too small to justify investments in energy efficiency equipment and the scope for CDM may become rather limited.

Overall, it may be argued that for projects to have a high likelihood of additionality the impact of CER revenues should at least be comparable to the main contributor to a positive cash flow, the related fuel savings. This would indicate that in such project types CER prices for energy efficiency projects would need to reach a level of at least 10-20 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} for steam coal, 30-50 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} for natural gas and 100-200 USD/tCO\textsubscript{2} for light fuel oil based systems (if prices on the level of OECD countries are assumed). With such CER prices, the economic contribution from CER revenues to positive cash flow reaches a level that may be considered significant (i.e. in the order of ¼ to ½ of fuel cost savings).

At prices significantly below this level, the economic impact of CERs is insignificant and the risk of non-additionality is very high.
**Figure 2-4:** Natural gas cost savings per tonne of CO₂ reduced in energy efficiency projects

![Natural gas cost savings graph](image)

**Notes:** Average fuel prices of OECD countries (in USD/TJ).
**Sources:** IEA 2015, IPCC 2006, authors’ own calculations

**Figure 2-5:** Light fuel oil cost savings per tonne of CO₂ reduced in energy efficiency projects

![Light fuel oil cost savings graph](image)

**Notes:** Average fuel prices of OECD countries (in USD/TJ).
**Sources:** IEA 2015, IPCC 2006, authors’ own calculations
3. Assessment of approaches for determining additionality and rules relevant towards additionality

3.1. Prior consideration

3.1.1. Overview

Prior consideration is a key requirement in the CDM. It aims to ensure that only projects are registered in which the CDM was seriously considered when the decision to proceed with the investment was made.

In the first version of the additionality tool prepared in 2004\textsuperscript{3}, a provision was introduced for projects with a crediting period starting prior to registration, which stipulated that evidence has to be provided “that the incentive from the CDM was seriously considered in the decision to proceed with the project activity” and that the “evidence shall be based on (preferably official, legal and/or other corporate) documentation that was available to third parties at, or prior to, the start of the project activity.” The provision remained almost unchanged in the second version of the additionality tool in 2005.

In the third version of the additionality tool in 2007, the provision was removed and then included in the Guidelines for completing the PDD, which are applicable to all projects and not only those applying the additionality tool. These guidelines stipulated that “project proponents shall provide an implementation timeline of the proposed CDM project activity” and that “the timeline should include, where applicable, the date when the investment decision was made, the date when construction

\textsuperscript{3} EB 16, Annex 1: Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality.
works started, the date when commissioning started and the date of start-up (e.g. the date when commercial production started). Also, according to the guidelines, “project participants shall provide a timeline of events and actions, which have been taken to achieve CDM registration, with description of the evidence used to support these actions.”

In 2008, the CDM EB introduced general guidance on the demonstration and assessment of prior consideration. The guidance was subsequently revised twice, including further guidance for DOEs on how to validate real and continuing actions; in 2011 it was incorporated in the project standard (PS). According to the latest version of the project standard, “if the start date of a proposed CDM project activity ... is prior to the date of publication of the PDD for the global stakeholder consultation, project participants shall demonstrate that the CDM benefits were considered necessary in the decision to undertake the project as a proposed CDM project activity”. More specifically, project participants of project activities with a starting date on or after 2 August 2008 “shall inform the host Party’s designated national authority (DNA) and the secretariat of their intention to seek CDM status in accordance with the Project cycle procedure”, while “for a proposed CDM project activity with a start date before 2 August 2008 and prior to the date of publication of the PDD for global stakeholder consultation, project participants shall demonstrate that the CDM was seriously considered in the decision to implement the proposed project activity”. For this purpose, “project participants shall provide evidence of their awareness of the CDM prior to the start date of the proposed project activity, and that the benefits of the CDM were a decisive factor in the decision to proceed with the project”, “provide evidence that continuing and real actions were taken to secure CDM status for the proposed project activity in parallel with its implementation” and “provide an implementation timeline of the proposed CDM project activity. The timeline should include, where applicable, the date when the investment decision was made, the date when construction works started, the date when commissioning started and the date of start-up (e.g. the date when commercial production started). Project participants shall provide a timeline of events and actions, which have been taken to achieve CDM registration, with description of the evidence used to support these actions”.

The CDM project cycle procedure includes details about the notification process related to prior consideration (i.e. forms to be used, etc.). According to this procedure, for project activities with a start date on or after 2 August 2008, notification to the DNA of the host country and to the Secretariat must be made “within 180 days of the start date of the project activity”. A list of notifications received by the Secretariat is available on the UNFCCC website.

The requirements for demonstrating prior consideration set out in the project standard are generally applicable with the exception of programmes of activities (PoAs).

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5 EB 41, Annex 46: Guidance on the Demonstration and Assessment of Prior Consideration of the CDM.
7 EB 49, Annex 5.
8 CDM project standard, Version 07.0, EB 79, Annex 3.
9 Relevant evidence could, for instance, relate to “minutes and/or notes related to the consideration of the decision by the EB of Directors, or equivalent, of the project participants, to undertake the project as a CDM project activity”.
10 Relevant evidences “should include one or more of the following: contracts with consultants for CDM / PDD / methodology / standardized baseline services; draft versions of PDDs and underlying documents such as letters of authorization, and if available, letters of intent; emission reduction purchase agreement (ERPA) term sheets, ERPAs, or other documentation related to the sale of the potential CERs (including correspondence with multilateral financial institutions or carbon funds); evidence of agreements or negotiations with a DOE for validation services; submission of a new methodology or standardized baseline, or requests for clarification or revision of existing methodologies or standardized baselines to the EB; publication in a newspaper; interviews with DNA; earlier correspondence on the project with the DNA or the secretariat”.
11 https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/PriorCDM/notifications/index.html.
12 Current version 07.0, EB 65, Annex 32.
With regard to PoAs, the project cycle procedure includes the non-binding provision that “the coordinating/managing entity may notify to the DNA(s) of the host Party(ies) of the PoA and the secretariat in writing of the intention to seek the CDM status for the PoA, using the [corresponding form] for the purpose of determining the start date of the PoA”. According to the CDM project standard, the start date of a PoA is either “the date of notification of the intention to seek the CDM status by the coordinating/managing entity to the secretariat and the DNA” or “the date of publication of the PoA-DD for global stakeholder consultation”. With regard to CPAs, “the start date of a CPA is the earliest date at which either the implementation or construction or real action of the CPA begins” and it shall be confirmed that “the start date of any proposed CPA is on or after the start date of the PoA”. The only exception to this rule relates to afforestation and reforestation (A/R) PoAs, which allows “the inclusion of any A/R project activity that started after 1 January 2000 but has not been registered as a CDM project activity as a CPA in an A/R PoA”.

3.1.2. Assessment

The issue of projects obtaining registration as CDM projects without serious consideration of the CDM benefits at the time of the investment decision was especially a concern during the first years of the CDM. The requirement to demonstrate prior consideration was only gradually introduced over time and became generally applicable only in 2007. Also, as pointed out by Schneider (2007), the requirement was also not always followed: only 36% of the projects seeking retroactive crediting provided evidence that the CDM was considered in the decision to proceed with the project and it is reported that relevant documentation has been backdated. It can, therefore, be concluded that for early CDM projects, the demonstration of prior consideration was questionable.

The approach applied as of August 2008 (i.e. for the bulk of projects and generated CERs) requires notification of the prior consideration of the CDM as well as, in situations of delay, evidence of continued interest in the CDM using a form designed for this purpose. This requirement addresses the issue of prior consideration in a more objective and appropriate manner, avoiding the risk of back-dating of company-internal information or subjective claims of prior consideration. In this regard, the rules have improved over time and there is no evident flaw in the current rules and therefore no need for the current practice to be changed.

However, it should be noted that the notification of prior consideration ensures that projects cannot claim CDM registration retroactively, but does not demonstrate whether or not a project is additional. In this regard, this rule does not provide any information on the additionality of projects since both truly additional projects and free riders may apply for the CDM status. This rule is therefore important to exclude projects which did not consider the CDM at all and are therefore clearly not additional, but it is not sufficient for assessing whether a project can be considered additional or not.

With regard to the practical implementation, a period of 180 days for notification of prior consideration can be considered quite generous. While a certain grace period is certainly reasonable due to the administrative process of making the PDDs available for global stakeholder consultation, a period of six months could mean that the project is already quite advanced, which would then call into question whether CDM benefits were actually necessary for the project to proceed. A long grace period could therefore be regarded as allowing retroactive crediting.

The requirements regarding the start date of PoAs and CPAs are sufficiently strict to avoid any project activity that has already started being registered as CPAs under a PoA. The only rule that cannot be considered adequate relates to the inclusion of old A/R activities in a newly registered

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13 Clarification “Start date and crediting period of component project activities under an afforestation and reforestation programme of activities”, EB 73, Annex 16.
A/R PoA (see above). For these A/R activities, CDM rules do not require demonstrating prior consideration of the CDM.

3.1.3. Summary of findings

There is no evident flaw in the general design of this rule with the exception of the inclusion of old A/R activities in a newly registered A/R PoA. Also, as outlined above, the time frame for notification of prior consideration appears to be quite generous.

3.1.4. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

The only rule that needs to be changed relates to the inclusion of old A/R activities in a newly registered A/R PoA (see above). It is therefore recommended that the corresponding rule be withdrawn.

Furthermore, it is recommended that the time frame for notification of prior consideration be shortened in order to reduce the risk that projects apply for the CDM having only learned of the possibility after the project has started. The grace period for notification to the secretariat should therefore be reduced in general, e.g. to a maximum of 30 days after the project start.

3.2. Investment analysis

3.2.1. Overview

The CDM’s additionality tool requires demonstration that a prospective project is either not financially viable without the CDM (using investment analysis) or that there is at least one barrier preventing the proposed project without the CDM (using barrier analysis). Though both methods are common (and some projects use both), investment analysis is the most widely used, by over three-quarters of all projects and over 90% of the renewable energy (especially hydro and wind) projects that are expected to dominate future CER supplies (Spalding-Fecher & Michaelowa 2013). Investment analysis (or a variation of it) is also used in the combined tool and in some CDM baseline and monitoring methodologies that refer neither to the additionality tool nor to the combined tool for demonstrating additionality.

The additionality tool provides three alternative options for conducting investment analysis:

- For projects with costs but no revenues (other than CERs), a simple cost analysis can be used to demonstrate that at least one scenario (other than the project) is less costly. This approach is quite common for a few project types (e.g. projects that capture N₂O from adipic acid plants, or methane from landfills), but it is not common overall.

- The investment comparison analysis compares the economic attractiveness of the project without revenues from CERs to other investment alternatives that provide similar outputs or services; this approach is common for just a few project types (e.g. higher-efficiency fossil power), and is not common overall.

- The benchmark analysis is used to demonstrate that a proposed project is, without revenues from CERs, economically not attractive (i.e. it does not meet a stated financial benchmark); this approach is, by far, the most common form of investment analysis.

In all cases, investment analysis relies on the premise that, if a project is not a better investment (or less costly) than an alternative or a financial benchmark, then it would not have proceeded but for the existence of the CDM. Exactly how the CDM causes it to proceed, whether through CER revenue or otherwise, does not need to be specified.
The approach to investment analysis has also been refined over time. In particular, in 2008 the CDM EB adopted “Guidelines on the assessment of investment analysis”, which aimed to provide further clarity and reduce ambiguity by, for example, clarifying how to calculate the common financial benchmarks net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) and suggested ranges for conducting sensitivity analysis in these parameters. In 2011, this guidance was further revised to introduce default values for the expected return on equity for different project types and host countries, which can (but are not required to) be used by project developers as benchmarks for the benchmark analysis.

3.2.2. Assessment

The expected financial performance of a project is clearly one important factor in determining whether or not it will proceed (see further discussion of this in Section 2.3). For example, unless mandated by an (enforced) government policy, there is little reason for projects with no revenue (other than CER values) to proceed, simplifying the assessment of additionality.

For projects that do collect revenue other than CER values, such as by selling electricity, the CDM rules seek to determine whether the project would not have been financially attractive (and therefore not have proceeded) without the CDM. Researchers have raised several critiques of this approach, which we address in this report under two broad themes.

The first is perhaps the most fundamental, and is whether investment analysis is appropriate for investments that may be driven largely by other (non-economic) factors. This critique asserts that many investments in common CDM activities – e.g. power generation – are undertaken for a host of political, social, and strategic reasons that extend beyond simple project-level economics and may not be designed to maximise economic return. Such critics argue that a market-based test such as investment analysis is not applicable in what is largely a non-market environment, perhaps especially so in centrally planned countries such as China (He & Morse 2010). For example, Bogner & Schneider (2011) and Haya & Parekh (2011) have argued that governments have already subsidized and developed large hydroelectricity projects in developing countries well before the CDM, making them financially viable and therefore raising questions about the extent to which investment analysis can credibly determine that they would not proceed but for the incentive provided by the CDM. For investment analysis to function properly – indeed, for any addi- tionality test to function properly – it must be able to demonstrate, with high confidence, that the CDM was the deciding factor for the project investment. For project types that are routinely constructed outside the CDM, including (but not exclusively) for broader economic, energy security, or political reasons, it remains highly difficult to determine with confidence that, in any particular case, a project’s financial returns are the reason it is not proceeding and that the financial incentive provided by the CDM is the reason for it proceeding (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2014).

Table 4-5 provides an example of how the decision of selecting a certain fuel (coal, fuel oil or natural gas) may depend on many factors that are not are only insufficiently covered in an investment analysis, such as level of initial investment or flexibility in operation that may lead, for example, in investment in a natural–gas-fired boiler rather than a coal–based one, even though natural gas may be more costly than coal in terms of direct costs.

The second critique is concerned with transparency, subjectivity, and information asymmetry, such as whether project developers provide sufficient and credible information to allow replication of their calculations and justification of their conclusions, as well as the inherent information asymmetry between project developers and those, especially the CDM EB, tasked with reviewing the information. For example, early research found that project developers regularly provided investment analyzes that were opaque, relied on proprietary company information, or were incomplete (Schneider 2009).
This analysis takes a new look at several aspects of this second critique, including:

- Transparency, by revisiting the prior work of Schneider (2009) to gauge how transparently developers conduct the investment analysis.

- Subjectivity and asymmetry, with a new exploration of benchmark rates and CER prices.

These two broad topics are addressed in turn below.

**Transparency**

To explore transparency in investment analyzes, Figure 3-1 updates the analysis of Schneider (2009) who reviewed a randomly selected group of PDDs for the level of information provided. In our updated analysis, 29 registered projects using the investment analysis were selected at random.\(^{14}\) Over 90% of the projects selected were registered after 2007, the year of Schneider’s prior analysis, so this sample can indicate how practices have changed. In particular, over 80% of the 29 projects in this new analysis provided detailed input data to support their calculations of capital and operating costs and revenues, compared to 2007, when fewer than half did. Furthermore, no projects provided only the result of their calculation in this analysis, with no input data to support their findings. These findings suggest that investment analysis has become more transparent.

**Figure 3-1: Level of information provided in PDDs on the investment analysis**

![Graph showing level of information provided in PDDs](image)

Sources: Schneider (2009), authors’ own calculations

Validation reports that review the investment analyzes also appear to have become more thorough. Figure 3-2 also returns to Schneider’s prior analysis to update it based on the same randomly selected group of projects as in Figure 3-1. As seen in Figure 3-2, more than 80% of the validation reports confirm that validators checked some or all of the key assumptions of the investment analyzes. The validation reports often review each of several of the most critical investment analy-

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\(^{14}\) According to the sampling design, 30 projects using investment analysis were to be selected. Upon further examination, one of the thirty projects selected, a small-scale, run-of-river hydropower plant, had demonstrated additionality using other methods, as outlined in the “Guidelines for Demonstration Additionality of microscale project activities” and so was not considered in this analysis.
sis inputs and describe that the inputs are reasonable, in many cases citing contract or other documents reviewed to support the choice of inputs.

**Figure 3-2: Information in validation reports on the investment analysis**

![Diagram showing information in validation reports](image)

Sources: Schneider (2009), authors’ own calculations

**Subjectivity and information asymmetry**

Despite the findings above, transparency and validator review of the input parameters do not remove subjectivity or choice of alternate input parameters in different contexts. For example, in some cases, project proponents have used different values for key input parameters when submitting applications to financial institutions (Haya 2009), suggesting that the metrics used (and choice of inputs therein) and reliability of such may vary. Indeed, project developers will always have much more information on the project’s local conditions – including costs and technical parameters – than will outside parties, whether validators or CDM administrators, and therefore have an incentive to provide biased or inaccurate information to increase the chance of a successful additionality determination and, therefore, the eventual awarding of credits to their project (Gillenwater 2011). This phenomenon is widely referred to as ‘information asymmetry’. As shown above, validators do have more information at their disposal now than in the past, but still lack an objective basis for determining that the investment would not have been undertaken and that inputs provided are the same as they would have been had CDM credits not been sought. Small changes in a number of input parameters – even if individually well within the range of other similar projects (CDM or not), could lead to significant changes in the overall stated financial return of the project. Interestingly, under the CDM, project participants do not need to provide any confirmation that they are submitting truthful information. Some project developers reported that different versions of investment analysis were used for CDM purposes and for the purpose of securing other funding for a project (e.g. loans). Other crediting mechanisms, such as the VCS and CAR, require declaration or attestations from project developers that all information is accurate and presents the truth. To explore further the issue of subjectivity and information asymmetry in input parameters, we take a deeper look at two particular inputs: benchmark rates and CER prices.
How additional is the CDM?

Closer examination of benchmark rates

This critique concerns appropriate levels for financial benchmarks (e.g., IRR) (Michaelowa 2009). To explore this question, we reviewed data on IRR benchmarks used by wind, hydro, biomass, and waste gas or heat projects in China, wind and hydro projects in India, and hydropower projects in Vietnam.15

Nearly all projects in China use standard, government-issued IRR benchmarks. By far the most common benchmark used is 8%, which is applied for most power projects, and derives from a 2002/2003 Chinese government source, *Interim Rules on Economic Assessment of Electric Engineering Retrofit Projects*. Other common benchmarks based on government rules include 10% for small hydro projects, and 12-13% for waste gas/heat projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Common IRR benchmark</th>
<th>Fraction of projects using this benchmark</th>
<th>Source of this benchmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>Government’s <em>Economic Evaluation Code for Small Hydropower Projects</em> (1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>Government’s <em>Economical Assessment and Parameters for Construction Project, 3rd edition</em> (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Conch Cement Company internal WACC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In this table, and throughout this section, we report IRR benchmarks and values based on analysis of IGES’s investment analysis database. We believe that most of the benchmarks, and values reported in the database, are in real terms, based on a review of a small number of PDDs and the assumption in the CDM’s Guidelines on the Assessment of Investment Analysis that is conducted in real terms. We make no attempt to identify or convert values in the database that may be in nominal terms.

Sources: IGES 2014, authors’ own calculations

Despite the ubiquity of the 8% government-set threshold in China, it is not clear how or why it matches the internal thresholds used by actual project inventors, who may themselves demand returns either higher or lower. (For example, benchmarks for wind power projects in India, where they are determined to a greater extent by investor hurdle rates, are more variable and, on average, higher). For this reason, it is not clear why 8% is the ‘correct’ benchmark for a test intended to gauge the attractiveness of an investment. Furthermore, it is not clear why common benchmarks used for hydro or waste gas are higher (10% or at least 12%, respectively), and whether these

15 These project type / country combinations were selected because each of them represents at least 1% of the registered projects in the CDM that use investment analysis (IGES 2012). Though this 1% threshold is arbitrary, it provided us with a basis for focusing the analysis.
rates accurately capture the risk and expected financial returns in these types of projects. Further analysis of this issue may be warranted, e.g. by comparing it with other sources of equity rates for different investments in China or for similar projects in other countries. A source of such data for projects within China was not immediately known, however.

In principal, the logic of investment analysis is that the project would not have proceeded but for the financial incentive provided by the CDM. That financial incentive is the value of CERs. Many project developers conduct an analysis to show that, at assumed CER prices, the financial return of the project is expected to clear the financial benchmark used. However, this is not actually required by the additionality tool. (In the first versions of additionality, a step 5 'impact of the CDM' was included, which was interpreted by many project developers as an obligation to show that the project is made economically attractive through the CDM. This was later removed).

The above discussion investigated benchmarks used in China, with special attention paid to the widely used 8% benchmark. Because of its ubiquity, this 8% benchmark provides an opportunity to investigate the extent to which CER values indeed bring about expected project returns above this value and therefore, in the logic of the investment analysis, enable the project to proceed. As stated above, though projects are not required to actually show that CER values would push the project above its stated threshold, most do report results of expected return.

The following chart (Figure 3-3) shows the stated IRRs before and after CERs for all wind projects in China that use a benchmark of 8%. As seen in the figure, most of these projects state an IRR without CERs of between 6% and 7%, and an IRR after CER value of 8% to 10%. Note in particular the sharp line at 8%, at which very few projects claim an after-CER IRR of just under 8%, but a large number of projects find a post-CER IRR of just barely more than 8%. 
In principle, one explanation for this distribution is that projects in which the 8% threshold is not reached with CER revenues are not implemented, do not apply for CDM registration, and are therefore not represented in this graph. The fact that so many projects just barely meet the 8% threshold (even though they are not required to do so), and so few do not meet it, may instead indicate, however, that project developers are eager to claim that the CER value has allowed the project to clear the benchmark rate.

In contrast to the situation in China where standard government benchmarks are provided, most projects in India use internal, company-specific required rates of return as their IRR benchmarks. However, as in China, the CER value tends to provide a similar increase in expected return (e.g., an increase in IRR of two to three percentage points), just clearing the stated benchmark.

To demonstrate that projects just clear the benchmarks, project developers could select project input parameters so that the benchmark is achieved. These parameters could include CER price, load factor, electricity tariff, or a number of other inputs required in calculating an IRR.
One such parameter that could be adjusted is the expected CER price, which rose consistently through mid-2008, then fell precipitously, and for which forecasts have varied widely since, providing a potentially broad scope for selecting possible future CER prices.

**Closer examination of selection of the CER price**

To explore the potential effect of the CER price in more detail, Figure 3-4 adjusts the post-CER values stated in the PDDs (as displayed in Figure 3-3) to use a common CER value of €10 for all projects. (€10 is the median value used across all registered projects.) In this example, a large number of projects no longer meet the 8% benchmark. In particular, about 70 projects with pre-CER IRRs of 4% to 6% used CER prices as high as €17 in order to claim they would meet the 8% benchmark. Though this represents just a small share (about 1%) of wind power projects in China, it strongly suggests that input parameters (CER values) have been chosen to achieve the desired result of the 8% government-set IRR benchmark.

**Figure 3-4: Estimated IRRs of Chinese wind projects using a benchmark of 8% before and after CER value of €10**

![Graph showing IRRs](image)

Sources: IGES 2014, authors’ own calculations

Similar to the situation for Chinese wind power projects discussed above, a number of Indian wind projects that claimed that CER values (median price assumed: €14) would lead them to exceed their benchmark would not have been able to claim that their benchmarks are met if they had used...
a lower, and more common, CER price of €10. This suggests that, as found in the case of wind power projects in China, project developers in some instances may select CER values that depart from values used by their peers in order to claim that CDM revenues will make the projects financially attractive.

A similar pattern emerges for hydropower projects in Vietnam, where benchmarks (averaging 13.1%) were derived either as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) or a stated commercial lending rate. Of the projects analyzed\(^\text{16}\), over half of the hydro projects would not have met their benchmarks if they had used a CER price of €10 instead of higher prices (median price assumed: €15.5, and as high as €30, in contrast to the remainder of Vietnamese hydro projects with median price assumed of €10). As above, while this is not definitive evidence of gaming, it suggests that project developers tend to invoke higher CER prices than their peers when needed to claim that their projects become economically viable under the CDM.

This raises the question of the plausibility of CER prices used by project developers. Looking at all registered projects (Figure 3-5), it appears that the CER prices used by project developers, though highly variable, tended to track then-current primary CER prices, through 2010, when CER prices began a steady decline. Project developers did not then use lower prices, but neither did industry analysts, who forecasted that higher prices would return.

These trends therefore display little evidence that project developers have systematically over- or under-estimated expected CER prices, at least as judged by the median (black line) values. However, the distribution of prices around that median displays a skew wherein a small fraction of projects use very high prices, perhaps because, as shown above, such high prices may be needed to demonstrate that these projects have met benchmarks.

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\(^{16}\) In Vietnam, the median IRR benchmark used by projects in Vietnam was 13.1%, and most benchmarks were derived either as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) or a stated commercial lending rate. The default expected return on equity for power projects in Vietnam, per the CDM's Guidelines on the Assessment of Investment Analysis, is 12.75%; 60% of power projects in Vietnam use an IRR benchmark higher than this rate; 5% have an IRR without a CER value exceeding this.

\(^{17}\) From the IGES investment analysis database, all hydro projects in Vietnam were selected that reported CER price assumptions in € as well as pre- and post-CER IRR values.
How additional is the CDM?

Figure 3-5: CER prices – assumed and estimated

Notes: CER prices assumed by project developers (grey dots) have been relatively consistent with industry forecasts made at the time (blue lines), even though they have been higher than market prices (orange line) since 2008.
Sources: IGES 2014, Point Carbon 2011, Point Carbon 2012

Sensitivity analysis: can it help address subjectivity?

The CDM addresses the subjectivity of input parameters, in part, through the use of sensitivity analysis required in investment analysis. As specified in the *Guidelines on the assessment of investment analysis*, “variables…that constitute more than 20% of either total project costs or total project revenues should be subjected to reasonable variation … and the results of this variation should be presented.” However, the guidelines do not require that parameters be varied simultaneously, and few project developers do so. For example, in calculating project IRRs (in the PDDs), no project developer of the 30 randomly selected projects assessed the possibility that more than one of the key input variables could vary simultaneously. Furthermore, nearly all claim that even the standard variations of as much as 10% in the individual parameters are implausible, despite evidence (as presented here) that variation in the input values used is quite common. Accordingly, because the possibility that individual parameters could vary widely is discounted, and the possibility that multiple inputs could vary is not considered, the sensitivity analysis as currently applied is not sufficient to address the subjectivity in these parameters.

3.2.3. Summary of findings

Investment analysis is designed to determine whether a project would be uneconomical or less attractive than an alternative in the absence of the CDM. The premise is that if the project is not economical (most often as compared to a particular investment threshold), it would not have proceeded. From a strictly financial perspective, this may well be the case. However, researchers have pointed out that several types of projects in the CDM – especially large power projects that dominate the CDM pipeline – are pursued for reasons that extend beyond simple financial return, particularly in the largely non-market regulatory environments that are found in some of the largest CDM countries. This may be the most fundamental critique of investment analysis, and yet it is also the most analytically challenging to prove or disprove. Projects may proceed for a variety of
factors – economic, strategic, and social – that defy attempts to attribute the viability, or failure, to any one factor. Complicated statistical tests have been proposed – and some statistical research has been attempted – but few compelling approaches have yet emerged.

This research has further explored the issues of information asymmetry, transparency, and subjectivity of input assumptions. Regarding information asymmetry, project developers have considerably more information about their own project than do those – likely including validators – that are charged with reviewing and assessing their additionality. Regarding transparency, this research finds that, since 2007, the transparency of both project design documents and validator assessments has increased markedly, such that the strong majority of projects now include detailed information on input assumptions that their investment analysis could be replicated.

In some cases, there is little reason to question the validity of these input assumptions, as they are based on contract documents (e.g. with equipment providers that would seem to reflect actual prices paid). In other cases, the input assumptions are highly subjective, as in estimates of future fuel prices (e.g. for biomass), electricity tariffs that may be adjusted, or CER prices. In particular, this research has identified dozens of cases in China, India, and Vietnam in which it appears that project developers have used CER prices higher (in some cases, much higher) than their peers in order to claim that the CDM would make their project exceed the chosen financial benchmark. This demonstrates how eager some project developers may be to select input values to give results that would give the appearance of additionality.

3.2.4. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

As stated above, for an additionality test to function properly, it must be able to demonstrate with high confidence that the CDM was the deciding factor in project implementation. This analysis has demonstrated that the subjective nature of the investment analysis limits its ability to provide that confidence. It is possible that improvements could decrease this subjectivity, such as by applying more complicated tests to assess the true motivations and financial performance of the project. Still, doubts may remain, especially for project types for which the financial impact of CERs is insufficiently large relative to variations in other potential inputs to provide a strong ‘signal-to-noise’ ratio, such as for large power projects. CDM administrators may therefore want to consider whether certain project types, if they cannot be confidently deemed additional by other tests (e.g. barrier analysis, common practice analysis, as in the next sections of this report), might be phased out of the CDM. If the investment analysis continues to be applied, we recommend further improving the guidance to reduce subjectivity. CDM rules could also require formal declarations by the project participants that information is true and accurate. Such declarations may discourage project participants from providing false information, as a violation of such a declaration may have consequences under national legislation. An even stronger form could be a declaration in lieu of an oath.

3.3. First of its kind and common practice analysis

3.3.1. Overview

The CDM uses two approaches to assess additionality based on the market penetration of technologies: the first-of-its-kind approach and the common practice analysis. Under the first-of-its-kind approach, a project is deemed automatically additional if certain conditions apply. The common practice analysis often complements the investment or barrier analysis. It requires an assessment of the extent to which the proposed project type (e.g. technology or practice) has already diffused in the relevant sector and region. It is a credibility check to demonstrate that a project is not common practice in the region or country in which it is implemented. The common practice analysis can also be used to demonstrate that the baseline technology or practice is frequently implemented and is hence a realistic scenario. The common practice analysis is only relevant for large-scale
projects. Small-scale projects are entitled to use simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale CDM project activities, which do not require common practice analysis.

The first-of-its-kind approach was initially applied as part of the barrier analysis; it was sometimes also referred to as the barrier of lack of ‘prevailing practice’. In 2011, the EB adopted guidelines specifying how first-of-its-kind should be demonstrated. The guidelines were further revised in 2012 and reclassified as a tool in 2015.18 Showing that a project is the first-of-its-kind is the first step in the additionality tool and combined tool, which stipulate that if a project is the first-of-its-kind, it is considered additional. The steps to be followed for demonstrating first-of-its-kind are further specified in the corresponding guidelines and, since 2015, the methodological tool. According to version 03.0 of the tool, a project activity is “first of its kind in the applicable geographical area” if

- “the project is the first in the applicable geographical area that applies a technology that is different from technologies that are implemented by any other project” with the same output and that “have started commercial operation in the applicable geographical area before” the PDD “is published for global stakeholder consultation or before the start date of the proposed project activity, whichever is earlier”, if

- “the project implements one or more of the measures” and

- “the project participants selected a crediting period for the project activity that is “a maximum of 10 years with no option of renewal”.

The common practice test was first introduced in the additionality tool in 2004 to complement the investment and barrier analyzes, as a safeguard to ensure the environmental integrity of the CDM. In a first step, other previous or current projects which are similar to the project activity were analyzed. Projects were considered similar “if they are in the same country/region and/or rely on a broadly similar technology, are of a similar scale, and take place in a comparable environment with respect to regulatory framework, investment climate, access to technology, access to financing, etc.” Other CDM projects were excluded from this analysis. In case similar activities were identified, it was necessary to justify why these exist, while the project activity is considered to be financially unattractive or as facing barriers. ‘Essential distinctions’ had to be identified which may for instance be due to the fact that new barriers have arisen or promotional policies have ended.

For both the first-of-its-kind approach and the common practice analysis, the key issues are defining what is regarded as a comparable technology, what the appropriate geographical scale is and what threshold should be used for a technology to be regarded as first-of-its-kind or common practice. Critics pointed out that no clear definitions of when a project activity should be regarded as common practice were given in the early versions of the additionality tool (Schneider 2009). Another criticism was that the common practice test allows project developers to claim that a frequently implemented project type is not deemed common practice if they can justify ‘essential distinctions’ from other projects. Yet the key terms ‘similar’ and ‘essentially distinct’ were defined so vaguely that any project could be argued to be not common practice, simply by defining ‘similar’ very narrowly or ‘distinct’ very broadly (Schneider 2009; Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012).

The requirements for the common practice analysis in the additionality tool remained largely unchanged until September 2011 when the “Guidelines on Common Practice” were introduced, incorporating elements from the additionality tool and providing additional guidance19. In parallel to the revision of the “Guidelines on first-of-its-kind”, the “Guidelines on Common Practice” were further revised in 2012 and reclassified as a tool in 2015.

18 Methodological tool. Additionality of first-of-its-kind project activities (version 03.0).
19 The new requirements of the Guidelines on Common Practice were then also incorporated in the additionality tool in the same year.
Both guidelines or tools are applicable to four GHG reduction activities, namely, “fuel and feedstock switch, switch of technology with or without change of energy source (including energy efficiency improvement), methane destruction” and “methane formation avoidance”. Both also use similar approaches for defining similar or different technologies and the appropriate geographical area.

In the 2011 version of the common practice guidelines, the first step was to calculate the applicable output range as +/-50% of the capacity of the project activity. In the next step, all existing plants in the geographical area within this capacity range needed to be identified (with the exception of registered CDM projects). The default applicable geographical area was the entire host country. If the technology was not country-specific, the geographical area should be extended to other countries. If projects differ significantly between locations, the geographical area could also be smaller than the host country. In the next step, among the identified projects, those with different technologies from the project activity were identified. A technology was considered different if it has a different energy source/fuel, feedstock, installation size (micro, small, large), investment climate at the time of the investment decision or other features. Eventually, if the share of plants using similar technology as in the project activity in all plants with the same capacity as the project activity is greater than 20% and if the absolute number of projects using a similar technology is larger than three, then the project activity is considered common practice.

In revising the Guidelines on Common Practice in September 2012, the rules and definitions were further clarified. It is now mandatory to provide a justification for using a geographical area smaller than the entire host country (e.g. province, region). The reference to extending the geographical area was removed from the guidelines. The exclusion of CDM activities was broadened to include registered projects, those requesting registration and those at validation. Furthermore, several definitions and the step-wise approach were better explained (without change in substance). Minor changes to the common practice analysis were made in subsequent versions of the additionality tool.

The definition of different technologies in the first-of-its-kind approach corresponds to the common practice analysis, with the exception that investment climate at the time of the investment decision and other features are not included.

3.3.2. Assessment

The general strength of using market penetration approaches for assessing additionality is that they do not assess the motivation or intent of project developers, but provide a more objective approach to evaluating additionality, based on the extent to which the project activity is already being implemented in the host country or region (Schneider 2009).

The initial criticism of the lack of clear definitions of similar projects and essential distinctions for common practice was addressed by the introduction and further refinement of the common practice guidelines, which clearly outline steps to follow and provide a definition of terms for a common understanding between project developers. Especially, the introduction of a threshold for common practice (20% and at least three similar projects) constitutes a significant improvement since it requires a quantitative assessment against a clear threshold. Clarity about the rules related to common practice analysis has therefore improved considerably over time. Also, from the sampled projects, it can be concluded that the introduction of the common practice guidelines has generally led to more detailed and better structured PDDs.

20 For other types of GHG reduction activities, the more general rules of the additionality tool continue to apply.

21 “Inter alia, access to technology, subsidies or other financial flows, promotional policies, legal regulations.”

22 Such as a difference in unit cost of output by at least 20%.
However, several unresolved issues still exist. In the following, different aspects of the common practice analysis and the first-of-its-kind approach are discussed and assessed. The assessment is based on an analysis of the common practice provisions and on the findings of an empirical evaluation of 30 representatively selected projects (i.e. the review of PDDs and validation reports) (Section 2.2).  

When defining similar projects in the common practice tool, the applicable output range is defined as “+/-50% of the design output or capacity of the proposed project activity”. This definition does not always reflect the scales of a technology, between which meaningful technological differences occur. For instance, in the case of a power plant with a size of 400 MW, power plants between 200 MW and 600 MW would need to be considered in the analysis. However, there may be smaller (e.g. 100 MW) or larger (e.g. 800 MW) power plants which still feature similar technical, economic characteristics (e.g. efficiency), a similar regulatory environment, or which are used in a similar manner (e.g. provision of electricity to the public grid). At the same time, a small power plant (e.g. 5 MW), may be significantly different in terms of technology or use. Also, when several plants are grouped to form a project (e.g. wind farm consisting of several wind generators), an output of +/-50% may be misleading. For instance, for a wind farm with 20 wind generators of 1 MW capacity, the output range would be 10 to 30 MW. However, a smaller wind farm with only 10 wind generators of 1 MW capacity has similar characteristics since the wind generator is identical. For wind power, the test may provide more meaningful results if there was no scale at all since wind parks are usually composed of different wind generators of the same size. However, small internal combustion engines may well differ, from a technological perspective, from a large combined cycle power plant. In conclusion, the definition in the common practice guidelines (+/-50%) does not allow for a meaningful classification of scale for different technology types. This definition can therefore be considered arbitrary and may lead to the erroneous exclusion of similar plants from the analysis. In contrast to the common practice tool, the first-of-its-kind tool does not use an output range to define similar technologies. This approach seems more appropriate.

When identifying similar projects, the common practice tool excludes CDM projects (registered, submitted for registration or undergoing validation) from the analysis. In the empirical analysis, of the 30 sampled projects, only three identified similar non-CDM projects. All other projects only identified projects under the CDM. A commonly used rationale (i.e. used by 9 of the 30 projects) is that, because all other comparable facilities are either CDM projects or are awaiting registration as CDM projects, the proposed project would also be non-viable without the CDM (i.e. not common practice). However, it could be argued that the general viability of projects is assessed as part of the barriers and/or investment analyzes and should therefore not be used as a pre-emptive argument for excluding CDM projects from the common practice analysis. The exclusion of CDM projects from the common practice analysis is particularly problematic if most or all new facilities in a sector use the CDM. For example, if all new wind power plants in a country register under the CDM, wind power could never become common practice, even if it reached a market share of more than 50% and was highly economically attractive. In contrast to the common practice tool, the first-of-its-kind tool does not have provisions to exclude CDM projects, which suggests that all existing projects, including CDM projects, are considered.

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23 Of the 30 projects sampled for the evaluation of the common practice analysis, the majority stem from China (20 projects), followed by India (3), Egypt (2), Pakistan (2), Brazil (1), Nicaragua (1) and Israel (1). Ten projects were registered before 2010, eight in the 2010-2011 period and twelve after 2011. Technology types in the sample are wind power (17 projects), hydropower (5), industrial projects such as coal mine methane utilisation or waste heat recovery (3), waste projects such as landfill gas capture (4) and other renewable energies such as biomass (1). Most projects (28 of 30) are classified as large-scale. Although the sampled two small-scale projects are not required to conduct a common practice analysis, some information on common practice was given in the corresponding PDDs.
The common practice tool and the first-of-its-kind tool use the same definition of the geographical area, which should be the entire host country, unless justification can be provided for a smaller geographical area. In the common practice analysis sample, 24 of 30 projects limited the applicable geographical area to a specific area smaller than the host country (such as province, region, state, municipality, etc.). All sampled wind projects from China (11) and from India (3) selected an area smaller than the host country as the applicable geographical area. The most commonly used justification in the corresponding PDDs for limiting the geographical area is that investment conditions, especially in terms of electricity tariffs, available resources and labour costs, differ from province to province, making provincial/state level comparison necessary.

At first sight, this appears to be plausible since China and India are large countries with regions/states being important players in infrastructure development. Notwithstanding this, the size of the country and the political structure may not be sufficient to justify the choice of the regional/state level. In China, a nationwide feed-in tariff for wind power generation was introduced in 2009, establishing four different tariff categories, ranging from 0.51 CNY/kWh (0.08 USD/kWh) to 0.61 CNY/kWh (0.10 USD/kWh), depending on the region’s wind resources (International Renewable Energy Agency 2012). For projects in India, the Electricity Act of 2003 and the resulting new tariff regulations were cited as the cause of different investment climates in various states. In fact, for wind power, the tariff varies based on local wind resources. Four bands of wind power density in W/m² determine the level of the feed-in tariff (International Energy Agency 2012). This means that the feed-in tariff may differ even between project locations in the same province if these feature different wind conditions. Therefore, the fact that there are different feed-in tariffs between provinces alone does not explain fundamentally different investment conditions in the different regions, as claimed in many PDDs, but rather only accounts for locally different wind resources, while the general support scheme is national. Based on these considerations, the rationale used by many projects for limiting the geographical area to a level below the entire country seems questionable. It can also be problematic to consider only the host country as the geographical area. If no or only a very few plants providing the same service exist in the host country, market penetration approaches do not give reasonable results. For example, the first aluminium plant in a country would always automatically be deemed additional, even if it used a technology that is clearly business-as-usual.

While the introduction of the common practice guidelines aimed to address the criticism of a vague definition of what constitutes ‘different’ technologies, several concerns remain. The possibility of defining a technology “as being different if there is a difference with regard to energy source/fuel, feed stock, installation size (micro, small, large), investment climate at the time of the investment decision (including, “inter alia, access to technology, subsidies or other financial flows, promotional policies, legal regulations”) or other features (such as difference in unit cost of output by at least 20%)” still allows for significant possibilities to claim that rather similar projects are very different. This allows for the project to be defined rather narrowly and other plants very broadly, so that the threshold of 20% is not reached. With regard to the installation size, the same issue as for the output range (above) applies. Also, the criterion ‘energy source/fuel’ may be misleading. For instance, if a country has been using light fuel oil as a basis for its power plants, a switch to natural gas constitutes a different fuel, but does not explain a significant difference since the same generation technology can be used for both fuels. The same holds true for different solid fuels. Finally, ‘other features’ is a very broad term allowing for arbitrary interpretations. For example, a difference in unit cost of output does not constitute a plausible difference per se. For instance, higher unit costs

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24 Also all other Chinese (non-wind) projects included in the sample use a sub-national geographical area with a similar rationale as that for wind projects.

25 A differentiation of the feed-in tariff depending on local wind resources is common practice in other countries as well.

26 Two sampled hydro projects used this rationale.
may be required for technical or other reasons and may be compensated for by higher yields. Also, according to this interpretation, a proposed CDM project with lower unit costs would be considered different from projects already implemented without CDM, even though it is more profitable than other projects. Although in some cases, ‘differences’ may be well justified (e.g. by explaining that the investment climate was significantly different due to a change from a state-controlled to a more private investment-oriented power market), overall, the review of arguments presented in the sampled PDDs indicate that the term ‘different’ allows for significant room for interpretation.

The threshold of 20% market diffusion in the common practice tool cannot be considered robust if applied to all technologies and sectors. The stringency of the 20% is highly dependent on the number of technologies in a sector. In a sector with only two technologies, both available technologies could easily exceed the threshold, whereas none of the technologies may ever reach the 20% threshold in sectors with many different technologies. For instance, in a country with several fuels and technologies available for power generation (e.g. natural gas, coal, wind, hydro, biomass, PV), a low market diffusion may still constitute common practice due to the abundance of options and due to the (potentially) limited potential of some technologies. For instance, hydro electricity generation may constitute only 5% of overall electricity generation. Nevertheless, hydropower could still be considered common practice due to the fact that hydro resources are limited and most of the resources have already been exploited. In contrast, in a sector in which there are only a few technologies (e.g. for a certain industrial process) a market diffusion of 20% may constitute a reasonable value for determining common practice. Also, even though a technology may not be considered common practice considering all existing plants in a sector (i.e. considering the market saturation), it may be common practice considering the recent trend (i.e. considering the market share in a certain year). For instance, electricity generation from wind may constitute only a small share of the overall electricity generation in a country (e.g. 1%). However, capacity additions in recent years may constitute a significant share of overall new capacity built. In the former case, wind power would not be considered common practice, whereas in the latter, trend-oriented, perspective wind power would constitute common practice. This issue is especially relevant in the case of long-lived capital stock such as in the power sector (Kartha et al. 2005). Similarly, the provision that at least three plants with a similar technology must have been constructed to consider a project common practice may not be appropriate in all situations. For example, if only four plants exist in a country and three use the same technology, thus constituting a market share of 75%, the construction of a fifth plant with the same technology would still not be regarded as common practice. In conclusion, a one-fits-all value as threshold for market diffusion cannot be considered appropriate.

With regard to the quality of evidence used for the demonstration that a project is not common practice, almost all PDDs provided anecdotal evidence to support their claims. Commonly made statements are that there is no evidence to suggest that a similar project has been, is being or will be implemented in this area and that all other projects use CDM financing as well. To support these claims, publicly available external documents such as energy statistics were used in the majority of projects (20 of 30 projects). Yet, these public documents do not provide information about different investment climates in terms of labour costs, available resources and feed-in tariffs.

As regards the validation of common practice, in 21 of 30 sampled projects, the DOE reviewed documents such as the World Bank website or energy statistics. Other means of validation were conducting interviews with stakeholders such as personnel with knowledge of the project design and implementation, local residents and officials. However, the DOEs did not evaluate claims

27 E.g. higher units costs may be required for certain equipment for small hydro in a mountainous area, which may be compensated for by higher yields due to a higher head of water.
28 See Kartha/Lazarus/LeFranc (2005) for a definition of market saturation vs. market share.
29 There is no further information available in the PDDs on the content of the interviews with the stakeholders.
How additional is the CDM?

made in the PDDs about different investment climates. In nine cases, the DOE in its validation report just repeated the claims made by the PDD.

3.3.3. Summary of findings

Overall, clarity about the rules related to first-of-its-kind and common practice analysis have improved considerably over time. In addition, from the sampled projects it can be concluded that the introduction of the common practice guidelines has generally led to more detailed and better structured PDDs. However, several flaws remain:

- The definition of the output range in the common practice tool is arbitrary and not linked to actual differences in scale of technologies or use.
- The exclusion of CDM projects from the analysis is questionable in a market situation in which most projects are implemented as CDM projects and significant technological changes and cost reductions occur.
- The rationale for limiting the geographical area to a level below the entire country is questionable. In some instances, limiting the geographical area to the host country can be problematic.
- The definition of a project as ‘different’ in the current common practice guidelines is still too vague and corresponding rules still leave significant room for interpretation.
- The share of 20% market diffusion and absolute number of three similar projects, across all sectors, cannot be considered robust since the appropriateness of these values depends on the number of available technologies in the sector. Additionally, the result of the common practice analysis is highly sensitive to whether all plants of a sector are considered or whether the recent trend (new plants built) is considered. This is especially relevant for sectors with long-lived capital stock.
- Generally, evidence used for the common practice analysis was not adequate in the sampled projects since relevant information for the determination of common practice (e.g. on different investment climates, available resources or feed-in tariffs) was not provided in the PDDs. Also, the validation by DOEs was not adequate in the sampled projects since claims on investment climates were not evaluated and since in several cases the DOE only repeated the claims made by the project participants.

3.3.4. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

In general, the first-of-its-kind approach and the common practice analysis can be considered more objective approaches than the barrier or investment analysis due to the fact that information on the sector as a whole is taken into account rather than specific information of a project only. It reduces the information asymmetry inherent in the investment and barrier analysis. In this regard, expanding the use of market penetration approaches could be a reasonable approach to assessing additionality more objectively. However, the presented analysis shows that the way in which first-of-its-kind and common practice are currently assessed needs to be reformed in order to provide a reasonable means of demonstrating additionality. In the following, several recommendations are made for the reform of the current rules.

We identified several issues with the approach of using the same generic approach in the context of rather different sectors or project types. We therefore recommend abandoning this ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and introducing specific approaches for specific project types, which adequately reflect the circumstances of the sector, in particular with regard to the definition of what is considered
a different technology and the threshold used to define common practice. A practical means of implementing this is including specific guidance in each methodology.

- Due to the inherently vague concept of ‘different’ technologies, it is recommended that the common practice rules are revised in such a way that methodologies or overarching guidance provide clearer guidance on how to support the claim of a ‘different’ technology including the evidence required (including evidence to demonstrate credible differences in the investment climate). Corresponding provisions in the VVS should also be amended in such a way to provide more specific guidance on how DOEs should assess the claim of ‘essential distinctions’ for different projects types. With regard to the above-mentioned arbitrary definition of the applicable output range, it is recommended that the common practice guidelines are revised in such a way to provide general guidance on how meaningful differences according to scale can be identified for different technologies. More specific guidance on how to define a range of capacity/output should then be defined in the corresponding methodology. In the absence of any definition of capacity/output range in the methodologies, the whole spectrum of plants or activities (from very small to very large) should be covered by the analysis.

- With regard to the exclusion of CDM projects from the common practice analysis, the rules should be amended in such a way that all CDM projects are to be included in the analysis as a general rule, unless specified otherwise by the methodology. Methodologies could specify that CDM projects are excluded to a certain extent and then gradually introduce them in the analysis. This is especially relevant if all projects of a certain technology use the CDM. As Schneider (2009) points out “other CDM projects could be included in the common practice analysis after a certain period or after a specific number of CDM projects have been implemented”. Another criterion for inclusion of CDM could be their market penetration. (International Rivers 2011) suggest that “after 3 years of full operation, a CDM project should be included in the common practice analysis”. Furthermore, a “list of project types that are not eligible for the CDM because they are common practice” (ibid.) (negative list) could also be helpful in this regard.

- Due to our finding that the selection of an area below the host country level as the applicable geographical area is a questionable assumption, it is recommended that the rules be revised to define the appropriate geographical area in the context of the specific circumstances, such as the number of projects or installations in the host country. A level below the host country level should not be used.

- The threshold for common practice should be defined depending on the type of technology and sector. Corresponding guidance should be provided in the methodologies. In sectors with long-lived capital stock (e.g. power sector), the common practice analysis could consider two different perspectives: a) common practice in the sector (e.g. power sector) as a whole (market saturation) and b) common practice in more recent investments (market share) (i.e. similar to the operating and build margin approach for projects displacing electricity). If common practice is established according to at least one of these perspectives, the project should be considered common practice. Since data availability for determining market diffusion may not be sufficient in each country and in order to ensure consistency in determining market diffusion, efforts (e.g. multilateral) for collecting this data and for providing this information to project developers could be helpful. Several global datasets already exist (e.g. UNEP DTU 2014, statistics by the World Bank, sectoral statistics, Platts database on power plants or cement statistics by Cembureau), which could be used to estimate market diffusion in different countries in a consistent manner. An extensive discussion of
the usefulness of market penetration for establishing common practice for certain projects types is included in (Karthä et al. 2005).

Due to the fact that several DOEs repeated the claims made by the project participants without documenting the way in which they actually assessed the appropriateness of the claims, we recommend strengthening efforts to ensure that all DOEs effectively comply with the reporting requirements related to the common practice analysis outlined in the VVS. For this purpose, no change in rules has to be applied, but the accreditation system may need to be strengthened to ensure compliance of all DOEs with applicable CDM requirements.

Another option for improving the analysis of common practice is to consider the overall potential available in a country. For instance, a small share of hydro in overall electricity generation may, on the one hand, be due to barriers, risks or economic unfeasibility of hydro construction (hydro electricity generation would therefore not be common practice). On the other hand, the small share of electricity generation from hydro may be due to the very limited hydro potential in the country. Most of the (small) potential may already have been exploited. Any additional hydro capacity could then be considered common practice since it has been exploited before. However, this approach would bring about the problem of defining ways to establish the potential (e.g. technical vs. economic potential, etc.), and the practicalities and transaction costs of evaluating this for many different technologies.

Furthermore, the common practice analysis could “be the first step in the additionality tool rather than the last” (International Rivers 2011). This way, instead of using often vague arguments for establishing common practice after the investment analysis, project developers would need to discuss common practice explicitly at the beginning of the analysis.

3.4. Barrier analysis

3.4.1. Overview

Historically, barrier analysis has been used as an important alternative or complement to the investment analysis analyzed above in Section 3.2. The barrier analysis is used to demonstrate that a project faces barriers that impede the project’s implementation in the absence of the incentives from the CDM. It is applicable to both small- and large-scale CDM projects:

Small-scale projects

According to Attachment A to Appendix B to Annex II of 4/CMP.1 the following barriers may be considered for small-scale projects:

- **Investment barrier**: a financially more viable alternative to the project activity would have led to higher emissions; this includes “the application of investment comparison analysis using a relevant financial indicator, application of a benchmark analysis or a simple cost analysis”.\(^{30}\) In essence, this barrier allows an investment analysis to be conducted, as described in Section 3.2, but without providing any guidance on how the investment analysis should be conducted. In practice, however, it appears that guidance for investment analysis for large-scale projects (e.g. justification of benchmark IRR or sensitivity analysis) is, in most cases, also applied to small-scale projects.

- **Access-to-finance barrier**: the project activity could not access appropriate capital without consideration of the CDM revenues;

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\(^{30}\) See “Non-binding best practice examples to demonstrate additionality for small-scale projects” (EB 35, Annex 34).
• **Technological barrier:** a less technologically advanced alternative to the project activity involves lower risks due to the performance uncertainty or low market share of the new technology adopted for the project activity and so would have led to higher emissions;

• Barrier due to **prevailing practice:** prevailing practice or existing regulatory or policy requirements would have led to implementation of a technology with higher emissions;

• **Other barriers** such as institutional barriers or limited information, managerial resources, organisational capacity, or capacity to absorb new technologies.

**Large-scale projects**

In large-scale projects, the barrier analysis is part of the additionality tool and the combined tool. It is applied in two steps:

1. Identify barriers that would prevent the implementation of the proposed CDM project activity. Here, the eligible barriers are similar to the barriers relevant for small-scale projects, with the following differences:
   - The ‘investment barrier’ of the small-scale guidance is, in the large-scale guidance, referred to as ‘investment analysis’ (Section 3.2); a separate option for demonstrating additionality besides ‘barrier analysis’;
   - The ‘access-to-finance barriers’ of the small-scale guidance is called ‘investment barriers’ in the large-scale guidance; and
   - ‘prevailing practice’ of the small-scale guidance is, in the large-scale guidance, usually a mandatory additional step termed ‘common practice analysis’ that is required but is not sufficient in itself to prove additionality.

2. Show that the identified barriers would not prevent the implementation of at least one of the alternatives (except the proposed project activity).

Another important requirement of the two tools is the following: “If the CDM does not alleviate the identified barriers that prevent the proposed project activity from occurring, then the project activity is not additional.”

If these steps are satisfied, the project is potentially additional (pending passing of the common practice analysis).

In late 2009 (EB50), the CDM EB adopted the “Guidelines for objective demonstration and assessment of barriers” with a view to improving the objectivity of the barrier analysis. The document provides guidance on the objective demonstration of different types of barriers. For instance, it requires that “barriers that can be mitigated by additional financial means can be quantified and represented as costs and should not be identified as a barrier for implementation of project while conducting the barrier analysis, but rather should be considered in the framework of investment analysis” (Guideline 4 in EB50 A13).

In addition, methodologies may – instead of using one of the tools – provide their own combination of steps from the tools.

**3.4.2. Assessment**

The concept of barriers preventing investments and mitigation activities is an important element of the research and discussion on technology diffusion and low carbon pathways. From this, it seems reasonable that the additionality test could also take barriers into account and not only be based on
investment analysis. However, the barrier analysis faces multiple challenges in practice that strongly limit its usefulness in the context of the CDM.

**Objectivity in barrier analysis**

In earlier phases of the CDM, the claim for barriers preventing the implementation of projects was often based on anecdotal evidence, and it was very difficult to provide objective proof of why a barrier is sufficient to "prevent the implementation" (Schneider 2009). In practice, the concept of barriers per se as proof for additionality is problematic, as all investment projects in all countries faces some sort of barriers to its implementation, be they financial, technical or other. In earlier CDM projects, it was sufficient for PDD consultants to state barriers without providing objective and verifiable evidence that they actually prevent the implementation of the project. This led to some market participants claiming that with good PDD consultants you could have any project registered based on barriers.

**Guidance on objective barriers**

In late 2009 (EB50), these problems with barrier analysis led to the adoption of the "Guidelines for objective demonstration and assessment of barriers" by the CDM EB (Section 3.4.1). With their requirement to monetize barriers, the guidelines aim to assess the role of barriers in preventing the implementation of projects in a more transparent way. The monetization of barriers and their inclusion in the investment analysis provide a framework that allows an objective balancing of higher barriers and associated costs with the need for higher revenues. This may be one of the reasons why investment analysis (with or without monetized barriers) has largely replaced the use of the barrier analysis without application of investment analysis in demonstrating additionality (see below).

**How much alleviation is necessary to overcome a barrier?**

Another weakness of the barrier analysis lies in the application of the requirement to demonstrate that the CDM “alleviates the identified barriers that prevent the proposed project activity from occurring”. The fulfilment of this requirement was not often (explicitly) provided in PDDs nor checked by DOEs. Moreover, the tools do not require that the degree of ‘alleviation’ should be at least comparable to the strengths of the barrier under consideration. To demonstrate the viability of the project with the CDM, one would need to make the case as to why, for example, €x of CER revenues are sufficient to alleviate the risk of damage to a wind farm due to severe sand storms.

Also with regard to this requirement, the Guidelines provide greater specificity: “Demonstrate in an objective way how the CDM alleviates each of the identified barriers to a level that the project is not prevented anymore from occurring by any of the barriers” (Guideline 2 in EB50 A13).

**The vanishing role of barrier analysis in the CDM**

The role of barrier analysis in demonstrating additionality in the CDM has been dramatically reduced from 2010 onwards (Figure 3-6). While in the period before 2010 approx. 24% of registered projects used the barrier analysis without applying an investment analysis in parallel, this share was reduced to approx. 1-2% of registered projects from 2010 onwards. Since then, the barrier analysis plays a certain role in reinforcing the additionality argument made in the investment analysis, but has largely lost its role as the main approach for demonstrating addiitionality.

This development might be explained by the introduction of the guidelines for objective demonstration and assessment of barriers.
With the adoption of the guidelines, the barrier analysis has largely lost its role as the main argument for demonstrating additionality. After 2010, non-financial barriers are quoted in some projects, but merely as additional information to reinforce the main case for additionality, which tends to be based almost uniformly on investment analysis. Potentially, this development may have been supported by an improved performance of DOEs in validating barrier analysis in PDDs, due to an improved accreditation system.

### 3.4.3. Summary of findings

In early CDM projects, the routine use of anecdotal and often subjective evidence for claiming barriers has led to the registration of projects with questionable claims for additionality, which cannot be objectively assessed by DOEs. With the adoption of the Guidelines and possibly the improved performance of DOEs, the barrier analysis has largely lost its role as the main line of argument for demonstrating additionality. Rather, barriers are monetized and reflected in the investment analysis.
In the CDM, barrier analysis has lost importance as a stand-alone approach to demonstrating additionality because of the subjectivity of the approach. With the guideline, if barriers are claimed, they are monetized and integrated as costs in the investment analysis.

3.4.4. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

Non-financial barriers can be important factors preventing the implementation of projects even though they may be profitable. Therefore, considering barriers in approaches for additionality determination is a valid approach. However, the objective demonstration of barriers (as required in the Guidance) has turned out to be very difficult to operationalise without the reflection and monetization in an investment analysis.

Given the de facto non-application of the barrier analysis without investment analysis approaches in the current CDM practice, we recommend removing the barrier analysis from the additionality and combined tools. In return, key aspects of the Guideline related to the monetization of barriers\(^{31}\) may be included in the investment analysis step in the additionality and combined tools.

In order to demonstrate additionality of projects with high (non-financial) barriers that may not be monetized, a comprehensive ‘common practice’ analysis or in small-scale projects ‘prevailing practice’ analysis shall be carried out (Section 3.3). Here, objective data on market shares of technologies/project types may be collected that may serve as objective proxy information for the extent to which barriers actually prevent the implementation of projects.

On another note, the approval of “Guideline on objective demonstration and assessment of barriers” by the CDM EB may be seen as a positive example of how the CDM regulator, under the right conditions, can react to an obvious flaw in the rules and practice, and rectify the system.

3.5. Crediting period and their renewal

3.5.1. Overview

Project participants can choose between one crediting period of 10 years without renewal or a crediting period of seven years for their project, which is due for renewal every 7 years for a maximum of two renewals (a total of 21 years for normal CDM projects). (For afforestation and reforestation projects, the choice is between one period of 30 years and three periods of 20 years). The Marrakech Accords state that for each renewal, a designated operational entity shall determine that “the original project baseline is still valid or has been updated taking account of new data where applicable”.

Requirements regarding the renewal of the crediting period were initially adopted in 2006 (EB28, Annex 40), subsequently revised several times (EB33, EB36, EB43, EB46, EB63, EB65, EB66), and partially incorporated in the project standard. At the renewal of crediting period, the latest valid version of a methodology must be used. If a methodology has been withdrawn or is no longer applicable, the project developers may use another methodology or request deviation from an applicable methodology. The CDM EB interpreted the ‘validity test’ in the Marrakech Accords in such a way that neither additionality nor the baseline scenario needs to be reassessed during the renewal of the crediting period. “The demonstration of the validity of the original baseline or its update does not require a reassessment of the baseline scenario, but rather an assessment of the emissions which would have resulted from that scenario” (Project Standard, Version 07.0, paragraph 289). The current rules mainly require an assessment of the regulatory framework, an assessment of

\(^{31}\) This relates to Guidelines no. 4 and 5 of EB50 Annex 13 that may be integrated as cost items related to barriers/risks in the investment analysis of the additionality and combined tool. Guideline 2 may also be implemented in the context of the investment analysis in the tools, in that the CER revenues should be sufficient to overcome the financial gap in project finance that is due to the barrier.
circumstances, an assessment of the remaining lifetime of technical equipment to be used in the baseline, and an update of data and parameters, such as emission factors.

Figure 3-7 plots the number of projects that have chosen a 7-year crediting period and that end their first crediting period in a given year and are therefore potentially entering a process of crediting period renewal. The increase in project registrations with the maturing of the CDM market from 2005 is mirrored by a steep increase in candidate projects for renewal seven years later, after 2012. The graph also indicates that the fraction of these candidate projects that actually underwent renewal significantly declines after 2012: While before 2012 roughly two thirds of all candidate projects underwent renewal on average, the rate dropped to roughly one third after 2012. This may be explained by the collapse in pricing and the petering out of the classical CDM market in 2011-2012, whereby CER prices below marginal transaction costs make renewal of crediting economically non-viable for most projects that do not benefit from long-term futures contracts with higher prices.

### Figure 3-7: Number of CDM projects ending first seven-year-crediting period – with and without renewals

Sources: UNFCCC 2014, authors’ own analysis

#### 3.5.2. Assessment

The requirements to use the latest approved version of a methodology is a very important rule to assure that changes in the methodological ruling are also implemented in CDM projects within a reasonable timeframe and therefore seem appropriate. At the same time, it provides some certainty for investors that rules regarding the calculation of emission reductions are not changed within their crediting period.

The CDM EB’s decision to interpret the Marrakesh requirement of assessing that “the original project baseline is still valid” in such a way that that only baseline emissions must be updated but that neither additionality nor the baseline scenario needs to be re-assessed could constitute a major risk for the environmental integrity of some project types. In 2011, the Meth Panel highlighted cer-
tain issues with this approach in an Information note to the EB (MP51 Annex 21\textsuperscript{32}), but the rules were not changed in response. In the following, we briefly analyze two main issues:

- The case of the baseline scenario changing over the course of the crediting period in a way that is not captured by the baseline methodology;
- The case of limited ‘lifetime’ of a baseline scenario.

**Baseline scenario changing over of the course of crediting periods**

In a number of instances, a baseline scenario could change over time during crediting periods and deviate from the assumptions in the underlying methodology. One example is a CDM project consisting of the conversion of an existing open cycle power plant to a closed cycle system. Assuming that after the first crediting period, new and lower cost technologies for the conversion would become available that would make the project economically viable, the implementation of the project activity after the first crediting period might be the most probable baseline scenario in the absence of the CDM. We are not referring here to the concept of dynamic baselines, e.g. the fact that baseline emissions are calculated based on the project output (e.g. in tons of steel or MWh per year). Rather, the scenario is changing, i.e. this refers to projects (or another low carbon activity) which, in the absence of the CDM project, would have been implemented at a later date due to changing circumstances.

However, it is important to note that not all CDM project types are prone to changing baseline scenarios. Baseline scenarios typically change over time if they are the ‘continuation of the current practice’. In such cases, changes such as retrofits could also be implemented at a later stage. In contrast, baseline scenarios do not change over time when they include a significant investment at project start in an alternative that provides similar services. This is the case if, for example, an industry can choose to fulfill their heat demand by either a new biomass boiler (project activity) or a new coal boiler (baseline). If one assumes that the project participant carries out a significant investment at the beginning of the baseline (e.g. to build the new coal boiler), it may be assumed that this investment is used until the end of its operational lifetime; replacing the coal boiler by a biomass boiler after seven years is economically not viable in general.

However, because CDM requirements explicitly rule out the re-assessment of the baseline scenario, cases with a change in baseline scenario cannot be taken into account, which leads to potential over-crediting in the second and third crediting periods in the case that the activity would have been implemented after the first crediting period due to changing circumstances.

Practical examples of such changing circumstances and related potential over-crediting can be found in Purdon (2014) for the co-generation sector. The paper provides an overview of how a change in external influence factors (e.g. sugar price) can influence the additionality and how a baseline scenario that is kept constant over several crediting periods can result in over-crediting.

\textsuperscript{32} [https://cdm.unfccc.int/Panels/meth/meeting/11/051/mp51_an21.pdf](https://cdm.unfccc.int/Panels/meth/meeting/11/051/mp51_an21.pdf)
Figure 3-8: Share of CDM projects renewing their seven year crediting period that is deemed non-problematic

Notes: Potentially non-problematic project types have been selected according to the criteria of having a lower risk of changes in the baseline scenario over several crediting periods.

Sources: UNFCCC 2014, authors’ own analysis
Assessment of the scale of the issue

In the following, we make a very rough assessment of the scale of this issue. As mentioned above, not all project types are in danger of undergoing changes in baseline scenarios that are not foreseen in the underlying methodology. In order to arrive at a preliminary estimate of the scale of the potential issue, a list of ‘potentially problematic’ project types was identified that have a higher risk of changes in the baseline scenario over several crediting periods than those categorised as ‘unproblematic’. 33

Please note that ‘potentially problematic’ does not mean that all projects in that project type have issues with the renewal of the crediting period, it simply means that the projects are in a sub-type that may contain potentially problematic projects. Figure 3-8 depicts the number of projects of a non-problematic project type in the total number of projects that actually underwent renewal of the 7-year crediting period in a given year.

The graph indicates that the number of projects renewing their crediting periods increased in 2007-2009. Until 2012, non-problematic projects made up the large majority of renewals. However, from 2013 the share of non-problematic projects dropped to approx. 60% of renewed projects. With such a low share, the issue may become more important in the future with a further increase in renewals (although the increase may be somewhat muted by the unfavourable market conditions).

In this context, it is important to note that CDM projects do not need to renew immediately, but may wait until market conditions are more favourable. Given the high number of projects that may undergo renewal at a later point in time combined with the lowering in the share of non-problematic project types may lead to considerable over-crediting.

Lifetime of baseline scenario

Another, also related, issue is that in more complex and very dynamic systems, such as the transport sector, the determination of a counterfactual baseline scenario is exposed to fundamental limitations in the ability to predict future developments. These limitations can lead to very high uncertainties in the baseline determination. In some instances even after a very few years, the actual baseline emissions could be significantly higher (or lower) than the calculated baseline emissions. For example, while it may be relatively certain that a project proponent choosing in the baseline situation to build a coal-fired boiler will continue to operate this boiler over its lifetime to meet its heat demand, the development of a city’s transport system in the absence of a specific urban rail project could be very difficult and uncertain to predict: over some years one may assume that an increase in transport demand is catered for by increased use of private cars; however, street capacities may be limited and the municipalities may have to find solutions to their transport problems anyway, also in the absence of a specific project activity.

It therefore might be considered that for some project types in complex and dynamic environments, such as transport systems, the baseline scenario cannot be reasonably extended over a period of

33 For a preliminary screening, the following projects sub-types (according to the classification of UNEP DTU) have been classified as “potentially problematic”: i.e. it cannot be ruled out that the projects would be implemented later in time without the CDM under changing circumstances (please note that the sub-types may also contain projects which clearly do not have an issue): Adipic acid, Aerobic treatment of waste water, Agricultural residues: mustard crop, Air conditioning, Appliances , Biodiesel from waste oil, Biogas from MSW, Bus Rapid Transit, Cable cars, Caprolactam, Carbon black gas, EE industry – Cement, Cement heat, Charcoal production, EE industry - Chemicals, EE own generation - Chemicals heat, Clinker replacement, CMM & Ventilation Air Methane, CO2 recycling, Coal Mine Methane, Coal to natural gas, Coke oven gas, Combustion of MSW, Composting, Domestic manure, EE public buildings, Existing dam, Food, Glass, Glass heat, HFC134a, HFC23, Industrial waste, Iron & steel, Landfill composting, Landfill aeration, Landfill flaring, Landfill power, Lighting, Machinery, Manure, Mode shift - road to rail, Natural gas pipelines, Nitric acid, EE industry - Non-ferrous metals, EE own generation - Non-ferrous metals heat, Non-hydrocarbon mining, Oil and gas processing flaring, Oil field flaring reduction, Oil to natural gas, EE industry – Paper, EE industry – Petrochemicals, PFCs, Power plant rehabilitation, Rail: regenerative braking, Solar water heating, Stoves, EE industry – Textiles, Ventilation Air Methane, Waste water. All other project types are deemed “non-problematic”.
ten years and a renewal of crediting periods should not be allowed, given the risks of inadequate and very uncertain baseline scenarios for later time periods.

It was for this reason that the crediting period was initially limited to a single crediting period for some project types, including:

- PFC emissions from manufacturing in the semi-conductor industry (e.g. AM0092). This is an industry in which manufacturing technologies and composition of materials etc. change frequently compared to the duration of a 7-year crediting period.
- Power saving from efficient management of data centers. Technologies and operating systems also typically have short lifespans compared to a 7-year crediting period.
- Complex transport systems such as the introduction of Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) systems in cities. In this context, the uncertainty in the baseline scenario and the resulting baseline emissions grows very rapidly, because development of transport systems over 5-10 years is difficult to predict with accuracy.

For these project types, the maximum crediting period has been set to 10 years in earlier versions of the methodology, because the uncertainty in the baseline scenario after 10 years did not allow for an objective determination of the emission reduction.

This limit in the crediting period to 10 years also allowed the methodology to be simplified, as the projection of baseline emissions over a limited period allows for simpler approaches and requires less monitoring provisions, thus reducing transaction costs.

Subsequently, however, the CDM EB took the decision (EB67, Para 107) that for each project type and methodology multiple crediting periods can be used (independent of any methodological limitations and uncertainty issues for the baseline setting as discussed above). This decision has been taken based on para 49 of the Modalities and Procedures for the CDM (decision 3/CMP.1, annex) that mentions alternative approaches. The paragraph was interpreted in such a way that both options shall be allowed in each and every methodology.

Since then, the relevant methodologies have been revised, allowing crediting for up to 21 years for all methodologies, without providing for further safeguards that would reduce the uncertainty in baseline scenario projection and potential over-crediting.

The issue of renewal of crediting period and more generally the updating of baseline scenarios is further discussed in Schneider et al. (2014).

3.5.3. **Summary of findings**

When the crediting period of a CDM project is to be renewed, the Marrakesh Accords require that the DOE check the validity of the original project baseline. A subsequent EB ruling (EB 43, Annex 13, paragraph 3) limited this check to an assessment of the regulatory framework, an assessment of the remaining lifetime of technical equipment that would be used in the baseline and an update of data and parameters, such as emission factors. The EB clarified that the validity of the baseline scenario should not be re-assessed.

With CDM project types for which the baseline scenario does not require a significant investment at the beginning of the crediting period (that would determine the baseline technology over the lifetime) this may lead to potential over-crediting. A preliminary analysis of projects that underwent renewal of the crediting period in recent years reveals that from 2013 onwards the share of potentially problematic project types (that might have issues of changing baseline scenarios leading to
over-crediting) increases to approx. 40% of projects with renewal. It is therefore recommended that this issue is resolved.

A subsequent ruling by the EB to remove the limit in the crediting period that some project types had in their methodology in sectors especially prone to baseline uncertainty over one crediting period (e.g. semi-conductor manufacturing, information technology, transport) further exacerbated the issue.

3.5.4. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

We recommend two reforms to the current rules:

- Reassessing the baseline scenario at the renewal of the crediting period: The issue of potential over-crediting arising from inadequate checking of the validity of the baseline at the renewal of the crediting period could be addressed by expanding the assessment to the validity of the baseline scenario for CDM projects that are potentially problematic in this regard. For this, clear criteria for problematic project types should be formulated and guidance should be provided on how to test the validity of baseline scenarios for specific CDM methodologies.

- Limitation of the overall length of crediting for specific project types: Project types in sectors or systems that are highly dynamic and complex, and in which the determination of baselines is notoriously difficult (e.g. urban transport systems) should be limited to a single 10 year CDM crediting period or should be supported by other (non-crediting) finance sources.

- A further step that may be considered is a general limitation of projects to one 7 years crediting period. This may also build on the observation that when discounting future streams of CER revenue beyond 7 (or 10) years at typical hurdle rates longer crediting periods do not really matter for the NPV calculation. Longer crediting periods would only be allowed for project types that require a continuous stream of CER revenues to continue operation such as landfill gas utilization/flaring etc.

3.6. Additionality of PoAs

The advent of CDM Programmes of Activities (PoA) in 2007, and the subsequent refinement of related additionality approaches, changed the nature of additionality testing for many project types. Additionality assessment for PoAs is simplified compared to the requirements for the registration of individual projects. Project developers can establish eligibility criteria to assess additionality, including eligibility criteria, which identify project types that may be automatically additional. More importantly, because the thresholds for identifying small-scale and microscale activities with simplified additionality procedures are set at the level of the Component Project Activity (CPA) and not the level of the PoA, the overall PoA could be far larger than these thresholds. For example, the registered PoA “Installation of Solar Home Systems in Bangladesh” (Ref. 2765) has so far installed 123 MW of solar power and has estimated emissions reductions of 569,000 tCO₂ per year, or almost ten times the small-scale CDM threshold.

In the period of 2013 to 2020, PoAs potentially could supply 0.16 billion CERs. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, the eventual volume for these PoAs could be many times this amount.

3.6.1. Assessment

There are three principle issues with the demonstration of additionality in PoAs: specific additionality concerns about the technology areas covered by PoAs, the robustness of eligibility criteria to check additionality, and the use of small and microscale thresholds for PoAs that are much larger
in total than these thresholds. The first point is largely addressed in Chapter 4, because it is related to the mitigation technologies used in PoAs. As shown in Table 2-2, the majority of PoAs are in technology areas that are analyzed in this report (e.g., efficient cook stoves, efficient lighting, wind, hydropower, biomass), so these chapters should be consulted for an assessment of those technologies.

The second point concerns eligibility criteria, namely that the PoA rules require that the project participants develop a set of eligibility criteria that should guide the inclusion of CPAs. The criteria should be constructed so that, for each new CPA, simply confirming that the CPA meets the criteria is enough to ensure that the CPA is additional. These criteria should be based on approaches used in the relevant methodology or other additionality approach that is relevant for the PoA. In other words, there is not a detailed additionality assessment for each CPA in the way that project activities submitted for registration are evaluated. Instead, the eligibility criteria in the registered PoA design document (PoA-DD) should ensure that the CPA meets the relevant additionality test. For example, if part of demonstrating additionality in the relevant methodology is proving that the project is a particular scale or uses a particular technology, then the scale and technology specification would be listed as eligibility criteria against which each new CPA was checked. A possible concern could be that, if the project participants proposed eligibility criteria in the PoA-DD that did not fully capture the additionality requirements of the underlying methodology, there would be a risk that future CPAs could be included even if they were not additional. Although there was some confusion during the early days of PoAs on how to formulate eligibility criteria, this has not been the case since late 2011 when the EB published a standard for eligibility criteria. This was later replaced by the standard for “Demonstration of additionality, development of eligibility criteria and application of multiple methodologies for programme of activities” (CDM-EB65-A03-STAN, version 3.0). This standard provides not only the full list of issues that must be covered in the eligibility criteria, but also clear rules on how additionality may be assessed for PoAs.

The third point is perhaps the most important – whether allowing PoAs that are, in total, much larger than the size thresholds for small and microscale projects could increase the risks of non-additionality among PoAs. The small-scale CDM thresholds are 15 MW for renewable energy, 60 GWh savings for energy efficiency, and 60,000 tCO₂ per year emissions reductions for other project types with approved small-scale methodologies. The scale limits for the microscale additionality rules are 5 MW for renewable energy, 20 GWh savings for energy efficiency projects, and 20,000 tCO₂ for other project types, and are then combined with other criteria (described in detail in Chapter 4, e.g. country type, size of individual units, or even designation by a national authority), to qualify as automatically additional. However, the EB decided at their 86th meeting that microscale technologies using unit size as the basis of automatic additionality (i.e. independent units of < 1500 kW for renewables, < 600 MWh for energy efficiency and < 600 tCO₂ for other projects, all serving households and communities) would have no limit of the total scale of the project or CPA. In other words, an efficient cook stove project activity or CPA could have total emission reductions of greater than 20, or even 60, ktCO₂ per year.

Projects (in this case, CPAs) that qualify as small-scale CDM (SSC) then have access to the technology-based ‘positive list’ in the tool for “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities” (Tool21, version 10.0). CPAs below the micro-scale thresholds would all be automatically additional as long as they meet both the scale and other requirements (e.g. technology, location, etc.). For small-scale CDM, the list of technologies considered automatically additional includes the following:

- Certain technologies whether grid-connected or off-grid: solar (PV and thermal), off-shore wind, marine (wave and tidal), and building-integrated wind turbines or household rooftop wind turbines up to 100 kW;
• Additional off-grid technologies below the SSC thresholds: micro/pico-hydro (with power plant size up to 100 kW), micro/pico-wind turbine (up to 100 kW), PV-wind hybrid (up to 100 kW), geothermal (up to 200 kW), biomass gasification/biogas (up to 100 kW);

• Technologies with isolated units where the users of the technology/measure are households or communities or Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and where the size of each unit is no larger than 5% of the small-scale CDM thresholds;

• Rural electrification projects using renewable energy in countries with rural electrification rates less than 20%.

Both microscale additionality and the small-scale CDM positive list approaches have been used extensively by PoAs. As shown in Table 3-2, 33% of the CPAs in registered PoAs, representing 27% of expected CERs, have applied the microscale or small-scale positive list approaches (‘first of its kind’ is discussed in Chapter 4). An analysis by the UNFCCC Secretariat\(^\text{34}\) also shows that 142 of the 282 registered PoAs use microscale or small-scale rules for automatic additionality, with 65% of PoAs targeting households utilising one of these tools (Table 3-3). Many of these PoAs have already exceeded the microscale and small-scale thresholds at an aggregate level, as allowed in the CDM PoA rules. In contrast, the 120 CDM project activities that have used small-scale positive lists or microscale guidelines comprise only 0.8% of projects and 0.1% of expected emissions reductions (UNEP DTU 2015a).

### Table 3-2: Use of automatic additionality approaches in CPAs within registered PoAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach for automatic additionality</th>
<th>Annual CERs (ktCO(_2)/yr)</th>
<th>CPAs</th>
<th>CERs</th>
<th>CPAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microscale tool: country, unit size or DNA selection</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microscale tool: SUZ</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC positive list</td>
<td>5,078</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>21,279</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29,936</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: A more recent version of the PoA pipeline was used here because of a revision of how the use of automatic additionality is classified.

Sources: UNEP DTU 2015b

\(^{34}\) “Concept note: Thresholds for microscale activities under programmes of activities” (CDM-EB85-AA-A09)
How additional is the CDM?

Table 3-3: Technology and end-user types in registered PoAs that applied microscale and/or small-scale positive list criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology type</th>
<th>PoAs</th>
<th>Share of this type of PoA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>End use type: Households</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household biogas digesters</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy efficiency - household</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy-efficient lighting (LED and CFL)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved cookstoves</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar water heaters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water purifiers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable-based rural electrification</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End use type: Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy efficiency – industrial</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel switch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grid/off-grid connected renewable energy technologies (e.g. wind, solar PV, geothermal)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste treatment (e.g. Wastewater, animal waste)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Concept note: Thresholds for microscale activities under programmes of activities (CDM-EB85-AA-A09)

Whether granting automatic additionality to PoAs that are over the small and microscale thresholds poses a risk for additionality testing depends on the reason for the positive list designations. One of the main issues raised by the positive list is the unit size of the technology, with the argument being that the unit size on its own may be sufficient to identify a project type with a high likelihood of additionality (in combination with the other microscale criteria, where relevant). On this basis, the EB recently agreed that the size criterion for the microscale additionality tool should be only unit size, and not total project size. This means that even a PoA using a large-scale methodology and have a total size beyond the SSC thresholds can still apply microscale additionality guidelines, as long as the unit size and other criteria are met.

The SCC positive list sets unit size limits for most categories of eligibility, although not for rural electrification or the grid-connected technologies (other than the 15 MW limit). The microscale guidelines also include the option of using a unit size less than 1% of the SSC threshold as a justification for applying these guidelines even if the projects are not located in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or Special Underdeveloped Zone (SUZs).

The most important categories of PoAs (in terms of their contribution to expected CERs) utilising these tools are improved cook stoves, energy efficient lighting, biogas and small unit size solar power. For the first three technologies, the unit size is inherently small, so the size of the total project or PoA should not, by itself, determine the viability of the technology (bearing in mind, however, that overhead programme costs are obviously lower per unit for larger programmes). The additionality issues with improved cook stoves and energy efficient lighting are reviewed in Sections 4.12 and 4.13, respectively. These sections raise important questions about the additionality

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35 The changes to the Tools for “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale activities” (version 22) and “Demonstration of additionality of microscale project activities” (version 07) were approved at EB86 (October 2015), as were changes in the Project Standard, Project Cycle Procedure, and standard on standard on “Demonstration of additionality, development of eligibility criteria and application of multiple methodologies for programmes of activities.”

36 Although the table from the UNFCCC Secretariat refers to “Grid/off-grid connected renewable energy technologies (e.g. wind, solar PV, geothermal),” our analysis has not identified any wind or geothermal PoAs using the small-scale positive list or the microscale guidelines.
of these project types, despite their small unit size, particularly because of the role of other support programmes in promoting these technologies and possible over-crediting for cook stoves, for example. On the other hand, the extensive literature on household energy access technologies and carbon markets also points to numerous well documented barriers, and the high unit transaction costs associated with small unit size technologies (e.g. Gatti & Bryan 2013; IFC 2012; Warnecke et al. 2015, 2013). In addition, the analysis from the UNFCCC Secretariat mentioned earlier also shows that the average unit size of PoAs using the small-scale and microscale positive lists is, in fact, far below even the microscale unit size of 1% of the SSC threshold (Table 3-4).

Table 3-4: Size of individual units in microscale and small-scale PoAs using positive lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit size as % of SSC threshold</th>
<th>Type I (kW)</th>
<th>Type II (MWh)</th>
<th>Type III (tCO2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoAs applying microscale criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average – 0.022%</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std deviation – 0.054%</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoAs applying small-scale criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average – 0.23%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std deviation – 0.34%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Concept note: Thresholds for microscale activities under programmes of activities (CDM-EB85-AA-A09)

For renewable power technologies, even if the total capacity of a PoA was over 15 MW, the unit size could not be larger than 5 MW for most technologies (15 MW for solar PV or solar thermal) to qualify for automatic additionality. Given the economies of scale in renewable energy power generation (Prysma 2012), small unit sizes would be expected to have higher capital costs, and would therefore be more likely to face investment barriers than larger scale plants. Project-level analysis by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) also suggests that smaller renewable energy plants not only have higher costs (i.e. because the smaller dots, representing smaller scale projects, are generally higher up in the figure), but that for solar PV and solar thermal these costs are still considerably higher than for fossils fuels (Figure 3-9). Analysis by EPRI has also shown that solar power at the several MW scale is considerably more expensive than conventional alternatives (EPRI 2012). This suggests that a solar PV (grid connected or off-grid) programme of any total size would not be economically viable if the units were below the small-scale thresholds. However, the challenge with solar technologies is that they are so expensive that carbon revenue is unlikely to close the financial viability gap, so they may be more driven by national policies than carbon markets (Section 3.7).
On the basis of the unit size analysis shown in Table 3-4, the Secretariat prepared a concept note with recommendations to the EB using on unit size, and not total project or CPA size, as the basis for determining microscale additionality (CDM-EB85-AA-A09). The EB agreed to begin to implement an approach of using only a unit size threshold to determine if the size of the project qualifies for microscale (EB85 report, paragraph 42). The other requirements for microscale (e.g. location in an LDC or SUZ, if the unit size is greater than 1% of the SSC threshold) would remain unchanged. This means that the CPAs comprised of technologies that were below the unit size threshold would not be limited in their total size. For example, a CFL PoA in an LDC could have a CPA with 100,000 MWh savings and still apply the microscale additionality guidelines.

3.6.2. Summary of findings

While the PoA rules do allow programmes with a total size greater than the small-scale and microscale thresholds to utilise the automatic additionality provisions for these scales of projects, there is no evidence that this increases the risk of non-additional projects on its own (i.e. the share of projects that could be non-additional). In other words, the PoA rules do not fundamentally change the additionality risks for a given category of project technologies. The PoA process could, of course, increase the overall scale of the risk because they were designed to facilitate the large scale dissemination of small, distributed technologies. For example, there are 40 registered ‘improved stove’ project activities with expected CERs of 1 million tCO₂ per year, but there are 46 registered ‘improved stove’ PoAs that already have expected CERs of 8.1 million tCO₂ per year.
3.6.3. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

Reform of the CDM rules related to additionality for particular project types and positive lists will address any concerns about additionality of PoAs.

3.7. Positive lists

The concept of ‘positive lists’ means that specific project types are considered automatically additional. Positive lists are one option to reduce transaction costs and increase the certainty of the CDM system from the perspective of project developers. Similar to standardized baselines, creating a positive list requires an upfront evaluation of technologies and their economic and regulatory environment, independent of the assessment of a particular CDM project proposal, to establish certain objective criteria that, if met, will result in a high likelihood of additionality. Once a positive list is established, a specific CDM project only needs to show that the pre-defined criteria are met, and does not have to apply other tools to justify additionality.

3.7.1. Positive lists in the CDM and impact on CER supply

Positive lists were introduced in the CDM through various routes. As briefly mentioned in Section 3.6, the CDM EB adopted the “Guidelines for demonstrating additionality of micro-scale project activities” in 2010, which were subsequently converted to a methodological tool, which first established automatic additionality for certain project types regardless of the type of methodology used (i.e. small-scale or large scale). Table 3-5 shows the technologies covered under version 7 of that tool, and the criteria they must meet in order to be deemed automatically additional. In addition to total project size (or, in the case of PoAs, the size of an individual CPA), the technologies must meet a further criterion such as location, unit size and/or consumer group.
Table 3-5: Projects considered automatically additional under the tool “Demonstration of additionality of microscale project activities”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Based on country (LDCs, SIDSs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Renewable energy up to 5 MW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy efficiency up to 20 GWh savings per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other small-scale CDM projects (Type III) up to 20 ktCO₂ emissions reductions per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Based on unit size and consumer (households, communities, SMEs) (i.e. any country)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Renewable energy of any size as long as unit size is less than 1500 kW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy efficiency of any size as long as unit savings are less than 600 MWh per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other small-scale CDM projects (Type III) of any size as long as unit savings are less than 600 tCO₂ per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Based on host country designation of special underdeveloped zone (SUZ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Renewable energy up to 5 MW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy efficiency up to 20 GWh savings per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other small-scale CDM projects (Type III) up to 20 ktCO₂ emissions reductions per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Based on designation of a technology by the host country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Grid connected renewable energy specified by DNA, up to 5 MW, which comprises less than 3% of total grid connected capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Based on other technical criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Off-grid renewable energy up to 5 MW supplying households/communities (less than 12 hours grid availability per 24 hours is also considered ‘off-grid’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: LDCs = Least Developed Countries, SIDSs = Small Island Developing States, SME = Small and micro enterprises, DNA = Designated National Authority.
Sources: Tool for “Demonstration of additionality for microscale activities”

In 2011, the “Guidelines on the demonstration of additionality of small scale project activities”, which later were similarly converted to a methodological tool, also included for the first time a list of technologies that would be considered automatically additional for any project meeting the small-scale CDM thresholds. This initially only included a list of grid and off-grid renewable energy technologies (i.e. the first two blocks in Table 3-6), but was expanded in 2012 to include small isolated units serving communities and renewable energy-based rural electrification.
Table 3-6: Technologies considered automatically additional under the tool “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities”

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Renewable energy (up to 15 MW, grid or off-grid, all end users)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solar PV and solar-thermal electricity generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offshore wind</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine technologies (e.g. wave and tidal)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building integrated wind turbines or household roof top wind turbines (unit size &lt;= 100 kW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Renewable energy (up to 15 MW, off-grid only)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Micro/pico-hydro (unit size &lt;= 100 kW)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Micro/pico-wind turbine (unit size &lt;= 100 kW)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PV-wind hybrid (unit size &lt;= 100 kW)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geothermal (unit size &lt;= 200 kW)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Biomass gasification/biogas (unit size &lt;= 100 kW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Distributed technologies for households/communities/SMEs (off-grid only)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aggregate size up to SSC threshold (15 MW, 60 GWh or 60 ktCO₂ emission reductions) with unit size &lt;= 5 per cent of SSC thresholds (i.e. &lt;= 750 kW, &lt;= 3 GWh/y or 3 ktCO₂e/y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rural electrification using renewable energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In countries with rural electrification rates less than 20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in left hand column continue from previous table.
Sources: Tool for “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale activities” (version 10.0)

In addition to these tools, which apply across many methodologies, some individual methodologies have provided for automatic additionality for certain project types, often related to regulations. The most widely used is ACM0002 “Grid-connected electricity generation from renewable sources” (version 16.0), which was revised in November 2014 to include a two-part positive list for grid connected technologies. The first part is a list of technologies that are considered automatically additional: solar PV, solar thermal, offshore wind, marine wave and marine tidal (i.e. the technologies included in the first part of the small-scale CDM additionality tool, except at larger scale). The second part says that any technology with less than 2% of the total grid-connected capacity or less than 50 MW total capacity in the country is considered automatically additional. Since the revision of ACM0002, ten new project activities have requested and completed registration (no new PoAs have been registered). Of these, only one project has applied the new positive list provisions – a 141 MW solar PV facility in Chile. This is the largest solar facility to be granted automatic additionality.

Another important methodology with automatic additionality provisions includes ACM0001 “Consolidated baseline and monitoring methodology for landfill gas project activities” (version 15.0), which was revised in late 2013 to consider the following technologies automatically additional if, prior to the project activity, landfill gas was only vented and/or flared:

- electricity generation in one or several power plants with a total nameplate capacity that equals or is below 10 MW;
- heat generation for internal or external consumption;
- flaring (assuming no flaring prior to the project).
AM0113 “Distribution of compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) and light-emitting diode (LED) lamps to households” (version 01.0) provides for automatic additionality for any project distributing self-ballasted LED lamps to households. Projects distributing CFLs are only considered automatically additional if they are in a country with “no or only limited lighting efficiency regulations” reported by the UNEP en.lighten initiative’s Efficient Lighting Policy Status Map. AM0086 “Distribution of zero energy water purification systems for safe drinking water” (version 04.0) considers projects automatically additional if less than 60 percent of the population has access to improved drinking water sources or if the project proponents can demonstrate that more than half of the improved drinking water delivered does not actually meet the appropriate health standards. AMS-III.D “Methane recovery in animal manure management systems” (version 19.0) considers projects automatically additional when there is no regulation that requires the collection and destruction of methane from livestock manure. In addition to these, AM0001 “Decomposition of fluoroform (HFC-23) waste streams” (version 6.0), the first approved large-scale methodology, essentially uses a positive list approach based on regulation, because any project that does not face a regulatory requirement to abate HFC-23 emissions is considered additional. The same is true for ACM0019 “N₂O abatement from nitric acid production” (version 02.0).

While the positive lists presented above have not been used widely by CDM project activities (e.g. only 121 registered projects), PoAs have utilised the lists in the small-scale and microscale additionality tools (Table 3-2), with a third of CPAs in registered PoAs using these additionality approaches. Whether this growing group of PoAs presents concerns for the additionality depends on the strength of the justification for the original positive lists and for how long this justification is likely to be valid (i.e. how often the lists should be updated).

The criteria used to select the positive lists as well as the validity of these lists are presented in an information note prepared by the Small-scale Working Group in November 2014 called “Criteria for graduation and expansion of positive list of technologies under the small-scale CDM” (CDM-SSCWG46-A23). Table 3-7 summarises all of the positive list approaches, and shows the range of criteria used. The individual methodologies often refer to regulations to determine automatic additionality, or current penetration rates. The small-scale and microscale additionality tools use a mix of end-users, location, cost of service and penetration rates, depending on the specific technology group. This also highlights the similarity between positive lists discussed here and standardized baselines (Section 3.8), which also define a list of automatically additional technologies based on penetration rates and comparative costs.
How additional is the CDM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-7: Criteria used for determining positive lists</th>
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<td>14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: LCOS = Levelized cost of service, LDCs = Least Developed Countries, SIDSs = Small Island Developing States, SMEs = Small and micro enterprises, DNA = Designated National Authority.

Sources: UNFCCC documents as cited in text
In terms of the duration of validity of the positive lists, the small-scale and microscale additionality tools did not originally include a time limit, although many of the methodologies specify a three-year duration of validity. The EB (EB81, paragraph 72) accepted a Small-Scale Working Group recommendation in late 2014 to set a three-year limit on validity for the small-scale CDM positive lists. In addition, the EB agreed on thresholds for ‘levelized cost of service’, ‘penetration rate’, and ‘capital cost#, as shown in Table 3-8. Note that these new rules only apply to the positive lists under the tool for “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities”, and not to microscale activities or any other positive lists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grid connected renewable electricity generation</th>
<th>End-user</th>
<th>LCOS</th>
<th>Penetration</th>
<th>Capital cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All renewable energy technologies in the current positive list</td>
<td>&gt;= 50% higher than all fossil fuels</td>
<td>Global average penetration &lt; 3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off-grid renewable electricity generation</th>
<th>End-user</th>
<th>LCOS</th>
<th>Penetration</th>
<th>Capital cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All off-grid renewable technologies in the current positive list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;= 3 times the cost of all fossil fuels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distributed technologies for households/communities/SMEs</th>
<th>End-user</th>
<th>LCOS</th>
<th>Penetration</th>
<th>Capital cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All distributed technologies eligible under Type I/II/III and providing services of households/communities/SMEs</td>
<td>Assess appropriateness of user groups</td>
<td>Global average penetration rate &lt; 3%</td>
<td>&gt;= 3 times cost of all plausible baseline technologies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Information note “Criteria for graduation and expansion of positive list of technologies under the small-scale CDM” (CDM-SSCWG46-A23)

3.7.2. Assessment of current positive lists

The positive lists developed under the CDM to date are based on specific criteria such as penetration rate, costs, regulatory environment, and location. While these lists have not been used widely for automatic additionality among CDM project activities, their use among PoAs is widespread and growing. Some of the positive lists are now reviewed regularly, and have a clear basis for determining whether a technology should still be included in the lists. This review of validity should also be extended to other project types, in particular those covered by the microscale additionality tool or approaches used in relevant methodologies (e.g. ACM0002).

An important challenge with the current positive lists, however, is that the basis upon which they are established varies widely, without a clear rationale for the choice or level of the indicator (e.g. why penetration might be used for some technologies but levelized cost of service for others). A consistent approach to determining technology eligibility is needed to ensure that existing and new positive lists do not pose risks of non-additionality. The criteria and indicators used should have clear justification for how they influence project implementation. For example, while low market penetration or high capital costs could be strong indicators of prohibitive barriers for some technologies, it is not clear how the concept of ‘special underdeveloped zones’ (SUZ), which may
be defined differently by each DNA according to UNFCCC guidelines, is a reliable indicator of barriers.

As part of the justification of project types and technology choices, **positive lists must address the impact of national policies and measures to support low emissions technologies** (so-called, E-policies). As discussed in Section 3.9 and many of the sections within Chapter 4, national policies may be the primary driving factor for the implementation of certain technologies, rather than their underlying economics, market position or location. In fact, one of the criticisms of allowing renewable technologies to be considered automatically additional is that their costs are so high that carbon revenue alone cannot possibly make them financially viable, and so other incentives and policies are the real determining factor (Lazarus et al. 2012; Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012). This is even truer with smaller scale technologies. For example, in a study in Southern Africa, the levelized cost of roof-top solar PV was 20% more expensive than utility scale solar PV, while small hydropower was 70% more expensive than large scale (Miketa & Merven 2013). For positive lists to avoid the possibility of ‘false positives’ driven by national policies, some objective measure of renewable energy support may be needed as part of the evaluation process. An example of this would be the REN21 renewable energy global overview and interactive map, which provides a comprehensive technology-specific database of the policies in place to support renewables. A positive list that included renewables could therefore be qualified by restricting its applicability to countries that did not have any support policies in place for that technology. Having support policies in place does not, on its own, mean that those technologies would not be additional, but only that there is a greater risk of this and so applying a positive list approach in that country would not be appropriate. Projects in those countries could still use the other tools available for demonstrating additio...
3.8. Standardized baselines

Project developers have repeatedly complained about the expensive and time-consuming process for formally registering a project under the CDM. The setting of the baseline for the greenhouse gas emission reductions associated with a project has required project developers to apply project specific methodologies in order to calculate baseline emission levels. The project developers take on significant costs before the approval of their project when collecting the data necessary to set the baseline and demonstrate additionality. In some cases the risks associated with these upfront costs may be too high for developers of smaller projects in poorer countries (Spalding-Fecher & Michaelowa 2013) – impacting the regional distribution of projects under the CDM. Apart from high transaction costs, the project-specific determination of baselines and assessment of additionality has been criticised in the past for being subjective (Schneider 2009). Due to the information asymmetry between project developers and DOEs subjective assumptions may be difficult to verify, which could result in non-additional projects or over-crediting, which both undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM.

The Cancun Agreements in 2010 provided for the use of standardized baselines in the CDM to address these limitations with the aim “to reduce transaction costs, enhance transparency, objectivity and predictability, facilitate access to the clean development mechanism, particularly with regard to under-represented project types and regions, and scale up the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions, while ensuring environmental integrity” (UNFCCC 2011c). In contrast to the project-by-project approach to setting baselines and demonstrating additionality, standardized baselines are established for a project type or sector in one or several CDM host countries. Standardized baselines can address any or all of three areas for standardization: demonstrating additionality, determining the baseline scenario or determining baseline emissions. In the latter case, standardization can include emission factors or individual parameters needed to calculate emission reductions.

Standardized baselines require host country approval and are submitted through the DNA of the host Party. They can cover one or several Parties. Once approved, project developers can use a standardized baseline when submitting a project for registration. In 2014, the EB further decided that it is up to the host Parties to decide whether projects must use an approved standardized baseline or whether they may alternatively use a project-specific approach, but noted that the EB could reject standardized baselines if this poses a risk to environmental integrity (CDM-EB78, para 24). In practice, all approved standardized baselines have so far been voluntary, except for a multi-country grid emission factor in the Southern African region.

The CDM allows standardized baselines to be derived either from suitable methodologies, from tools such as the ‘Tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity system’ or from a generic framework that is applicable to all project types and sectors such as the ‘Guidelines for the establishment of sector specific standardized baselines’ adopted by the EB in 2011. Further regulatory documents include a procedure for submission of standardized baselines, a standard on the coverage and vintage of data, and guidelines for quality assurance and quality control.

The ‘Guidelines for the establishment of sector specific standardized baselines’ combine elements of market penetration, performance benchmarks, investment and barrier analysis. Under this framework, the standardized baseline results in a positive list of fuels, feedstocks and/or technologies for a given sector. The least emission-intensive fuel/feedstock/technology needed to produce

39 https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-07-v2.pdf
40 https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/4/I/Y/4IY1RB7DMKLWPFG59XC3UE6JNH8Q2A/eb62_repan08.pdf?_=N2d8bnRoeHN3fDDSYyp3xU9Kx6fMk59Ho1yFw.
How additional is the CDM?

A certain percentage of the sector’s output (i.e. defined by the CDM EB)\(^{41}\) is selected as the baseline fuel/feedstock/technology. All fuels/feedstocks/technologies that are associated with lower emission intensities than the baseline technology are candidates for inclusion in a positive list of fuels/feedstocks/technologies that are automatically deemed additional. The DNA of the host country also needs to demonstrate for each of the candidates for the positive list that they are either less economically attractive than the non-candidates or face barriers to entry (Schneider et al. 2012). The baseline technology is also used to determine the baseline against which emission reductions are calculated (Hermwille et al. 2013).

### Table 3-9: Approaches for deriving grid emission factors

DNAs could use either the standardized baseline guidelines or the grid emission factor tool to determine the grid emission factor and submit the value as a standardized baseline. The weaknesses of this opportunity to choose between two alternative approaches are explained below:

1) **Pick and choose issue:** The two approaches will provide two different values for the grid emission factor. Thus, the DNA could pick and choose between two completely different methodological approaches for determining the grid emission factor. Countries for which the guidelines result in higher values will use that approach, whereas countries for which the tool results in higher values will use that approach. Overall, having two parallel approaches could undermine the environmental integrity compared to the current situation in which only one approach is available.

2) **Vintage of data issue:** The standardized baseline guidelines consider all plants, whether they were recently constructed or decades ago. This could result in a situation in which coal power is determined as the baseline fuel, even if no coal power plant has been constructed or been under construction for a decade. In contrast, the grid emission factor tool aims to consider recent developments by observing which plant types were recently added to the system or are under construction or which plants actually operate at the margin.

3) **‘One size fits all’ issue:** The grid emission factor tool uses a methodologically approach that considers the particularities of the electricity system, considering different possible effects of displacing grid electricity (marginal plants not being dispatched/the construction of other power plants avoided or delayed). In contrast, the guidelines do not consider the characteristics of the sector and make generalised assumptions, which have little meaning in the power sector. The guidelines therefore result in less accurate grid emission factors than the grid emission factor tool.

**Sources:** Own compilation

The environmental impact of standardized baselines will be affected by how stringently the standardized baseline is set for a given project type. The stringency of standardized baselines needs to safeguard the environmental integrity of the CDM whilst also striking the right balance between accuracy and transactions costs in order to ensure that there is an incentive for developing new CDM projects.

The implications of standardized baselines on environmental integrity will also vary depending upon the sector that they are applied to, as the approach relies considerably upon the assumption that the penetration of a fuel/feedstock/technology is negatively correlated with its cost and/or with barriers that impede their deployment (Hermwille et al. 2013). For certain sectors there will undoubtedly be a strong correlation, i.e. energy efficient lighting and efficient electrical appliances.

\(^{41}\) In its guidance, the EB has defined a preliminary additionality/crediting threshold of 80 % in priority sectors and 90% in other sectors.
However for other sectors, i.e. with multiple products or with strongly varying circumstances among installations, the correlation will be weaker or absent and alternative approaches for setting baselines and demonstrating additionality may be more suitable (Hermwille et al. 2013). Applying the current framework to sectors for which such a correlation is lacking could broaden the positive lists for technologies that are unlikely to be additional. In the power sector, for example, the guidelines do not reflect the particular features of an electricity system. The Methodologies Panel recommended that the EB limits the applicability of the SB standard to sectors other than the power sector (MP65, paragraph 38 and 39). In response, the EB requested the Methodologies Panel to assess the applicability of the proposed framework to different project types (EB81, paragraph 41). However, as of January 2016, the current guidelines are still applicable to all sectors. In 2015, a standardized baseline was finalized for consideration by the EB, which includes grid emission factors for different islands of Cape Verde and applies for some islands the “Guidelines for the establishment of sector specific standardized baseline” and for others the grid emission factor tool. The issues arising from the application of the guidelines to the power sector are highlighted in Table 3-9.

The following issues may pose further environmental risks through the implementation of standardized baselines in the future:

- **Mandatory versus voluntary use of standardized baselines:** The current CDM EB framework does not make the use of standardized baselines mandatory (CDM-EB74, para 24). It is the discretion of the DNA to decide whether project participants can select between project-specific or standardized baselines. In this regard, the DNA can make their use voluntary or mandatory. This may have two consequences:
  - Standardized baselines open an alternative route towards positive lists (Section 3.7), while keeping the approach of demonstrating additionality through the current means. By definition, this can only increase the number of false positives. Hence, the likelihood for additionality is lower, compared to a situation in which there would be no standardized baselines.
  - The voluntary use of standardized baselines could lead to project developers picking and choosing between baseline emission factors which could result in over-crediting (Table 3-9, bullet point 1). Indeed, Spalding-Fecher & Michaelowa (2013) argue that the CMP should make standardized baselines mandatory.

The degree of these risks depends on how conservative the standardized baselines are set. The more conservatively that they are set, the lower the risk is. An example of how picking and choosing between project-specific and standardized baselines can undermine environmental integrity is the approved standardized baseline ASB0018 for cook stove projects in Burundi. The approved standardized baseline provides default values for the amount of non-renewable biomass consumed in the baseline (1.5 tonnes per person and year for households in urban areas and 1.1 tonnes per person and year for households in rural areas). However, at the same time, a PoA (9634) is registered in Burundi with project-specific baseline values based on data from a more recent survey. The project-specific baseline is more ambitious (1.21 tonnes per person and year for households in urban areas and 0.83 tonnes per person and year for households in rural areas). Had the standardized baseline been approved prior to the registration of the project, the project could have opted for the less ambitious standardized baseline. At the same time, projects with higher project-specific baseline values could opt for their project-specific baseline and not use the standardized baseline.

- **Quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) of standardized baselines:** Version 04.0 of the procedure ‘Development, revision, clarification and update of standardized baselines’...
(CDM-EB84-A10) sets out how a project developer can submit a proposal for a standardized baseline to the CDM EB following first the approval of the relevant DNA. It is necessary for the project developer to provide a list of documents when submitting a standardized baseline proposal, which includes the Form F-CDM-PSB, supporting documents and an Assessment Report of QA/QC. The CDM EB clarified only in 2015 that DOEs not only need to verify whether the required documents were submitted and that the data were collected according to guidelines for quality assurance and quality control but that they also need to check that the standardized baseline has been calculated in accordance with the relevant standards (CDM-EB85-A10). However, this decision still needs to be adequately reflected in the latest version of the ‘CDM validation and verification standard’ (CDM-EB82-A14). Moreover, stakeholders expressed concerns that if the requirements for QA/QC are too stringent, it may prevent the approval of standardized baselines from LDCs (Hermwille et al. 2013). Therefore, the QA/QC Assessment Report is currently not compulsory for countries with 10 or fewer registered CDM projects as of 31 December 2010 for the first 3 submissions (CDM-EB84-A10, Para. 18), even though countries can request financial support from the UNFCCC for the development of Assessment Reports. These exemptions from applying the QA/QC guidelines could undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM.

- **Development of country-specific thresholds**: CMP9 requested the EB “to prioritise the development of top-down thresholds for baseline and additionality for the underrepresented countries in CDM” (CDM-EB82-AA-A10, Para. 3). Many stakeholders regard the currently approved default thresholds for additionality and baseline as ‘unattractive’ and ‘not suitable’ for specific national/regional/sectoral circumstances (CDM-EB82-AA-A10). However, the adoption of country-specific thresholds could be a difficult process as such thresholds are a policy choice rather than a methodological choice. It is uncertain whether or not the development of country-specific thresholds would undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM. However, it would likely result in the incomparability of emission reductions from different standardized baselines within the same project type or technology.

- **Exclusion or inclusion of CDM facilities in the peer group to determine standardized baselines**: The development of certain standardized baselines relies upon the performance and actual output from the facilities of a sector of the host country. Some of these facilities may already have registered CDM projects (i.e. referred to as CDM facilities) that would have improved performance due to the incentives provided by the CDM. Given that it is difficult to determine the performance and outputs of these facilities in the absence of the CDM, it is necessary to take a decision on whether to include CDM facilities in the calculation of a standardized baseline or not. Exclusion of CDM facilities could undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM (CDM-EB78-AA-A05). As a default all CDM projects need to be included in the respective cohort unless the DNA can demonstrate that the cost of fuels/feedstocks/technologies exceed those of certain comparable projects (CDM-EB79, para 41).

- **Vintage of standardized baselines and static versus dynamic standardized baselines**: Standardized baselines are often constructed based on plants for which the investment decision was taken many years in the past. If a standardized baseline is static and not frequently updated, it can mean that additionality is established and baselines are determined based on a market situation that is ten or twenty years old (i.e. failing to take into account technological breakthroughs). This could result in significant crediting of BAU (Table 3-9, bullet point 2). The high-level CDM Policy Dialogue has therefore recommended that in order to drive technological change, the standardized baseline framework must ensure “that the focus of incentives constantly shifts to the next generation of technologies” (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012, p. 6). As a consequence, the current standardized baseline framework specified interim data vintages and
update frequencies of 3 years respectively (CDM-EB77-A05). For example, sectors associated with slow dynamic developments in the past may allow for a relaxation in the frequency of updates without compromising the environmental integrity of the CDM.

- **Level of disaggregation:** The level of disaggregation is an important factor to consider in the development of a standardized baseline, which can enable a DNA with limited resources to prioritise which mitigation measures to incentivise within a sector. For example, Hermwille et al. (2013) refer to a case study of the rice mill sector in Cambodia where only a small number of large scale rice mills account for approximately 60% of the total output. Given that the remaining output is provided by thousands of small-scale rice mills with very varied use of technologies that are associated with different emission intensities, it was necessary to disaggregate the standardized baseline on the basis of plant size (i.e. focus standardisation on the large-scale mills). The importance of disaggregation of standardized baselines is further demonstrated in the power sector. If a standardized baseline is based upon the entire power sector of a country, it is likely that the use of renewables and possibly of the most efficient fossil fuel technologies would be encouraged. However, if the standardized baseline was disaggregated further to consider fossil fuel consumption only – different mitigation options such as fossil fuel switching would be encouraged instead (Hermwille et al. 2013). The appropriate level of disaggregation depends very much on the project type and the actual circumstances. With the current approach, DNAs can determine the level of disaggregation, though there is no EB guidance on how the appropriate level can be determined. In addition, such guidance would hardly be compatible with the ‘one size fits all’ approach pursued in the standardized baseline guidance.

In light of all of these challenges, the implementation of standardized baselines may not be suitable for all sectors, project types or countries. The development of a standardized baseline can achieve the objective of simplification in certain sectors associated with more homogenous products. However, standardized baselines will be more difficult to apply to sectors associated with a range of products and strongly varied circumstances amongst installations. Therefore, it should be carefully checked for which purposes, sectors, project types and baseline emission sources standardized baselines are appropriate. Applying one single approach to establish standardized baselines for different sectors, project types and locations, as currently pursued under the CDM, is likely to undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM. Standardized baselines should be developed from actual projects and reflect the particular circumstances of the sector, project type and location. Once approved within a country or region, standardized baselines need to be mandatory for all new CDM projects to prevent that more CERs are issued as if the standardized baseline was not established (Schneider et al. 2012).

To ensure that the concept of standardized baselines provides what it was established for, particularly “to reduce transaction costs, ... while ensuring environmental integrity” (UNFCCC 2011c), the EB should review the standardized baseline framework. This review should ensure that:

- stringent QA/QC procedures are applied to all standardized baselines,
- all CDM facilities without any exemptions are included in the peer group for the standardized baseline,
- DNAs can build their decision on the appropriate disaggregation level on a clear guidance document which aims to determine the level of disaggregation in a way that covers the mitigation activity of the standardized baseline as accurately as possible and includes as few external factors ('noise') as possible;
- the practice of using the same methodological approach to establish standardized baselines for all the different sectors, project types and locations is replaced by the development
of project-specific standards derived from actual projects and reflect the particular circumstances of the sector, project type and location, and last but not least,

- standardized baselines are mandatory for new projects once they are approved for a country.

If these improvements were introduced, standardized baselines could be a valuable tool to improve the environmental integrity of the CDM while lowering transaction costs.

3.9. Consideration of policies and regulations

The consideration of policies and regulations in demonstrating additionality and establishing emissions baseline has been a controversial issue for project-based mechanisms as the CDM. Policies and regulations adopted by the host country can have a significant impact upon future emission pathways. For example, the introduction of air quality regulations for power plants impacts their CO₂ emissions while fossil fuel subsidies reduce the viability of less emission-intensive technologies (Schneider et al. 2014). When setting the baseline and demonstrating additionality there have been concerns raised about both perverse incentives for policy makers (i.e. host countries not implementing policies and measures that reduce emissions so that they can secure greater carbon revenues) and about environmental integrity, by either over-crediting of emission reductions (i.e. inflating the baseline by excluding polices and measures that reduce emissions) or non-additional projects (i.e. registering projects that are economically viable and do not face barriers by allowing the exclusion of subsidies in the investment analysis).

The modalities and procedures for the CDM require that “a baseline shall be established taking into account relevant national and/or sectoral policies and circumstances, such as sectoral reform initiatives, local fuel availability, power sector expansion plans, and the economic situation in the project sector” (decision 3/CMP.1, para 45(e)). However, in order to avoid the creation of perverse incentives for policy makers, the CDM EB adopted, at its 22nd meeting, the following rules with regard to the consideration of policies in setting baselines:

- **E+ policies**: to not consider policies adopted after 1997 which “give comparative advantages to more emissions intensive technologies or fuels over less emissions intensive technologies or fuels” in setting the baseline;

- **E- policies**: to not consider policies adopted after 2001 which “give comparative advantages to less emissions intensive technologies over more emissions intensive technologies” in setting the baseline.\(^{42}\)

These rules failed, however, to fully address perverse incentives for policy makers, as host countries would continue to have incentives to maintain existing E+ policies such as fossil fuel subsidies. Furthermore, although host countries will not be discouraged from implementing national policies and measures that reduce emissions (E- policies), the rules are likely to result in over-crediting of emission reductions.

Overall, in the case of E- policies it seems difficult to reconcile the two policy objectives: avoiding perverse incentives for policy makers and ensuring environmental integrity. If E- policies were excluded when demonstrating additionality or setting baselines, perverse incentives would be addressed but environmental integrity would be undermined, since projects that are financially viable could claim they are not, and emissions baselines would be inflated. If E- policies were included, environmental integrity would be ensured but perverse incentives not addressed.

\(^{42}\) EB 22 report, Annex 3: Clarifications on the consideration of national and/or sectoral policies and circumstances in baseline Scenarios (Version 02), [https://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/022/eb22_repan3.pdf](https://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/022/eb22_repan3.pdf).
In 2013, the EB reviewed its E-policy guidelines with a view to balancing these two conflicting policy objectives and “agreed to pursue an approach by which, for the first seven years from the effective implementation date of the relevant E-policy, the benefit of that E-policy does not need to be considered by project participants in the additionality demonstration through investment analysis” (CDM-EB73, para. 70). The approach would thus ignore new E-policies but for a limited time period. Initially allowing the exclusion of E-policies could be seen as addressing perverse incentives for policy makers, while ensuring environmental integrity in the longer term. It would also expand the approach of ignoring E-policies from baseline setting to demonstrating additionality. However, the EB has not yet been able to agree on a revision of its E+/- policy guidelines.

Based upon an econometric analysis, Lui (2014) raises questions about the decline of feed-in tariffs in China\(^+\) that may imply a gaming to ensure wind projects are not economically attractive for the purpose of demonstrating additionality under the CDM. Schneider et al. (2014) argue that with regards to E-policies it is simply not feasible to achieve both a robust crediting baseline and avoid the creation of perverse incentives at the same time. Striking a balance between the two objectives is therefore required when setting the crediting baseline, which is likely to vary depending upon the sector, project type and type of policy.

Given the contrasting objectives, the decision on whether to include E-policies in the baseline or not and the determination of additionality of a project-based mitigation activity should depend upon the potential risk of either creating perverse incentives or over-crediting. Schneider et al. (2014) recommend that the following approach should be pursued when setting baselines and determining additionality:

- If the **risk of creating perverse incentives** is judged to be considerably larger than the risk of over-crediting, then E-policies should not be considered (for a certain period) in setting the baseline;

- If the **risk of over-crediting** is deemed to be considerably greater than the risk of creating perverse incentives, then E-policies should be considered in setting the baseline.

The extent to which the setting of baseline and determination of additionality for a project-based mitigation activity is more liable to either the risks of perverse incentives or over-crediting depends upon the wider co-benefits associated with a policy other than simply climate change mitigation. For example, the deployment of renewables is associated with multiple co-benefits such as employment opportunities, energy security and air quality improvements. Given the additional benefits associated with such E-policies, it is less likely that these policies would not be adopted as a consequence of changes to an international crediting mechanism. Schneider et al. (2014) and Spalding-Fecher (2013) therefore both argue that the risk of creating perverse incentives (i.e. delaying policies and regulations to secure more CER revenues) may be lower than the risks of setting a less robust baseline (i.e. by not including E-policies in the baseline) that leads to the over-crediting of emission reductions. Spalding-Fecher (2013) also points out that such co-benefits are likely to occur with electricity generation, energy efficiency and agriculture projects.

However, the risk of creating perverse incentives is likely to be greater from mitigation activities such as the capture of HFC-23, which reduce GHG emissions but do not lead to significant co-benefits. In such a case, preventing the creation of perverse incentives (i.e. host country delaying regulation on the capture of HFC-23) could be given priority over additionality and environmental integrity by not considering such E-policies when setting the baseline. Nevertheless, CERs resulting from such projects would be used to offset GHG emissions in other capped systems and, since

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\(^{+}\) Spalding-Fecher (2013) discusses the uncertainty within the CDM EB on how such a policy change should be classified under the E+/- policy guidance.
How additional is the CDM?

they are not truly additional, result in globally higher emissions. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to support such technologies by other means such as ODA or climate finance or by addressing these mitigation potentials as own contribution under the ADP negotiations.

From a more practical perspective, Spalding-Fecher (2013) emphasises the difficulty of accurately accounting for the effects of E+ policies when setting either the baseline or demonstrating additivity. The level of difficulty depends upon the policy type. For example, the impact of direct financial incentives such as mandatory feed-in tariffs can be removed more easily from an emissions baseline than indirect sectoral incentives such as renewable energy portfolio standards or economy-wide policies such as domestic emissions trading schemes. Furthermore, defining the date of policy implementation and the effectiveness of enforcement may sometimes represent additional challenges (Spalding-Fecher 2013). If the guidance provided by the CDM EB – given the difficulty in isolating the impact of multiple (and sometimes conflicting) policies when setting emission baselines or demonstrating additivity – would only relate to direct financial incentives this could lead to the unequal treatment of host countries under the CDM based upon the types of policies implemented (Spalding-Fecher 2013). For example, it would be easier to determine the additivity of a renewable energy project in a host country with direct financial incentives such as feed-in tariffs compared to a host country that adopted a domestic emissions trading scheme. This practical problem could not only undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM but also mean that excluding E+ or E- policies may simply not be practical.

Taking into account the various challenges to strike the right balance between avoiding perverse incentives for policy makers and ensuring environmental integrity, Spalding-Fecher (2013) concludes that the risk of perverse incentives is not as high as previously assumed in many countries and sectors, while the risk of over-crediting is substantial. He therefore suggests that as a general rule all E- policies should be considered in both baseline-setting and additivity determination. Schneider et al. (2014) outline the following options in relation to E- policies:

- No consideration of E- policies: No perverse incentives would be created if both existing and planned E- policies were not considered when setting the crediting baseline. In fact, host countries would be encouraged to introduce further E- policies to further reduce emissions below the baseline. However, the disadvantage of this option would be that the emission baseline would most likely be inflated above BAU.

- Consideration of existing E- policies, exclusion of future E- policies: A more balanced approach could involve the introduction of a cut-off date for excluding future E- policies from being considered in the setting of the crediting baseline. However the setting of a cut-off date is problematic. For example, if the cut-off point is set too early it may inflate the crediting baseline by considering E- policies that have already been adopted. Nevertheless, the option provides a positive incentive for host countries to adopt new E- policies (after the cut-off point) to reduce emissions.

- Consideration of existing and future E- policies: A robust crediting baseline would be established if both existing and future E- policies were considered (either ex-ante or ex-post), however this would most likely create disincentives to introduce E- policies as their introduction could lower the potential for credits. In addition, this option would provide greater uncertainty for investors as to when a crediting baseline would be updated.

In order to prevent the over-crediting of emission reductions, it would be a sensible approach to include current E- policies in the crediting baseline. However, accounting for future E- policies is

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44 These options are outlined in the context of a sector based crediting mechanism though they also apply to the CDM.
more problematic and warrants further research to ensure that a reasonable balance is achieved between limiting the over-crediting of emission reductions and preventing the creation of perverse incentives. Schneider et al. (2014) and Spalding-Fecher (2013) conclude that the balance should be more in favour of limiting over-crediting in the CDM or future mechanisms as they judge this risk to be greater to undermining environment integrity than from the creation of perverse incentives. Therefore, as a general rule Schneider et al. (2014) recommend that adopted policies and regulations reducing GHG emissions should be included when setting crediting baselines and policies that increase GHG emissions should be discouraged by their exclusion from the crediting baseline where possible.

3.10. Suppressed demand

One of the challenges of applying GHG accounting approaches in poor communities is that the current consumption of many household services (e.g. heating and cooking energy, lighting and potable water) may not reflect the real demand for those services. This could be a result of lack of infrastructure, lack of natural resources or poverty, particularly the high costs of these services relative to household incomes. The situation of ‘suppressed demand’ creates a problem for setting baselines, because the CDM rules say that the baseline scenario selected for a project should provide the same level of service and quality as the project scenario (Gavaldão et al. 2012; Michaelsowa et al. 2014; Spalding-Fecher 2015; Winkler & Thorne 2002). This is clearly not the case if the project scenario provides a much higher service level, owing to low historical consumption. At the same time, the CDM rules state that “the baseline may include a scenario in which future anthropogenic emissions by sources are projected to rise above current levels, due to the specific circumstances of the host Party” (UNFCCC 2006a para. 46). This section analyzes how the concept of suppressed demand has been implemented in CDM methodologies and what the potential impacts on CER issuance as a result of the revised and new methodologies. For a more detailed conceptual explanation of suppressed demand, as well as background on previous EB decisions and guidance, see Chapter 9 of Spalding-Fecher et al. (2012).

3.10.1. Treatment of suppressed demand in approved methodologies

Table 3-10 below shows the methodologies in which suppressed demand has been explicitly considered, in three different categories. The first group is from a work plan agreed by the EB at their 67th meeting, when the EB requested that the Secretariat and relevant support panels explore how to incorporate suppressed demand. The second group is methodology revisions for which the proponent of the revision motivated the change based on the Suppressed Demand guidance. The final group is new methodologies that were developed after the approvals of the Suppressed Demand guidance and incorporated those ideas, as documented in the UNFCCC Methodology Guidebook. Of the original 10 methodologies in the EB work plan, 5 were revised or replaced, while an additional 8 methodologies fall into the second and third categories.

Note that a group of methodologies not listed here, but that implicitly recognise suppressed demand, are those addressing new large-scale power generation or industrial development. New renewable energy, natural gas or high-efficiency coal power plants are not required to show that they actually replace an existing power plant. Given that most developing countries have shortages in power supply, building a new natural-gas-fired power plant, for example, could potentially increase emissions compared to current levels. However, the accepted principle on baseline development across the CDM is that the baseline is not necessarily the same as historical emissions, but should reflect the most likely development scenario for the sector. Even in countries with chronic power shortages, it would be difficult to argue that there would be no capacity increases under the baseline scenario. This means that, even in these cases, CDM projects – if properly justified –
would potentially displace another alternative new plant. The determination of the alternative plant is then the subject of the methodology’s baseline scenario analysis.

Table 3-10: Methodologies explicitly addressing suppressed demand or part of EB work plan on suppressed demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meth No.</th>
<th>Meth Name</th>
<th>Revised?</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Pipeline¹</th>
<th>PoAs</th>
<th>PoAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From EB67 work plan List of Methodologies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0025</td>
<td>Alternative waste treatment processes</td>
<td>ACM22</td>
<td>EB69</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0046</td>
<td>Distribution of efficient light bulbs to households</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0086</td>
<td>Installation of zero energy water purifier for safe drinking water application</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EB70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0094</td>
<td>Distribution of biomass based stove and/or heater for household or institution</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>EB70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM0014</td>
<td>Treatment of wastewater</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB77</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM0016</td>
<td>Mass Rapid Transit Projects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.A</td>
<td>Electricity generation by the user</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.E</td>
<td>Switch from non-renewable biomass for thermal applications by the user</td>
<td>Not neces-sary</td>
<td>EB70</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.E</td>
<td>Energy efficiency and fuel switching measures for buildings</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.AR</td>
<td>Substituting fossil fuel based lighting with LED/CFL lighting systems</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB68</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional revisions referring to Suppressed Demand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0091</td>
<td>Energy efficiency technologies and fuel switching in new and existing buildings</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.G</td>
<td>Energy efficiency measures in thermal applications of non-renewable biomass</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.F</td>
<td>Avoidance of methane emissions through composting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB67</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New methodologies where EB noted Suppressed Demand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM0022</td>
<td>Alternative waste treatment processes</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>EB69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.R</td>
<td>Energy efficiency space heating measures for residential buildings</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>EB73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.L</td>
<td>Electrification of rural communities using renewable energy</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>EB66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.BB</td>
<td>Electrification of communities through grid extension or new mini-grids</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>EB67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.AV</td>
<td>Low greenhouse gas emitting safe drinking water production systems</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>EB60/62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total with revisions or new related to suppressed demand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total pipeline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,990</td>
<td>446²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ¹Pipeline is as of 1 January 2014. ²PoA DD’s submitted, which may include multiple methodologies and include 23 PoAs replaced by new versions. Total number of methodology citations in all PoAs submitted is 874.

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

While the proportion of project activities influenced by these methodologies is very small, a significant share of PoAs are utilising the revised or new methodologies. In terms of the quantitative impact of the revisions to methodologies to incorporate suppressed demand; however, this may only relate to projects or PoAs entering the pipeline after the revision. While project participants are allowed to update the version of the methodology that they use prior to the renewal of the crediting period, this should not make the emission reduction calculations less conservative. Given that the suppressed demand revisions could increase the baseline significantly, it is not entirely clear whether the EB would approve this revision for existing projects prior to the renewal of the crediting period (when the latest version of the methodology must be used). Because AM00025 was replaced by ACM0022 in order to address suppressed demand, none of the projects or PoAs under AM0025 (which was not used after October 2012) would be able to utilise the new suppressed...
demand approach embodied in ACM0022. Table 3-11 below shows the number of PoAs and Projects in the pipeline both before and after the revisions.

Table 3-11: CDM pipeline affected by suppressed demand methodologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meth No.</th>
<th>Meth Name</th>
<th>Total pipeline</th>
<th>New pipeline since revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>PoAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised methodologies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM0014</td>
<td>Treatment of wastewater</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.A</td>
<td>Electricity generation by the user</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.AR</td>
<td>Substituting fossil fuel based lighting with LED/CFL lighting systems</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0091</td>
<td>Energy efficiency technologies and fuel switching in new and existing buildings</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.G</td>
<td>Energy efficiency measures in thermal applications of non-renewable biomass</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.F</td>
<td>Avoidance of methane emissions through composting</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New methodologies that incorporate suppressed demand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.E</td>
<td>Switch from non-renewable biomass for thermal applications by the user</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM0022</td>
<td>Alternative waste treatment processes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.R</td>
<td>Energy efficiency space heating measures for residential buildings</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.L</td>
<td>Electrification of rural communities using renewable energy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.BB</td>
<td>Electrification of communities through grid extension or construction of new mini-grids</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.AV</td>
<td>Low greenhouse gas emitting safe drinking water production systems</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>283</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

How the suppressed demand concepts and guidance are implemented varies significantly by methodology. With the exception of AMS III.AR, all of the methodologies use the project activity level as the baseline activity level. Only AMS III.AR defines a quantitative Minimum Service Level that is used to calculate baseline emissions. AMS I.L and AMS III.BB define an MSL, but it is only used to adjust the emissions factor for the baseline, rather than to directly calculate baseline activity levels or emissions. For AMS III.F and ACM0022, the minimum service level is qualitatively defined as having a solid waste disposal site (i.e. rather than considering the quantity of waste processed per household). What the methodologies all do, however, is to define a baseline technology that may have higher emissions than the actual current technology. For example, households may currently only use candles and kerosene hurricane lamps, and therefore have very low lighting services, but the methodologies use a kerosene pressure lamps for the baseline technology, because this can deliver the MSL for lighting services.

For the revised methodologies, the resulting baselines emissions could be substantially higher per household (Annex 8.2, Table 8-1). For example, under ACM0014, baseline methane emissions may still be considered even if the wastewater is currently not treated or stored in a way that would necessarily produce emissions (e.g. lagoons with depth less than 1 m). ACM0022 and AMS III.F have emissions factors that could be double the current practices, while for AMS I.L and AMS
III.BB, the emission factor for very small users (e.g. 50 kWh/yr) is almost 7 times the emissions factor originally used in AMS I.A for these projects.

3.10.2. **Impact on CER supply**

If current energy service demand is suppressed by lack of income, relatively high energy prices and/or lack of physical access, how quickly might this change without the CDM project? In other words, how long might it take for the current emissions to reach the suppressed baseline emissions? This depends on many factors, including income growth in the host communities and changes in access. Data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), for example, shows that, at a highly aggregated level, per capita incomes in most developing regions have, indeed, increased substantially, but this is slower in low income countries. Electricity consumption per capita, however, has not shown such consistent growth in Africa, largely due to population growth outstripping energy supply growth and electrification programmes (World Bank 2014). This data cannot necessarily be applied to specific sub-regions or project areas, but does show that significant increases in energy consumption are possible in a relatively short time frame. In terms of electrification rates, these have increased relatively rapidly for key countries, rising from 25% or 30% to 60% to 80% in as little as 10 or as many as 30 years (Bazilian et al. 2011). Clearly, the level at which the minimum service level is set will also influence the risk of over-crediting, with lower service levels being more likely to reflect potential consumption in the shorter term without the CDM.

Even if the households were not to reach the minimum service levels in the near term and the emissions factors used in these methodologies is substantially higher than in traditional methodologies, the overall impact on CER generation is likely to be very small. The total CERs projected to 2020 for the methodologies in Table 3-11 after the revisions to those methodologies is approximately 17 million. Even if all of the CERs for those methodologies are considered (i.e. before and after revision), at approximately 112 million, this is still less than 1% of the entire CDM pipeline, and so does not represent a significant impact on emissions.

3.10.3. **Additionality concerns**

In summary, while the introduction of the concept of suppressed demand in CDM methodologies is expanding, and will have important development impacts, it is unlikely to have a major impact on the overall additionality of CDM projects. In many project areas, it is likely that the communities could reach the Minimum Service Levels during the course of the CDM project life, although this is uncertain and will depend on local circumstances. Creating an open and transparent process of setting minimum service levels, with expert input as well as input from other stakeholders, could also help to balance the risks of over-crediting with the potential increased development benefits. In addition, the application of suppressed demand principles in methodologies could be restricted to certain country groups (e.g. LDCs, under-represented countries), in which development needs are highest and the potential for over-crediting it the smallest. Even if the suppressed demand does lead to some over-crediting, the overall impact is very small, particularly if restricted geographically. More importantly, the increased contribution to sustainable development provides a strong justification for this approach to project types that address poverty and development issues.

4. **Assessment of specific CDM project types**

The relevant literature highlights that the likelihood of CERs representing real, measurable and additional emission reductions varies considerably among project types. Some project types do not generate revenues other than CERs. These projects have a high likelihood of being additional. Other project types are heavily promoted and/or subsidized by governments, generate significant
other revenues, or their economic feasibility is hardly impacted by CER revenues. For these projects, additionality is more questionable.

Other aspects affecting the quality of CERs also vary among project types. Perverse incentives are particularly relevant for projects that generate large CER revenues compared to the cost structure of their main business (e.g. HFC-23 projects). Baselines are particularly challenging to determine in dynamic sectors with high rates of learning and innovation and penetration of new technologies over relatively short periods of time. The length of crediting is critical for project types which are implemented earlier due to the CDM incentives.

For these reasons, this chapter evaluates the ability to deliver real, measurable and additional emissions reductions for specific CDM project types. In the following, we select important project types in Section 4.1 and assess these project types in the subsequent sections.

4.1. Project types selected for evaluation

We select the project types for evaluation mostly based on their potential CER volume in the period of 2013 to 2020 according to the current CDM project portfolio. Focusing on the period of 2013 to 2020 and on the largest CDM project types in terms of potential CER volume allows the best estimation of the quality of the overall CDM project portfolio for future new demand for CERs. Moreover, the project types with the largest market share are most critical for the overall quality of the CDM.

The specific project types selected for evaluation are provided in Table 4-1. The table also shows that these project types cover a potential CER volume of 4.8 billion CERs, which corresponds to 85% of the overall CER supply potential for the period of 2013 to 2020 (Section 2.3). This ensures a large representativeness.
### Table 4-1: Project types selected for evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Potential CER supply 2013 to 2020 [million]</th>
<th>Focus areas analyzed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass power</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines, leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFC-23</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Perverse incentive, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipic acid</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>Perverse incentives (leakage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>Perverse incentives, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines, perverse incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mine methane</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste heat recovery</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient cook stoves</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Additionality, baselines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Additionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of all selected project types</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,829</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of all projects in the CDM portfolio</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,671</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ own compilation and calculations

### 4.2. HFC-23 abatement from HCFC-22 production

#### 4.2.1. Overview

Hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) is a waste gas from the production of hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22), which is a GHG and an ozone-depleting substance (ODS) regulated under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. HCFCs were introduced as an alternative to the highly ozone-depleting chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) because of their lower ozone-depleting potential. HCFC-22 is mainly used for two purposes: as a refrigerant in refrigeration and air-conditioning appliances and as a feedstock in the production of polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE). The production for the refrigeration and air-conditioning industry is regulated under the Montreal Protocol, whereas the production for feedstock purposes is not.

HFC-23 is a potent greenhouse gas; its global warming potential (GWP) is estimated at 14,800 for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions of HFC-23 from HCFC-22 production can be abated in two ways: a) by reducing the rate of waste gas generation (by-product rate) through process optimization and b) by capturing and destroying HFC-23 through installation and operation of high temperature incinerators. In the absence of regulations, incentives, or voluntary commitments by the industry, HFC-23 is usually vented to the atmosphere (Schneider & Cames 2014).

#### 4.2.2. Potential CER volume

Under the CDM, 19 HFC-23 projects have been registered. Eleven projects are located in China, five in India; South Korea, Argentina and Mexico each host one project. All projects apply the baseline and monitoring methodology AM0001. In the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the abatement of HFC-23 has been the project type with the largest CER issuance: 516 million HFC-
23 CERs or 36% were issued of a total of 1.4 billion CERs by the end of 2013. The potential CER supply for the period of 2013 to 2020 is estimated using a bottom-up model based on a detailed evaluation of the information in PDDs and monitoring reports from all 19 projects (Schneider & Cames 2014). In estimating the potential CER supply we differentiate between CERs from the application of versions 1 to 5 and version 6 of the applicable baseline and monitoring methodology AM0001 due to the significant differences between these methodology versions. The potential CER supply for the period of 2013 to 2020 is illustrated in Figure 4-1; it amounts to approx. 375 million CERs for the entire period, with 191 million from the application of version 1 to 5 and 184 million from the application of version 6 of the methodology AM0001.

![CER supply potential of HFC-23 projects](image)

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

### 4.2.3. Additionality

All versions of the applicable baseline and monitoring methodology AM0001 consider HFC-23 projects to be automatically additional, as long as no regulations to abate HFC-23 are in place in the host country. This rule seems appropriate. Prior to the CDM, none of the plants in developing countries had equipment to destroy HFC-23; HFC-23 generated in the production process was vented to the atmosphere. The same holds for plants that are not eligible for crediting under the CDM because they started commercial operation after 31 December 2001. Plant operators do not have economic incentives to install HFC-23 destruction equipment, as the installation and operation does not reduce costs or generate any significant revenues other than from CERs.\(^{45}\) Based on these considerations, we assess that this project type is very likely to be additional.

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\(^{45}\) Schneider & Cames (2014) report that plant operators could sell HF which is a by-product from flue gas treatment. However, these revenues are likely lower than the costs for HFC-23 destruction.
4.2.4. Baseline emissions

HFC-23 generation from HCFC-22 production depends on two factors: the amount of HCFC-22 production and the ratio between HFC-23 generation and HCFC-22 production, which is often referred to as ‘waste generation rate’. The applicable methodology AM0001 determines baseline emissions of HFC-23 based on these two factors, by multiplying the baseline HCFC-22 production with the baseline waste generation rate.\(^{46}\) How these two parameters are calculated, has evolved over time.

The approaches changed over time with a view to addressing perverse incentives which are a particular concern for the crediting of HFC-23, due to the low technical abatement costs\(^{47}\) and significant profits which can accrue from CER revenues and could exceed the costs of HCFC-22 production (Schneider 2011, UNFCCC 2011b, TEAP 2005). Significant perverse incentives were observed in two JI projects in which plant operators increased the waste generation rate to unprecedented levels once methodological safeguards were abandoned (Schneider & Kollmuss 2015). Perverse incentives can arise from the CDM in the following ways:

- HCFC-22 plants could operate at a higher waste generation rate than they would in the absence of the CER revenues, leading to over-crediting;
- The amount of HCFC-22 produced at CDM plants could be higher than in the absence of the CER revenues. This could lead to over-crediting if
  - HCFC-22 production is displaced at non-CDM plants that have a lower waste generation rate than the baseline rate used at the CDM plants;
  - HCFC-22 production is displaced at plants located in Annex I countries that already are required to abate HFC-23 emissions;
  - HCFC-22 is not produced for use in applications but is vented to the atmosphere;
  - The use of HCFC-22 becomes economically more attractive due to the CDM and is increasingly used compared to other less GHG-intensive alternatives;
  - The base year emissions (2009-2010) under the accelerated phase-out under the 2007 amendment to the Montreal Protocol are higher due to the CDM;
  - The implementation of the accelerated phase-out of HCFC-22 is delayed due to the CDM;
- The HCFC-22 plants could operate longer than they would in the absence of CDM revenues. This could lead to over-crediting under the same circumstances as a higher HCFC-22 production at the plants.

Robustness and conservativeness of the methodology has significantly increased over time. Perverse incentives constitute a major challenge in versions 1 to 5, whereas the conservative approach in version 6 largely avoids and compensates for perverse incentives.

For CERs issued to projects under versions 1 to 5, the amount of over-crediting is uncertain, since it hinges strongly on assumptions on HCFC-22 production levels, HFC-23 waste generation rates and the indirect effects noted above. Munnings et al. (2016) suggest that under-crediting due to conservative baselines may have more than compensated for the potential over-crediting from perverse incentives that these baselines were intended to curb. However, Munnings et al. (2016) make several assumptions that seem rather implausible. For example, they assume that in the absence of the CDM, some plants would have produced more HCFC-22 than they did under the CDM. As a result, we do not find their arguments persuasive.

\(^{46}\) Versions 1 to 5 of methodology AM0001 do not explicitly calculate baseline emissions but directly calculate the emission reductions.

\(^{47}\) Schneider & Cames (2014), Appendix, provide an overview of technical abatement costs for HFC-23 destruction.
Under version 6, on the other hand, net under-crediting (or net emissions benefit) is very likely since the methodology uses an ambitious default value of 1.0% for the baseline waste generation rate and caps the amount of HCFC-22 production that is eligible for crediting in a more conservative manner (Erickson et al. 2014). However, as of 1 January 2016, no credits have been issued under version 6.

### 4.2.5. Other issues

Continued low CER prices could jeopardize continued abatement activities at CDM HFC-23 project sites, an unfortunate outcome given the very inexpensive abatement opportunities they provide. At the same time, the failure of the CDM market to ensure continued abatement creates the opportunity for other policies that could yield even greater net emission benefits, especially if no credits are generated that could be also used to increase emissions elsewhere. For example, China recently launched a results-based finance programme that supports HFC-23 abatement in CDM and non-CDM plants (NDRC 2015). This programme helps support HFC-23 abatement across the sector in China. However, continued abatement in other CDM-eligible countries is less certain.

There are also other means to ensure these important abatement opportunities are not lost. Emissions of HFC-23 from HCFC-22 production can be regulated through the Montreal Protocol and for new facilities that have not yet installed GHG abatement, the Protocol’s Multilateral Fund (MLF) for GHG abatement can provide financial support (Schneider & Cames 2014).

Note also that continued crediting under the CDM could also create perverse incentives for policy makers not to pursue alternative policies such as these, which address emissions without yielding CERs.

### 4.2.6. Summary of findings

Past changes to methodologies have now improved the integrity of these projects. If they are operated they are likely to yield more emissions reductions than CERs – i.e. a net mitigation benefit. However, continued low CER prices jeopardize their continued operation in some countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additio-nality</th>
<th>Likely to be additional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over-crediting</td>
<td>Risk of perverse incentives largely addressed in most recent methodology (version 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Version 6 could lead to under-crediting (net mitigation benefit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>Low CER prices jeopardizes continued operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emissions could be addressed through Montreal Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perverse incentives to avoid domestic regulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

The necessary changes in AM0001 have been implemented in recent years. No changes in CDM rules are needed.

### 4.3. Adipic acid

#### 4.3.1. Overview

Adipic acid is an organic chemical that is used as a building block in a range of different products, most importantly polyamide, often referred to as ‘nylon’. Other applications include the production of polyurethanes and plasticizers. Adipic acid is a globally traded commodity, with more than one-third of the production traded internationally. Nitrous oxide (N₂O) is an unwanted by-product of adipic acid production. The formation of N₂O cannot be avoided; it is the result of using nitric acid
to oxidize cyclohexanone and/or cyclohexanol. Generally, the amount of N\textsubscript{2}O generated varies very little over time and among plants.

N\textsubscript{2}O in the waste gas stream can be abated in different ways: by catalytic destruction, by thermal decomposition, by using the N\textsubscript{2}O for nitric acid production, or by recycling the N\textsubscript{2}O as feedstock for adipic acid production (Schneider, L. et al. 2010). These methods typically reach an abatement level of about 90% (IPCC 2006, p. 3.30, Ecofys et al. 2009, p. 44). However, plants implemented under CDM and JI achieved significantly higher abatement levels of approx. 99% in the case of CDM and 92% to 99% in the case of JI, apparently through the strong economic incentives from the CDM and JI (Schneider, L. et al. 2010).

4.3.2. Potential CER volume

Under the CDM, four projects were registered. Two projects are located in China, one is in Brazil and one in South Korea. All four CDM plants had no abatement installed before project implementation and applied either thermal or catalytic abatement. The four implemented CDM plants cover only a part of the adipic acid production in developing countries because the applicable CDM methodology AM0021 is limited to plants that started commercial operation before 2005. Since then, five new plants are known to have started commercial operation in China; none of them abates N\textsubscript{2}O emissions (Schneider & Cames 2014). Based on a bottom-up model used by Schneider & Cames (2014), the four CDM projects could generate about 257 million CERs in the period of 2013 to 2020.

4.3.3. Additionality

The applicable methodology AM0021 combines the approaches included in the different approaches to demonstrate additionality. Version 1 establishes three criteria for additionality demonstration: no regulations should require N\textsubscript{2}O abatement, the project should not be common practice and it should not be economically viable. Versions 2 and 3 refer to the additionality tool and hence the investment analysis is not mandatory for additionality demonstration, as compared to version 1. Nevertheless, all four registered projects conduct an investment analysis and determine the net present value (NPV). Versions 2 and 3 also require reassessment of additionality during the crediting period if new NO\textsubscript{X} regulations were introduced.

N\textsubscript{2}O abatement from adipic acid production can be regarded as highly likely to be additional, for several reasons. Firstly, none of the non-Annex I countries in which adipic acid is produced have regulations in place to abate N\textsubscript{2}O. Secondly, for thermal or catalytic destruction of N\textsubscript{2}O, plant operators have no economic incentives to abate N\textsubscript{2}O emissions. The abatement generates steam as a by-product; however, the cost savings or revenues are lower than the investment and operation and maintenance costs. Based on a review of PDDs and literature information, the technical abatement costs are estimated at €0.3/t CO\textsubscript{2}e, with a range from €0.1/t CO\textsubscript{2}e to €1.2/t CO\textsubscript{2}e (Schneider & Cames 2014).

Thirdly, the abatement of N\textsubscript{2}O from adipic acid production is not common practice in non-Annex I countries. In Western industrialized countries, N\textsubscript{2}O has been abated voluntarily since the 1990s. In non-Annex I countries, only one plant in Singapore had abatement technology installed prior to the CDM (Schneider, L. et al. 2010). None of the plants commissioned after 2004, which are not eligible for crediting under the CDM, installed N\textsubscript{2}O abatement technology.

4.3.4. Baseline emissions

Baseline emissions of N\textsubscript{2}O are determined by multiplying the amount of adipic acid production eligible for crediting with a baseline emission factor. The methodology further estimates baseline
emissions from steam generated during the catalytic or thermal destruction of N₂O. Baseline emissions from steam generation are very small compared to baseline emissions of N₂O.

The baseline emission factor is determined as the lower value between the actual rate of N₂O formation and a default value of 270 kg N₂O / t adipic acid, which corresponds to the lower end of the uncertainty range of the IPCC default value of 300 kg / t adipic acid (IPCC 2006). This approach is used in all three methodology versions and intends to exclude the possibility of manipulating the production process to increase the rate of N₂O formation. Versions 2 and 3 require the actual N₂O formation rate to be determined in two ways: 1) based on the consumption of nitric acid and the ratio of N₂O to N₂ in the off-gas, and 2) based on direct measurements of N₂O in the off-gas adjusted by a 5% discount factor to account for measurement uncertainty. As a conservative approach, the lower resulting value of the two ways is used to determine the baseline emission factor. Overall, the methodology ensures that the baseline emission factor is determined in a conservative manner. The rate of N₂O formation typically observed is higher than the default value of 270 kg / t adipic acid, which could potentially lead to under-crediting of few percentage points.

The amount of adipic acid production that is eligible for crediting is capped in all three methodology versions with a view to avoiding incentives to expand the production as a result of the CDM. Version 2 and 3 establish the cap as the highest annual production in the three years prior to the implementation of the project activity. Version 1 does not provide a procedure to determine a cap but specifies that the methodology is “only applicable for installed capacity (measured in tons of adipic acid per year) that exists by the end of the year 2004”. There has been controversy about how this requirement is to be interpreted. Following a request for clarification (AM_CLA_0148), the Methodologies Panel recommended using production data from three historical years, similar to Versions 2 and 3. However, the CDM EB concluded that the panels’ clarification “provides too extensive interpretation to an older version of methodology” and clarified instead that the cap should be determined as the “validated maximum daily production of adipic acid multiplied by 365 days multiplied by the operational rate”. This was further interpreted in a way that allowed plants to seek credits beyond their annual design capacity specified in PDDs. All four CDM projects were registered with Version 1 of the methodology. Two projects (0099 and 0116) recently renewed their crediting period, applying Version 3 of the methodology, which lead to caps that that are 14.8% and 13.9% lower than the caps applicable in their first crediting period.

While the methodology intended to avoid production shifts through caps on the amount of production that is eligible for crediting, data on adipic acid production, plant utilisation and international trade patterns suggest that carbon leakage, i.e. a shift of production from non-CDM plants to CDM plants, occurred during the economic downturn in 2008 and 2009 (Schneider, L. et al. 2010). Such production shifts do not only lead to distortions in the adipic acid market but can also lead to over-crediting if N₂O is abated in the non-CDM plants. Schneider, L. et al. (2010) estimate that carbon leakage leads to over-crediting of approx. 6.3 MtCO₂e or about 17% of the CERs from adipic acid projects issued in 2008 and approx. 7.2 MtCO₂e or about 21% of the CERs from adipic acid projects in 2009. These effects could thus outweigh the conservative determination of the baseline emission factor.

The lenient interpretation of historical production capacity in version 1 of the methodology considerably contributed to the carbon leakage. However, the more conservative approach for the establishment of the cap on adipic acid production in versions 2 and 3 of the methodology addresses this issue only partially. In a global economic recession, adipic acid production could fall well below historical rates of plant utilisation. Depending on the CER prices, CDM plants operators would then have significant competitive advantage over non-CDM plants, which could lead to similar produc-

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tion shifts as observed in 2008 and 2009. As for HCFC-22 production, the underlying issue is that carbon market revenues can have a strong impact on adipic acid production costs. Carbon leakage is unlikely to occur at current market prices for CERs, but could become an issue again if CER prices increased.

4.3.5. Other issues
No other issues were identified.

4.3.6. Summary of findings
Adipic acid projects have a very high likelihood of additionality. The baseline emission factor is determined in a conservative manner that could lead to a few percentage points of under-crediting. The methodology does not include sufficient provisions to address carbon leakage. This could lead to significant over-crediting in times of higher CER prices and when the adipic acid production capacity significantly exceeds demand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additivity</th>
<th>Likely to be additional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over-crediting</td>
<td>Most recent methodology could lead to slight under-crediting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules
Based on the considerations above, we recommend revising the applicable CDM methodology as follows:

- The provisions for additionality demonstration could be simplified, as this project type can be considered to be very likely additional. We recommend considering this project type as automatically additional, as long as no regulations require N₂O abatement.

- The potential for carbon leakage should be addressed. We recommend introducing a standardized ambitious emission benchmark to determine baseline emissions. Carbon leakage would be avoided most effectively if a consistent emissions benchmark is used for all plants around the world, including plants under ETSs, and if it is set at or below the abatement level typically achieved in the industry. A standardized global emission benchmark for all adipic acid plants, regardless of policy approach or specific emission trading mechanism, could provide a level playing field for the adipic acid industry and eliminate potential economic distortions. Adipic acid production is particularly amenable to a standardized global benchmark because it is a highly globalized industry, and all plants are very similar in structure and technology (Schneider, L. et al. 2010). We recommend a level at or below 30 kg/t adipic acid, which reflects the abatement level achieved by the large majority of producers world-wide.

- If a standardized ambitious emissions benchmark is introduced, the methodology could be further simplified as measurements and calculations of the rate of N₂O formation would not be necessary.
4.4. Nitric acid

4.4.1. Overview

Nitric acid is mainly used for the production of synthetic fertilizers and explosives. In the industrial production of nitric acid, ammonia (NH\textsubscript{3}) is oxidized over precious metal gauzes (primary catalyst) to produce nitrogen monoxide (NO), which then reacts with oxygen and water to form nitric acid. N\textsubscript{2}O is an unwanted by-product generated at the primary catalyst. The better a primary catalyst functions, the lower the N\textsubscript{2}O emissions. Nitric acid is produced during production campaigns of typically 3-12 months (Kollmuss & Lazarus 2010).

N\textsubscript{2}O emissions from nitric acid production can be abated in three ways (Schneider & Cames 2014):

- **Primary abatement** prevents the formation of N\textsubscript{2}O at the primary catalyst. According to gauze suppliers, improved gauzes could potentially lead to a 30-40% reduction of N\textsubscript{2}O formation (Ecofys et al. 2009).

- **Secondary abatement** removes N\textsubscript{2}O through the installation of a secondary N\textsubscript{2}O destruction catalyst in the oxidation reactor. The abatement efficiency of the secondary catalyst is often estimated as ranging from 80% to 90%. However, in practice it varies in CDM plants from about 50% to more than 90%. Registered CDM projects achieved an average abatement efficiency of 70% (Kollmuss & Lazarus 2010, Debor et al. 2010).

- **Tertiary abatement** removes N\textsubscript{2}O from the tail gas through either thermal or catalytic decomposition. Tertiary abatement can reduce N\textsubscript{2}O emissions by more than 90% but involves larger investment and operating costs and more demanding technical requirements than secondary abatement. Registered CDM projects achieved an average abatement efficiency of 86% (Kollmuss & Lazarus 2010, Debor et al. 2010).

Four methodologies have been approved for N\textsubscript{2}O abatement from nitric acid production:

- **AM0028** is applicable to tertiary abatement in plants that started commercial operation before 2006. 19 projects used the methodology. In 2013, the methodology was limited to caprolactam production in 2013, and replaced by amending the methodology ACM0019.

- **AM0034** is applicable to secondary abatement in plants that started commercial operation before 2006. 56 projects used the methodology. In 2013, the methodology was withdrawn and replaced by amending the methodology ACM0019.

- **AM0051** is also applicable to secondary abatement in plants that started commercial operation before 2006. The methodology was never used and was withdrawn in 2013. It is therefore not considered in detail in this study.

- **ACM0019** is applicable to both secondary and tertiary abatement and both existing and new plants. 26 projects used the methodology. Since 2013, this is the only valid methodology for nitric acid projects.

Table 4-2 provides an overview of the main features of and differences between the methodologies.
Table 4-2: Overview of methodologies for nitric acid projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AM0028</th>
<th>AM0034</th>
<th>AM0051</th>
<th>ACM0019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Secondary and tertiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity</td>
<td>Limited to caprolactam in 2013</td>
<td>Withdrawn in 2013</td>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicability</td>
<td>Plants that started operation before 2006</td>
<td>Existing and new plants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additionality demonstration</td>
<td>Additionality tool</td>
<td>Automatically additional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline emission factor</td>
<td>Ex-post measurements</td>
<td>Ex-ante measurement campaign</td>
<td>Ex-post measurements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap on baseline production</td>
<td>Design capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>No cap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-assessment of baseline scenario or additionality</td>
<td>In case of new NO\textsubscript{x} regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

4.4.2. Potential CER volume

Under the CDM, 97 projects were registered and another four projects were submitted for validation as of January 2014. China is the most important host country with 44 projects. Other important countries are India (5 projects), Uzbekistan (6 projects), South Africa (5 projects), and Brazil, Egypt, Israel and South Korea which host each four projects. Among the 97 registered CDM projects, only 51 have issued CERs as of January 2014. In the current market situation, it is likely that most of the remaining 47 projects have not been implemented. Based on a bottom-up model developed by Schneider & Cames (2014), the 101 published CDM projects could generate approx. 175 million CERs in the period of 2013 to 2020. Potential new projects that have not yet been developed or published are estimated to have a potential of approx. 31 million CERs over the same period.

4.4.3. Additionality

Up to 2011, all three approved methodologies (AM0028, AM0034, AM0051) used the additionality tool to demonstrate additionality. In 2011, ACM0019 was adopted, which deems projects to be automatically additional and employs a dynamic emission benchmark to determine baseline emissions.

N\textsubscript{2}O abatement from nitric acid production can be regarded as highly likely to be additional, for similar reasons as for HFC-23 abatement from HCFC-22 production and N\textsubscript{2}O abatement from adipic acid production. Non-Annex I countries usually do not have regulations which address N\textsubscript{2}O emissions from nitric acid production. Prior to the CDM, secondary or tertiary abatement is not known to have been used in non-Annex I countries and N\textsubscript{2}O is usually released to the atmosphere. While plant operators have economic incentives to take primary abatement measures to reduce the rate of N\textsubscript{2}O formation, they do not save any costs or generate any revenues – other than car-
bon market revenues – from the installation of secondary or tertiary abatement. Based on a review from PDDs and literature information, the average technical abatement costs are estimated at €0.9/t CO$_2$e for secondary abatement and at €3.2/t CO$_2$e for tertiary abatement (Schneider & Cames 2014). For these reasons, in our assessment, the approach in ACM0019 of assuming this project type automatically additional seems reasonable.

4.4.4. Baseline emissions

Baseline emissions are determined by multiplying the amount of nitric acid production with a baseline emission factor. The methodologies AM0028, AM0034 and AM0051 limit the amount of nitric acid production eligible for claiming emission reductions to the design capacity of the plant in 2005; ACM0019 has no such cap. The baseline emissions factor is determined in three different ways in CDM methodologies: through measurement campaigns conducted prior to the installation of the abatement technology (AM0034), through measurements during the crediting period (AM0028 and AM0051), and by using an emissions benchmark (ACM0019).

All three methodologies using measurements (AM0028, AM0034 and AM0051) aim to provide safeguards to avoid perverse incentives to artificially increase the rate of N$_2$O formation in order to increase CDM revenues (UNFCCC 2012b; UNFCCC 2013; Schneider & Cames 2014). In AM0028, the baseline emission factor is capped to the level of previous monitoring periods if project participants do not use a primary catalyst that is common practice in the region or has been used in the nitric acid plant during the last three years and if they cannot justify the use of a different catalyst. In addition, key operating conditions of the plants cannot be changed during project implementation. In AM0034, the methodology requires a new baseline measurement campaign to be conducted if the chemical composition of the primary catalyst is changed after project implementation. While these provisions aimed to avoid perverse incentives to increase the N$_2$O formation due to the CDM, they provide economic disincentives to plant operators to use primary catalysts that reduce the formation of N$_2$O, as this would lower their CER revenues and could involve additional costs for conducting a new baseline campaign (UNFCCC 2012b; UNFCCC 2013; Schneider & Cames 2014). However, advanced primary catalysts that increase the NO yield and lower the generation of the by-product N$_2$O are emerging in the industry. They have become widespread in Europe, are gaining market shares in other parts of the world, and have been used in a number of CDM projects prior to their start (UNFCCC 2012b). It is thus possible that some CDM projects applying the AM0034 or AM0028 methodology would, in the absence of the CDM incentives, employ more advanced primary catalysts, in particular over the time frame of three crediting periods, leading to over-crediting (UNFCCC 2012b).

The Methodologies Panel further identified that some plants using the AM0034 methodology had established baseline emission factors which are significantly above the uncertainty range of the IPCC default values and which would result in considerable economic losses for the plant operators (UNFCCC 2012b). The highest reported value from a baseline measurement campaign is 37.0 kg N$_2$O/t nitric acid, while the highest IPCC default value is 9.0 kg N$_2$O/t nitric acid, with an uncertainty range of ±40% (IPCC 2006). Such high emission factors indicate that these plants are operated at a high specific ammonia consumption. Plant operators could intentionally reduce the production efficiency during the baseline campaign in order to achieve a higher CDM baseline emission factor (UNFCCC 2012b). Moreover, while inefficient plant operation can be observed in Non-Annex I countries, it seems questionable whether the observed levels of nitrogen loss would continue over the course of three crediting periods. On the other hand, it is important to take into account that the IPCC default emission factors were estimated at times when much less information was available on N$_2$O formation from nitric acid plants. In particular, continuous measurements over the length of a production campaign, with increasing N$_2$O emissions towards the end of the
campaign, were not available. The values and their assigned uncertainty should therefore not be overweighed.

To address these two issues, the CDM EB withdrew the AM0034 and AM0051 methodologies and limited the applicability of the AM0028 methodology to caprolactam plants in 2013. At the same time, the EB revised the methodology ACM0019, distinguishing the approach between plants that used AM0028 or AM0034 in their first crediting period and other (mostly newer) plants. For AM0028 and AM0034 plants up to their design capacity, the methodology uses the lower value between the historical baseline emissions during the first crediting period under AM0028 and AM0034 and a default value set at the upper end of the uncertainty range of the IPCC default value and declining by 0.2 kg N₂O/t nitric acid per year to reflect technological innovation in primary catalysts that may reduce emissions over time. This approach caps the baseline emissions particularly for those plants that have established baseline emission factors above the IPCC uncertainty range. It also reduces the maximum amount of baseline emissions that can be claimed over time.

The new approach has several advantages but also some shortcomings:

- Importantly, using default emission benchmarks – whatever the real baseline emissions from a specific plant are – fully avoids perverse incentives for plant operators not to use advanced primary catalysts that reduce the formation of N₂O. Plant operators have incentives to innovate, as this lowers their project emissions and increases the number of CERs issued;
- Using default emission benchmarks further fully avoids the risk that plant operators could intentionally increase the rate of N₂O formation during a baseline campaign in order to maximize CER revenues;
- Using default emission benchmarks can lead to over-crediting in plants that actually have lower N₂O formation rates and to under-crediting in plants that actually have higher N₂O formation rates. Both under- and over-crediting is likely to occur since the N₂O formation rate observed in CDM projects varies by a factor of 10 from 3.5 to 37.0 kg N₂O/t nitric acid, with an average value of 8.6 kg N₂O/t nitric acid (UNFCCC 2012b). Significant over- and under-crediting can have several unintended consequences (Schneider et al. 2014). Plants with a high N₂O formation rate may not be able to reduce their project emissions significantly below the emissions benchmark and may thus not be implemented – although their implementation would be possible with a project-specific baseline. Such ‘lost opportunities’ could increase the global cost of GHG abatement.

The overall impact on environmental integrity depends on the methodology and plant type (Table 4-3). For newer plants, the emission benchmark declining from 3.7 to 2.5 kg N₂O/t nitric acid is rather conservative and will likely lead to under-crediting for most – if not all – plants. For plants that used AM0028 or AM0034 in the first crediting period, the declining project-specific benchmark in ACM0019 is a reasonable baseline on average over all projects in our assessment; projects with higher baseline emission rates than the IPCC range will receive less CERs, while some over-crediting could occur for projects that adopt more advanced catalysts at a faster rate than the decrease of 0.2 kg N₂O/t nitric acid per year foreseen in the methodology. The use of AM0028 and AM0034 could lead to over-crediting in some instances, due to the issues identified above. Considering all plant types and methodology versions together, it seems likely that the approaches for
baseline emissions overall reasonably provide for environmental integrity; the low or moderate levels of over-crediting that could occur under AM0028 and AM0034 could be compensated by significant under-crediting for newer plants applying ACM0019. Over time, the quality of CERs will increase due to the increased phase-in of ACM0019.

Table 4-3: Assessment of environmental integrity of nitric acid projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plant type</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Identified environmental integrity issues</th>
<th>2013-2020 CER potential</th>
<th>Potential for under- or over-crediting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plants that started operation before 2006: 1st CP</td>
<td>AM0028 AM0034</td>
<td>• Perverse incentives not to adopt technologies that reduce the rate of N₂O formation • Risk of manipulation of the production process during the baseline campaign</td>
<td>73 million</td>
<td>Low or moderate over-crediting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plants that started operation before 2006: 2nd and 3rd CP</td>
<td>ACM 0019</td>
<td>• Under-crediting for plants with higher N₂O formation rates than the IPCC range • Over-crediting for plants that adopt advanced primary catalyst technologies at faster rates</td>
<td>70 million</td>
<td>Neutral / Low over- or under-crediting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newer plants or plants that did not use AM0028/ AM0034</td>
<td>ACM 0019</td>
<td>• None</td>
<td>32 million</td>
<td>Moderate to significant under-crediting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

4.4.5. Other issues

No other issues were identified.

4.4.6. Summary of findings

Nitric acid projects have a very high likelihood of additionality. Baseline emissions can be over- or under-credited; overall, they are likely to reasonably ensure environmental integrity for 2013-2020 CERs, with the average quality of CERs improving over time.

An important lesson learned from this project type is that the potential for technological innovation and perverse incentives was not sufficiently considered when approving the initial methodologies. For sectors that could undergo significant technological innovation, using historic data or measurement campaigns to establish a baseline for up to 21 years is debatable. The more recent ACM0019 methodology accounts for technological innovation by using an emission benchmark that declines over time.
4.4.7. **Recommendations for reform of CDM rules**

No recommendations.

4.5. **Wind power**

4.5.1. **Overview**

CDM wind power projects mainly use four methodologies.\(^{49}\) The vast majority of projects (more than 99% of all CDM wind projects) feed electricity into the grid.\(^{50}\)

According to the UNEP DTU (2014), by the end of 2013, an overall wind power capacity of 111 GW had been installed by projects using the CDM. The main contributors to this overall capacity are China (83 GW), India (10 GW), Mexico and Brazil (both 4 GW). The other 36 countries with CDM wind power projects account for 10 GW of installed capacity in total.

Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 illustrate the development of wind power capacity and the use of the CDM in China, India and Brazil.\(^{51}\) In China, installation of wind power capacity accelerated from 2005 onwards. A comparison of the total wind power capacity installed and the capacity installed by projects using the CDM\(^{52}\) over the 2005 to 2012 period (Figure 4-2) shows that CDM projects accounted for about 90% of the total cumulated installed capacity as of 2012 (about 75 GW). In the case of India (Figure 4-3), installed capacity increased significantly between 2005 and 2012 from 1.4 GW in 2005 to more than 15 GW in 2012. CDM projects accounted for about half (51%) of the total cumulated capacity installed as of 2012. In the case of Brazil (Figure 4-4), the total cumulated installed capacity as of 2012 was much smaller (2.5 GW). The share of CDM projects in cumulative capacity was 43% as of 2012.

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\(^{49}\) ACM0002, AMS-I.A, AMS-I.D, AMS-I.F.

\(^{50}\) ACM0002 (large scale), AMS-I.D (small scale).

\(^{51}\) China, India and Brazil are selected for the graphs in order to ensure comparability across chapters on renewable power generation since they are important CDM countries for hydropower and biomass power, too.

\(^{52}\) The total installed capacity between 2005 and 2012 is taken from the World Wind Energy Association statistics (WWEA 2015) and accumulated across the years. The installed capacity of projects using the CDM is taken from UNEP DTU (2014) and accumulated, too. The installation year is taken as the starting date of the crediting period. Cumulative values were used to illustrate the contribution of the CDM since annual values are misleading due to potential differences between the year of construction and the year in which the crediting period starts. Therefore, cumulative values provide a better picture of the general trend of the CDM share in total capacity installed.
Figure 4-2: Total cumulated wind power capacity installed in China between 2005 and 2012

Sources: UNEP DTU 2014, WWEA 2015, authors’ own calculations

Figure 4-3: Total cumulated wind power capacity installed in India between 2005 and 2012

Sources: UNEP DTU 2014, WWEA 2015, authors’ own calculations
4.5.2. Potential CER volume

According to our own estimates, registered CDM wind power projects have the potential to issue 3.5 billion CERs by the end of their respective crediting periods, of which 1.4 billion CERs fall in the period from 2013 to 2020 (Table 2-1). CERs from wind power account for about one quarter of the total CER issuance potential.

4.5.3. Additionality

Large-scale wind power projects apply the methodology ACM0002 which requires using the “Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality” to demonstrate additionality. In this tool, the investment analysis is one of the approaches for demonstrating additionality. Most CDM wind power projects use investment analysis. The tool for small-scale projects (“Methodological tool. Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities”) requires “an explanation to show that the project activity would not have occurred anyway due […] to barriers”, among which one of the most important barriers is the so-called ‘investment barrier’, which generally features a similar rationale as for the investment analysis of large-scale projects.

Section 3.2 describes the general criticism associated with the investment analysis and Section 2.4 assesses for different project types the impact of CER revenues on their economic performance. According to these analyzes, for wind power projects, CER revenues lead to an increase in the internal rate of return (IRR) of two to three percentage points. An analysis by the World Bank finds that “the incremental IRR from future carbon revenues in renewable energy projects, taking the World Bank’s projects as an example, is quite low” (Carbon Finance at the World Bank 2010). In
In this analysis, the incremental IRR for renewable energy projects amounts to 1.7% for a purchase period of 10 years and an assumed CER price of $10/t. Another analysis finds that “wind, hydro and biomass projects experience only a small increase in profitability through CDM” and that “the change in profitability caused by regional variables is greater than the CDM’s impact for wind, hydro and biomass” (Schneider, M. et al. 2010). From these analyzes, it can be concluded that the CDM impact in the profitability of wind power plants is generally relatively low and that the ‘signal’ provided by the CDM is usually much smaller than the ‘noise’ of national and regional variations in other parameters.

In addition, many countries have set up domestic support schemes in order to promote the increased use of renewables. Spalding-Fecher et al. (2012) provide an overview of several important support incentives for renewable energy generation in major CDM countries (such as China and India) and find “that national policies on electricity tariffs for renewable power could be a more important driver of the viability of wind, hydropower and biomass projects than the CDM is.” In the case of wind power plants in China, Bogner & Schneider (2011) point out that “the wind power boom in China is mainly driven by favourable policies and not by the CDM” and that “the majority of projects would most likely have been implemented without the CDM”. Liu (2014) elaborates on the links between the CDM and national policy in the case of wind power development in China. He finds that a decreasing national feed-in tariff can increase “CDM-supported installed capacity because more projects may comply with CDM requirements as their financial returns remain below the predefined additionality threshold”, which indicates that there is a clear interference between national policy development and the additionality requirements of the CDM. He also finds that “the reduction of technology costs combined with an increasing local manufacturing capacity has paved the way for a scaled-up deployment of wind capacity” (ibid.), which indicates that other factors than the CDM were important in the significant growth of wind power in China. However, he concludes that the CDM “effect on wind technology diffusion […] is more than twice as high as that of technology cost and industrial policy” (ibid.). He also finds that “while domestic policies must be the engine for large-scale clean energy investments in developing countries, the international carbon offset policy can help that engine run faster, but only if the engine is running” (ibid.). For India, in comparing wind power projects registered under the CDM with those without such support, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2014) find that, “all other things being equal, CDM wind farms tend to be larger, to benefit from higher feed-in-tariffs, and to be located in windier areas, three factors which increase profitability.” According to this analysis, there is “serious evidence of non-additionality of the CDM” (ibid.). He & Morse (2013) find that “Chinese power prices are either tightly controlled by state regulators or are distorted by the presence of large state owned enterprises (SOEs)” and this leads to the conclusion that “IRR-based additionality tests are fundamentally incompatible with state-controlled power pricing regime”.

Furthermore, investment costs for wind power generators have decreased significantly in recent years, which results in wind power featuring (in many cases) competitive leverlited costs of electricity in comparison to new fossil-fired power plants (IRENA 2015; ISE 2013). In addition, IRENA (2015) also shows that specific investments costs for onshore wind power plants are significantly lower in China and India than in OECD and ‘rest of the world’ countries. Similarly, Schmidt (2014) finds that the risk associated with low-carbon investment is higher in some parts of the world than in others. In an analysis for industrialised and low-income countries (using typical values for costs of capital in these countries), he finds that due to the higher cost of capital in low-income countries, leverlized costs of electricity for onshore wind power plants could be as much as 46% higher than in low-risk countries. Altogether, the available information indicates that the profitability of wind power

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55 In this analysis, regional factors are the electricity tariff, the load factor and the discount rate.
plants has generally improved. However, there is also a significant dependence of the profitability on regional circumstances.

Overall, due to the limited impact of CER revenues on the profitability of wind power plants, the widespread introduction of domestic support schemes and the significant decrease of wind power costs, we consider the additionality of wind power projects as generally questionable in the context of the CDM, at least for countries with support schemes, low investment costs for wind power and low investment risks.

4.5.4. Baseline emissions

Baseline emissions of CDM wind power projects feeding electricity into the grid include CO₂ emissions from fossil-fired power plants that are displaced due to the project activity. In most cases, the corresponding baseline CO₂ emission factor is estimated using the "Tool to calculate the emission factor of an electricity system"⁵⁶ (Box 4-1).

Box 4-1: The grid emission factor tool

The grid emission factor is calculated as the "combined margin (CM), consisting of the combination of operating margin (OM) and build margin (BM)".⁵⁷ According to the tool, "the operating margin is the emission factor that refers to the group of existing power plants whose current electricity generation would be affected by the proposed CDM project activity. The build margin is the emission factor that refers to the group of prospective power plants whose construction and future operation would be affected by the proposed CDM project activity."

In the tool, several approaches for estimating the combined margin are presented, depending on the specific conditions of the project and data available. In general, the approach of using a combination of OM and BM, depending on the type of project, is appropriate. It suitably reflects that CDM projects could have short-term impacts on the dispatch of power plants and long-term impacts on the power plants built, and different weights for the OM and the BM can be applied (depending on the crediting period and on whether it relates to a project using intermittent or non-intermittent sources), which also can be considered appropriate. A number of specific issues arise from the tool:

In many cases, so-called low-cost and must-run power plants are not considered in the calculation of the CO₂ grid emission factor, which may lead to higher baseline emissions per amount of electricity produced. Neglecting low-cost/must-run power plants, such as renewables or nuclear power, may generally be considered adequate for the estimation of the operating margin (since low-cost/must-run power plants can be expected to be running irrespective of any other power plant in the system). However, an increasing share of renewables (e.g. wind or solar) in the system may lead to a situation in which renewable power generation is at the margin in some hours, i.e. an additional kilowatt hour of renewable electricity does not displace fossil fuels in that hour. In some countries, for example, wind power plants are switched off when electricity supply exceeds demand in order to ensure a stable electricity system. Furthermore, ‘low-cost’ power plants are not clearly defined and some of them may be dispatchable (such as biomass). Overall, the provision of excluding low-cost/must-run power plants may lead to an overestimation of baseline emissions.⁵⁸

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⁵⁶ Current version 04.0 (EB 75, Annex 15).
⁵⁷ AMS-I.D, version 17 (EB 61, Annex 17).
⁵⁸ It has to be noted, however, that in the case the country has a large share of low-cost/must-run power plants (more than 50%), e.g. hydro, the simple adjusted operating margin has to be used. In that case, whenever hydro electricity provides sufficient electricity to cover the load demand in a certain hour, this hour is counted as not emitting. This leads to lower baseline emission factors overall than the simple operating margin. The implicit assumption is that water would be spilled in that hour if additional (i.e. CDM) power
Also, both the operating and the build margin approaches are based on historical production and installation data if the option of determining the grid emission factor at the validation stage (ex-ante) is chosen. The resulting baseline grid emission factor is then kept constant throughout the crediting period and only updated at the renewal of the crediting period. This approach does not reflect the general trend towards an increasing share of less-emitting power sources in the electricity mix of many countries. It is oriented to past power systems (backward-looking perspective) rather than to the actual power systems during the crediting period with a higher penetration of renewables (forward-looking perspective). This is especially problematic in countries with a rapidly changing or expanding electricity system. In countries with a growing share of renewable energy capacities, this approach may lead to an overestimation of baseline emissions. However, due to the long-lived capital stock in the electricity sector, changes of the grid emission factor are only gradual (i.e. take several years) in case the power system as a whole is not expanding fast. An advantage of using historical data is that it relies on observed and objective information, whereas scenarios for the future development of the power system may be prone to uncertainty and use of unrealistic assumptions. Therefore, the determination of the grid emission factor based on historical data is not considered problematic per se but should be adjusted to account for trends in the sector. Another option for determining the grid emission factor is the ex-post determination during monitoring. This approach is certainly adequate since it reflects the current state of the power sector.

With regard to the build margin, CDM projects are generally excluded from the estimation of the CO₂ emission factor. CDM projects only need to be gradually included if they comprise a significant share of power plants built in the last ten years. This approach can generally be considered adequate, especially in countries with an already significant share of renewable electricity generation or promotional policies for renewables in place, in which case a neglect of CDM projects in the build margin would not be a plausible representation of what would have happened in the absence of the project. This approach therefore addresses the risk of over-estimating baseline emissions in countries with a large share of CDM projects.

The quality of input data in calculating the grid emission factor is also important. In analysing grid emission factors provided by different DNAs, Michaelowa (2011) finds “that most of the documents provided by the DNAs do not allow an external observer to judge whether the data has been collected correctly” and that “there are clear indications that the grid emission factors, as well as the coal power plant benchmarks, have been overestimated both in China and India.” In some countries, the governments established grid emission factors, and DOEs apparently used the values without validating whether they comply with the methodological requirements under the CDM. In order to address this issue, Michaelowa (2011) recommends, inter alia, an independent validation of grid EF. Recently, few grid emission factors are submitted as standardized baselines which ensures independent validation by a DOE or the UNFCCC secretariat.

Furthermore, the tool provides several default values for parameters such as the electric efficiency of power plants. The values provided can be considered quite conservative, i.e. they assume rather high electric efficiencies. For those countries using the default values, this may lead to an under-estimation of baseline emissions.

generation is available. However, some countries do not only have run-of-river hydro power plants (for which case, the assumption of spilling water may be reasonable), but water may also be stored in large reservoirs and thus used at a later stage. In this regard, the estimation of baseline grid emissions for countries with a large share of low-cost/must-run power plants can be considered conservative, i.e. tending to under-estimate baseline emissions. However, it has to be noted that less than 5% of CDM projects used this approach for estimating the grid emission factor.

E.g. assuming that there would be a significant increase of coal-fired power generation without straightforward evidence.

For example, trends in a changing composition of the electricity grid or the grid emission factor observed in recent years could be considered and extrapolated for future years. Similar approaches are used in a number of other CDM methodologies.
The overall emissions impact of wind power plants also depends on other factors. Firstly, the upstream emissions from wind power, such as for construction, are relatively low (about 10 g CO₂e/kWh (IPCC 2014)); for most countries they are likely to be lower than upstream emissions from fossil fuel use displaced in grid power plants. Ignoring upstream emissions is therefore a conservative assumption. Secondly, an increasing uptake of wind power plants due to the CDM may lead to decreasing costs for wind power generation, which in turn could contribute to a higher uptake of wind power. This positive spillover effect is, however, difficult to estimate, in particular with regard to any emissions outcome. Thirdly, the length of the crediting period may lead to under-crediting if wind power plants are operated longer than the crediting periods. However, many wind power plants are expected to operate for about 20 years and about three quarter of wind power projects have selected a renewable crediting period of up to 21 years. Further aspects of potential over- and underestimation of baseline emissions are described in (Erickson et al. 2014).

Overall, we conclude that the current approach for estimating emission reductions from CDM wind projects is largely suitable. Methodological assumptions lead to both over- and under-estimation of emission reductions but can be considered appropriate for estimating baseline emissions of CDM wind projects.

4.5.5. Other issues

No other issues were identified.

4.5.6. Summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additonality</th>
<th>CER revenue has only a limited impact on profitability of wind power plants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support schemes often exist and are a main driver for wind power development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment costs have decreased significantly in recent years, making wind power in some cases competitive with fossil generation (LCOE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wind power is already widely used in large CDM countries (e.g. China, India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-crediting</td>
<td>Methodological assumptions may lead to both over- and under-crediting; no clear-cut conclusion on whether over- or under-crediting occurs overall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Other issues       | None |

4.5.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

Due to our finding of an overall questionable additionality of wind power projects, we recommend that this project type is generally no longer eligible for new projects under the CDM. As an exception to this rule, countries with significant technological and cost barriers may be allowed to further use the CDM for implementing wind power plants.

With regard to the estimation of baseline emissions, we recommend the following:

- The CDM EB should ensure that grid emission factors are always verified by designated operational entities (DOEs);

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61 For a discussion of the effects of the crediting period, refer to Section 3.5.
62 Such as transaction costs, e.g. due to the non-availability of technical knowledge in the country, or risk premiums in low-income countries. Least-developed countries could, for instance, be included in the list of eligible countries. Furthermore, the market share of wind power could be used to establish eligibility since it could be considered an indicator for barriers in the country.
The provisions for low-cost/must-run plants should be reviewed, including a clear definition of such plants and provisions which ensure that such plants are included in the operating margin if they are at the margin of the dispatch at any time;

The grid emission factor tool should be revised to reflect trends in the composition of the power sector over time.

4.6. **Hydropower**

4.6.1. **Overview**

CDM hydropower projects mainly use two methodologies. According to the UNEP DTU (2014), by the end of 2013, an overall hydropower capacity of 92 GW had been installed by projects using the CDM. The main contributors to this overall capacity are China (58 GW), Brazil (12 GW), followed by Vietnam and India (6 GW each). The other 44 countries with CDM hydropower projects account for 11 GW of installed capacity in total.

**Figure 4-5: Total cumulated hydropower capacity installed in China between 2005 and 2012**

As for wind power, Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7 illustrate the development of hydropower capacity and the use of the CDM in China, India and Brazil. In all three countries, hydropower has played an important role for many decades. Significant capacity has been installed without the CDM. Hydropower may therefore be considered common practice in all three countries.

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63 ACM0002, AMS-I.D.
64 Cf. footnote 51.
In China, the cumulated installed capacity in 1990 amounted to approx. 25 GW. A comparison of total hydro capacity installed and the capacity installed by projects using the CDM over the 2005-2012 period (Figure 4-5) shows that there were no CDM projects until 2005, even though capacity additions in that year amounted to 11 GW. As of 2012, the share of CDM projects was 29% of total installed capacity.

In the case of India (Figure 4-6), the cumulated installed capacity in 1990 amounted to approx. 19 GW. Almost 7 GW of capacity was added in 2005 alone, with the CDM covering only a negligible share. After the introduction of the CDM, only a small share of hydropower projects used the CDM, with the CDM accounting for about 8% of total cumulated installed capacity as of 2012.

**Figure 4-6: Total cumulated hydropower capacity installed in India between 2005 and 2012**

![Graph showing total capacity installed, registered CDM projects, and CDM share from 2005 to 2012.](image)

Sources: UNEP DTU 2014, Platts 2014, authors’ own calculations

In the case of Brazil (Figure 4-7), the cumulated installed capacity in 1990 amounted to approx. 53 GW. Almost 4 GW of capacity was added in 2005, with no CDM projects being registered in that year. Even after the introduction of the CDM, only a small share of hydropower projects used the CDM (approx. 7% of total cumulated installed capacity as of 2012).

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65 The total installed capacity between 2005 and 2012 is taken from the Platts database and accumulated across the years. The installed capacity of projects using the CDM is taken from the UNEP DTU (2014) and accumulated, too. The installation year is taken as the starting date of the crediting period. See Section 4.5 for the rationale of using cumulative data.

66 Between 2005 and 2012.

67 Between 2005 and 2012.
Figure 4-7: Total cumulated hydropower capacity installed in Brazil between 2005 and 2012

4.6.2. Potential CER volume

According to our own estimates, registered CDM hydropower projects have the potential to issue 4.2 billion CERs by the end of their respective crediting periods, of which 1.7 billion CERs fall in the 2013-2020 period (Table 2-1). CERs from hydropower account for approx. 30% of the total CER issuance potential.

4.6.3. Additionality

Generally, the same methodologies and additionality rules apply as for wind power (Section 4.5.2). Hydropower CDM projects primarily use investment analysis to demonstrate additionality.

The analysis in Section 4.6.1 demonstrates that hydropower plants have been constructed for a long time in many countries, which suggests that the technology may be regarded as common practice in many countries. In many cases, especially large hydropower plants were established without subsidies, which is demonstrated by the uptake of hydropower many years ago (Section 4.6.1). In the case of small hydropower (SHP) plants in China, Bogner & Schneider (2011) find that “apparently, smaller SHP plants face stronger barriers despite the government’s commitment to SHP development” and that “an especially remote location, an inappropriate feed-in tariff or banks that deny loans can be possible barriers”. Therefore, they conclude that “the CDM may have played a certain role for some SHP project developments” (ibid.). However, they argue that “investment in SHP stations between 20 and 50 MW appear more feasible without the CDM” (ibid.). Moreover, according to their analysis “medium and large hydropower has witnessed considerable growth a long time before the CDM even existed, which makes it difficult to justify that new projects...
can only be implemented with the help of the CDM. In conclusion, our analysis suggests that the CDM is for most projects not an important factor for investment decisions in the medium and large hydropower plants. It appears likely that most projects would have been implemented in any case, i.e. without the CDM”.

The impact of CER revenues on profitability is, at three to four percentage points, somewhat larger than for wind power (Section 2.4), mostly due to a higher plant utilization than for wind power. However, the increase in profitability due to CDM revenues is still relatively small compared to other project types. Also, in many cases, hydropower generally features competitive levelized costs of electricity in comparison to new fossil-fired power plants (IRENA 2015; ISE 2013).

Overall, due to the fact that hydropower is common practice in many countries, the limited impact of CER revenues on the profitability of hydropower plants and the competitiveness of hydropower with fossil electricity generation in many cases, we consider additionality of hydropower projects as questionable in the context of the CDM, especially for large hydropower.

4.6.4. Baseline emissions

Hydropower projects largely use the same methodological approaches for baseline emissions as wind power plants, and hence the same conclusions apply with regard to different aspects of over- or under-crediting. Few differences should be noted with regard to the emission impacts: Hydropower projects have, on average, somewhat higher upstream emissions for their construction (approx. 20 g CO₂e/kWh related to the “infrastructure & supply chain emissions" according to (IPCC 2014)), which, however, are still lower than typical upstream emissions from fossil use in the baseline. Thus, ignoring upstream emissions is still conservative. More importantly, the lifetime of hydropower can be significantly longer than the maximum crediting period under the CDM (21 years), which adds to the conservatism of the estimation of emission reductions for hydropower plants. In this regard, over the plants’ lifetime, overall emission reductions may be rather under-estimated than over-estimated.

4.6.5. Other issues

In addition to baseline emissions, project CH₄ emissions ensuing from hydro reservoirs are considered under the CDM. The ACM0002 methodology uses the power density, which is defined as the installed hydro capacity divided by the reservoir surface, as an indicator of whether CH₄ emissions from reservoirs need to be considered. CDM projects with a power density below 4 W / m² are not eligible and projects with a power density between 4 and 10 W / m² have to estimate methane emissions, using a default emission factor of 90 g CO₂e/kWh. According to (IPCC 2014), methane emissions from “currently commercially available technologies” amount to 88 g CO₂e/kWh, however, the bandwidth is quite large. However, according to (Fearnside 2015), the default emission factor of 90 g CO₂e/kWh refers “only to bubbling and diffusion from the reservoir surface and” is an underestimate “of hydropower impact because these values ignore the main sources of methane release: the turbines and spillways”. Overall, he finds that “tropical hydroelectric dams themselves emit more greenhouse gases than are recognized in CDM procedures”. It can therefore be concluded that the current methodological rules under the CDM may lead to a potential underestimation of methane emissions from hydropower.

68 It has to be noted, however, that the range of operating hours and investment costs of hydro power plants depends quite strongly on plant-specific conditions, for which reason the contribution of the CDM to overall profitability may be higher in some cases and lower in others.
4.6.6. Summary of findings

Additionality
- Common practice in many countries
- CERs have only a moderate impact on profitability
- In many cases competitive with fossil generation (LCOE)

Over-crediting
- Methodological assumptions may lead to both over- and under-crediting; over the lifetime of the project, emission reductions are likely to be underestimated

Other issues
- Potentially significant methane emissions from reservoirs which may not be fully reflected by CDM methodologies

4.6.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

We recommend excluding large scale hydropower projects from being eligible under the CDM, due to the overall questionable additionality. A similar recommendation is made by (Erickson et al. 2014), who, in an analysis of the net mitigation impact of the CDM conclude “that excluding large scale power supply projects from the CDM could help increase the net mitigation impact of the CDM, as well as steer investment towards projects that are truly dependent on CER revenues”. We recommend that small-scale hydropower projects with significant technological or cost barriers may be allowed under the CDM.

With regard to the estimation of baseline emissions, our recommendations for wind power plants (Section 4.5.7) also apply here. In addition, the provisions with regard to the estimation of methane emission from hydropower should be revised to address the potentially significant magnitude of these emissions.

4.7. Biomass power

4.7.1. Overview

CDM biomass power projects mainly use four methodologies. According to the UNEP DTU (2014), by the end of 2013, an overall biomass energy capacity of 8.5 GW was installed by projects using the CDM. The main contributors to this overall capacity are China (3.7 GW) and India (2.1 GW), followed by Brazil (0.9 GW). The other 36 countries with CDM biomass projects account for 1.8 GW of installed capacity in total.

Generally, data availability is not sufficient to judge the magnitude of biomass capacity installed prior to the introduction of the CDM. Moreover, due to inconsistencies in the data, no meaningful comparisons can be made between projects installed with and without the use of the CDM.

4.7.2. Potential CER volume

According to our own estimates, all registered CDM biomass power projects have the potential to issue 0.36 billion CERs by the end of their respective crediting periods, of which 0.16 billion CERs fall in the period from 2013 to 2020 (Table 2-1). CERs from biomass power account for about 3% of the total CER issuance potential.

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69 The criteria need to be further specified. See also footnote 62.
70 ACM0006, AM0015, AMS-I.C, AMS-I.D. It has to be noted, however, that the AM0015 methodology was only used for CDM projects registered in the early phase of the CDM.
71 Including different energy forms from biogenic sources.
4.7.3. Additionality

For large-scale projects (according to ACM0006), the identification of the baseline scenario and the demonstration of additionality are conducted in parallel.\textsuperscript{72}

With regard to the investment analysis, due to the diversity of project types, no overall conclusions can be drawn. Also, analysis available in the literature is quite limited, in contrast to wind and hydropower. On average, the impact of CER revenues on the profitability of projects is with about eight percentage points considerably larger than for wind or hydropower plants, making additionality claims more plausible (Section 2.4). The profitability of projects without CER revenues is, with an average IRR of approx. 5%, also lower than for wind (approx. 7%) and hydro (approx. 8%). The higher impact of the CDM is mostly due to the claiming of avoided methane emissions in many projects, which significantly improves the profitability of CDM biomass projects.

The investment analysis, which is applied by many projects, involves considerable uncertainty due to the variability of the biomass price, which strongly affects the profitability of biomass plants. In addition, many countries have set up domestic support schemes in order to promote the increased use of renewables, including ones for biomass power generation. In addition, biomass power is not a completely new technology, but is rather based on the technology of thermal power plants in general and has been used extensively in some industries and countries before (e.g. in the sugar cane industry in Brazil), which indicates that the technology has been profitable in the past in some instances. This is underpinned by the fact that biomass power features competitive levelized costs of electricity in comparison to new fossil-fired power plants (IRENA 2015; ISE 2013).

Only a few scholars explicitly deal with the additionality of CDM biomass power projects. Stua (2013) finds that, in the case of China, the national feed-in tariff made “most of the biomass-fuelled power plants [cost-competitive] against [...] coal-fired plants”.

Overall, based on the information presented above, we cannot clearly conclude on the likelihood of the additionality of biomass power plants.

4.7.4. Baseline emissions

As outlined in Section 4.7.2, the identification of the baseline scenario and the demonstration of additionality are conducted in parallel, considering a wealth of different options.

One key requirement in methodologies for using biomass residues is that the biomass residues would not be used in the absence of the project and would be left to decay (sometimes aerobically, sometimes anaerobically also claiming CH\textsubscript{4} baseline emissions). This requirement is appropriate and important due to potential competing uses for the biomass. If the biomass residues were used in the absence of the project for other purposes, there may be no emission reductions, since the diversion of biomass from one use to another due to the CDM may lead to increased emissions elsewhere. If CDM projects only divert the use of biomass residues but do not result in more biomass residues being collected which would otherwise decay, this may also lead to indirect land-use change, i.e. due to the increased use of biomass (residues), previous demand may be covered by drawing on biomass from other areas, thus leading to decreasing carbon stocks there.

Methodologies vary with regard to how they assess that the biomass residues are indeed ‘available in abundance’ and that decay is a likely scenario. In older versions, the abundance of biomass residues had to be monitored annually, while in newer versions this is only checked once at the project start and at the renewal of the crediting period.

\textsuperscript{72} For small-scale biomass projects, the same additionality rules as for wind power apply (Section 4.5.2).
In general terms, there is an increasing demand of biomass for different uses (food, raw materials, energy) worldwide. This means that biomass residues (in many cases) either already have or will likely have a price in the future. As a consequence, the demonstration that biomass residues would otherwise be (completely) left to decay needs to take current market developments into account. For this reason, a regular checking of the abundance of biomass residues through monitoring may be more appropriate than a simple check once at the project start.

Furthermore, in many cases, anaerobic decay of biomass is claimed by project developers. However, this assumption may be contested depending on the circumstances. For instance, if biomass waste is spread on fields, biomass decay is rather aerobic than anaerobic, thus producing little or no methane emissions. In many instances, the amount of methane emissions claimed appears very large; it may be questionable whether truly anaerobic conditions prevail in the typical circumstances in which biomass residues are left to decay. We therefore conclude that the current approach of demonstrating the abundance of biomass residues may lead to a risk of over-crediting as no adequate monitoring of availability of biomass residues is in place. In addition, exaggerated claims of anaerobic decay of biomass may lead to further over-crediting.

With regard to the baseline emissions from displacing power plants in the grid, the same conclusions apply as discussed in Section 4.5.4.

4.7.5. Other issues

No other issues were identified.

4.7.6. Summary of findings

| Additio-nality | • Significant impact of CER revenues on plant profitability due to claims of methane emission reductions  
|               | • In many cases competitive with fossil generation (LCOE)  
|               | • Support schemes exist  
| Over-crediting | • Demonstration that biomass is left to decay or available in abundance is only conducted once at the start of the project activity  
|               | • Risk of exaggerated claims of anaerobic decay  
| Other issues | • None  

4.7.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

Due to our finding that the demonstration of abundance of biomass as well as of the claim that biomass is left to decay (under potentially anaerobic conditions) is key for avoiding any over-crediting of emissions, it is recommended that corresponding provisions in the applicable methodologies are reviewed, with a view to ensuring that this demonstration considers current trends of biomass use and disposal and that any claims for anaerobic conditions of biomass decay are realistic. In particular, the monitoring of biomass abundance should be carried out more frequently (e.g. annually).

4.8. Landfill gas

4.8.1. Overview

Decomposition of solid waste in landfills generates carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane (CH₄). This landfill gas can be captured and flared or captured and utilised for electricity production or as a fuel. GHG emission reductions are achieved through the destruction of methane, and in the case of
energy production, displacement of a more GHG-intensive energy source. Global estimates suggest that 50 Mt of methane are generated annually from landfills (IPCC 2014).

The composition of landfill gas is usually approx. 50% CO₂ and 50% CH₄ (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata 2012; US EPA 2013). It varies by climate and waste composition. In general, methane generation increases in wetter versus arid climates and warmer versus cooler climates. Warmer climates increase the growth of methane-producing bacteria (US EPA 2013). Waste composition with a higher percentage of organic material generates more methane and degrades more quickly (US EPA 2013). Waste in lower income countries often includes a higher percentage of organic material than higher income countries (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata 2012).

4.8.2. Potential CER volume

The potential to capture landfill gas varies by landfill management type. Gas collection rates can be as high as 75% for basic landfills in which waste is compacted and covered and up to 85 - 95% for engineered sanitary landfills whereby landfills are lined or capped to prevent leakage or contamination from the waste (US EPA 2013). Landfill management practices vary by region. While the majority of landfills in developed countries are engineered landfills, in developing countries mitigation opportunities are more limited because the majority of landfills are basic landfills or open dumps (US EPA 2013). In open dumpsites, decomposition is predominantly aerobic; as a result methane generation rates are relatively low and gas recovery rates are limited (~10%) (US EPA 2013). Because there is often a high concentration of food waste and wet condition in developing coun-
sites, waste decays quickly and the methane gas is released quickly. As a result, mitigation activities to capture methane must be implemented on active open dumpsites, since after a lag of even 1-2 years most of the methane will have already been generated73 (US EPA et al. 2012).

There are two primary landfill gas methodologies under the CDM. ACM0001 is the consolidated large-scale methodology and AMS-III.G is the small-scale methodology. As of 1 July 2015, there were 364 registered landfill gas projects. Predominantly these are large-scale projects located in Latin America and Asia/Pacific regions, though there are also projects in Africa, Europe/Central Asia and the Middle East. Of the 364, 149 projects have issued a total of 69 million CERs. As of 1 August 2015, the average issuance success rate amounted to 58% (UNEP DTU 2015a).

4.8.3. Additionality

Prior to 2013, large-scale landfill gas projects assessed additionality according to the CDM “Combined tool to identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality”. This tool, similar to the CDM ‘additionality tool’ requires that projects demonstrate that they are additional based on either an investment or a barrier analysis, complemented by a common practice analysis. Similarly, prior to 2014, small-scale projects applied the general guidelines or tool for small-scale activities. Most projects used investment analysis to demonstrate additionality, predominantly benchmark analysis or simple cost analysis (IGES 2014, similar to earlier results from Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012).

A standardized approach to additionality assessment was incorporated into Version 15 of ACM0001, eligible as of 8 November 2013, and version 9 of AMS-III.G, eligible as of 28 November 2014. This revision established a positive list for additionality of landfill gas projects. All landfill gas projects are automatically considered additional if prior to the implementation of the project they only vented or flared methane, and if under the project activity they either flare the methane, or use methane to generate heat, or use the methane to generate power with a capacity of less than 10 MW. As of 1 May 2014, only one landfill gas project had been registered using this methodology.

73 While not applicable for the landfill gas methodology (ACM0001), the rapid decay rates may have implications on the applicability of the first order decay model used in the CDM "Tool to determine methane emissions avoided from dumping waste at a solid waste disposal site" and included in the avoided landfiling via composting methodologies.
How additional is the CDM?

Version 15, as shown in Figure 4-8. The CDM EB will review the validity of these standardized procedures after a three-year time period.

CDM projects can only claim emission reductions for methane capture that exceeds any applicable regulations. In regions in which a regulation is in place but it can be demonstrated that it is not enforced, projects can still claim emission reductions for implementing the regulation. This has raised concerns that enforcement may be discouraged by constituencies receiving CER revenues. One such example is in the Philippines, where regulation has been established requiring gas capture and destruction, but it has not been enforced. Concerns have been raised that CER revenue has led to a pressure to discourage enforcement (Docena 2010).

Projects that capture and flare methane have no independent revenue source (US EPA et al. 2012). Flaring projects are therefore very likely to be additional. For projects using landfill gas for energy generation, additionality seems likely. As shown in Section 2.4, the available data from CDM projects indicates that the IRR is rather low without CER revenues (approx. 2.5-2.8% on average) but increase substantially with CER revenues (to approx. 16.6-18% on average). Indeed, collection and flaring of landfill gas is not common practice in developing countries without carbon finance, though it may be possible to implement projects economically where there are renewable portfolio standards (RPS) or feed-in tariffs, to allow energy production revenue to cover costs and provide capital investment for methane collection systems. For projects that supply heat, electricity, or methane to natural gas pipelines, the price and revenue from energy generation are a primary driver of the economics of the project. With economies of scale, the larger the landfill gas project, the more energy can be generated and the more likely the project is profitable.

Overall there are no substantial concerns with the approach to assess additionality for large- and small-scale landfill gas projects. The primary lingering concern is the potential for CDM projects to discourage the implementation of regulations that require capture and destruction of landfill gas.
4.8.4. Baseline emissions

The baseline scenario for ACM0001 and AMS-III.G is assumed to be the atmospheric release of methane, unless capture and flaring is required by regulation or unless capture occurred to some extent prior to the implementation of the project. Baseline emissions are determined based on the amount of methane flared or used under the project activity (less any methane gas that was flared under the baseline). The overall volume of emission reductions generated is based on the baseline emissions minus any combustion efficiency losses and minus any methane that would have been destroyed under the baseline via soil oxidation. ACM0001 considers four different cases for how to account for regulation and existing landfill gas capture systems. These include no regulation/no existing capture system, no regulation with existing capture, regulation without existing capture, and regulation with existing capture. The small-scale methodology uses, in principle, the same approach but is less specific; the baseline emissions must take into account the volume of landfill gas required to be collected by regulation and the presence of pre-existing landfill gas collection and combustion systems. The overall approach of estimating the baseline emissions based on the amount of captured gas seems reasonable. However, there are concerns related to the default assumptions for pre-existing systems and regulations, and the accounting for soil oxidation.

If a regulation requires the collection of landfill gas or if a landfill gas collection system was pre-existing, but the regulation does not specify the amount to be collected or the historical amount collected is not known precisely, then both methodologies assume that 20% of the amount captured under the project scenario would be captured in the baseline. The methodology explains that this default value is based on assumptions that the capture efficiency of the project system is 50% and under the baseline 20%, and that in the baseline the methane was flared using an open flare with an efficiency of 50%. Despite the explanation, it remains unclear how the overall default value
of 20% of project emissions is derived. While a 50% destruction efficiency for an open flare is conservative when considering project emissions, used in the context of baseline emissions it has the potential to actually overestimate the emission reductions. The methodologies implicitly assume that the CDM project captures five times the amount of methane than would be captured under a regulation. This assumption seems rather optimistic and likely leads to a significant over-estimation of emission reductions.

There are two types of soil oxidation that can occur at a landfill. Top-layer soil oxidation refers to soil oxidation under baseline conditions when methane oxidizes as it passes through the top layers of the landfill. The second type of oxidation can occur when additional air is introduced into the landfill due to suction from the LFG capture system under the project scenario.

Early versions of ACM0001 and AMS-III.G did not account for these two effects. This likely led to an overestimation of baseline emissions for projects that were registered up to version 11 of ACM0001 (valid until 25 July 2012) and up to version 7 of AMS-III.G (valid for registrations until 28 May 2013). This shortcoming was recognised and, in principle, addressed from version 12 of ACM0001 and version 8 of AMS-III.G onwards, by introducing a default factor for the amount of methane that would oxidize in the baseline, using 10% for “managed solid waste disposal sites that are covered with oxidizing material such as soil or compost” and 0 “for other types of solid waste disposal sites”.

Concerns have been raised about the default values applied for the soil oxidation factor. Methane oxidation in covered landfills occurs mainly through bacterial degradation, primarily by methanotroph bacteria, resulting in production of carbon dioxide, water, and biomass. The rate of oxidation is influenced by a variety of physical factors, including different soil cover types (Chanton et al. 2009). Methane oxidation generally increases with temperature up to around 40°C and is also influenced by moisture, where either too dry or too wet conditions can inhibit methane oxidation (Chanton et al. 2009; Spokas & Bogner 2011). Soil oxidation further depends on the type of soil cover and the thickness of soil cover. Higher soil oxidation rates occur in landfills that are well managed with a thick soil cover. In a study of landfills with similar operational characteristics in different climate zones of the United States, methane oxidation was lowest in humid subtropical regions and highest in arid regions (Chanton et al. 2011). This research suggests that for poorly managed landfills in humid sub-tropical and tropical regions the soil oxidation rates may be very low.

The IPCC sets default values for landfill cover methane oxidation are typically between 0% and 10% of generated CH₄ (IPCC 2006), possibly derived from one early study of a New Hampshire landfill. The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories indicate that:

“The use of the oxidation value of 10% is justified for covered, well-managed solid waste disposal sites to estimate both diffusion through the cap and escape by cracks/fissures. The use of an oxidation value higher than 10%, should be clearly documented, referenced and supported by data relevant to national circumstances.”

This highlights that the 2006 IPCC Guidelines consider a soil oxidation value of 10% as justified only for covered and well-managed sites. However, more recent literature surveys and experimental studies indicate that oxidation rates for covered landfills are higher, amounting on average to approx. 30% (Chanton et al. 2009; Chanton et al. 2011), although the 2009 paper indicates that the data may over-represent warmer conditions when oxidation rates would be higher.

Some stakeholders have raised concerns that the soil oxidation factor was not adjusted upwards in the CDM methodologies when more recent research indicated that an average value of 30% may be more representative (Chanton et al. 2009). However, the higher soil oxidation rates reported by
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(Chantón et al. 2009) may not be fully appropriate for the context of developing countries, given that both an intermediate and final cap would have to be in place to a certain engineering standard. In most developing countries, landfills are rarely well managed with a thick soil cover required for this level of soil oxidation. This suggests that the higher soil oxidation rates may not be applicable to the conditions for some CDM projects. Nevertheless, having a default factor for both managed and unmanaged landfills avoids creating a disincentive for covering and managing landfills. The use of the soil oxidation rates as a standard default for all projects runs the risk of underestimating the volume of credits generated in some sub-tropical and tropical regions with unmanaged landfills for which soil oxidation rates under the baseline would have been very low or zero.

4.8.5. Other issues

Stakeholders have commented in public submissions to the UNFCCC with regard to revisions of ACM0001 that different types of perverse incentives can arise from landfill gas projects. Two main perverse incentives can be of concern, which both lead to an over-estimation of emission reductions.

Firstly, project developers can have an incentive to store the waste in a manner that generates more methane. For example, a ‘flat’ landfill with low methane generation potential could be changed to store waste at a greater height. Moreover, project proponents can have an incentive to maximise methane generation through other means, such as pulling water in the landfill to create anaerobic conditions. On a site visit to a landfill gas project in China in 2005, engineers proudly explained how they had found a way to generate more methane by stacking waste higher in one section of the landfill rather than spreading it evenly across the landfill site. While this is just one anecdotal example, there is reason to believe that some landfill projects may be altering management practices to do so. Based on these observations, in 2012 more recent versions of both the large- (version 13.0) and small-scale methodologies (version 8.0) included an applicability criterion that excludes projects in which the management is changed in order to increase methane generation. However, verifying this requirement may be difficult in practice and it has not been included as an explicit provision for DOEs to assess after the project implementation.

Secondly, there could be perverse incentives for policy makers and private actors not to engage in recycling or other ways of preventing waste generation, as this could lower the potential for CDM landfill gas projects. Similarly, there could also be perverse incentives to continue landfilling instead of introducing other waste treatment methods (incineration, composting).

Public comments received on behalf of waste picker organizations have raised concerns that development of a project limits access of waste pickers who, through the informal economy, contribute significantly to the recycling of materials (Global Alliance for Incenterator Alternatives, GAIA). Project developers who were interviewed acknowledged that sites need to be secured for project installation, to avoid having equipment tampered with or material stolen. For certain projects, including examples in Latin America and Thailand, agreements have been made for waste pickers to pick through waste before it is transferred into the secure site. However, in other cases there has not been any cooperation between the project developers and waste pickers, which has resulted in conflict and loss of livelihoods. There is evidence that the development of landfill gas projects is limiting the access of waste pickers and thereby reducing the reuse and recycling of waste through the informal economy. Given the success of collaborative agreements with waste pickers, this may be a model which new projects should be required to incorporate.

Pursuing landfilling instead of other waste treatment methods, such as recycling, incineration or composting, is likely to result in overall higher GHG emissions, even if the landfill gas is captured, because landfill gas collection systems are not able to capture all of the methane. The CDM may thus provide perverse incentives for policy makers or project owners to continue pursuing a waste
treatment method that is more GHG-intensive. If in the absence of the CDM, other waste treatment methods would be pursued, it would lead to an over-estimation of emission reductions.

Early versions of CDM methodologies did not include any provisions to address this issue. Regarding the potential perverse incentive to reduce recycling, starting with version 12 of ACM0001, an applicability criterion requires that “the implementation of the project activity does not reduce the amount of organic waste that would be recycled in the absence of the project activity”. However, there is no reference to how this should be assessed. Moreover, this applicability condition does not address the broader concern that the CDM provides incentives to continue pursuing landfilling and not composting or waste incineration. In public comments submitted by non-governmental organisations, such as the GAIA, there have been calls for eligibility requirements that would allow projects only on closed landfills in order to prevent the potential for this perverse incentive of reducing recycling and composting. Project developers argued that in developing country contexts, with warmer climates and higher percentage of organics in the waste stream, the capture of methane must take place while the landfill is actively being used, otherwise the methane will have already been released once it is closed. This is in contrast to landfills in more temperate climates, where methane production happens more slowly and where it is more common to develop a project at a closed landfill.

Overall, there is reason to believe that landfill gas projects are contributing to perverse incentives to manage landfills in ways that generate more methane and to reduce reuse and recycling or avoid a shift towards composting or waste incineration. In addition, it appears there are cases in which project participants increase methane production – an issue which may deserve particular attention in the validation and verification auditing processes.

### 4.8.6. Summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additio-nality</th>
<th>Likely to be additional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over-crediting</td>
<td>Default assumptions for the rate of methane captured under pre-existing collection systems or regulations are unjustified and have the potential to overestimate emission reductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Default soil oxidation rates may underestimate emission reductions for uncovered landfills in humid sub-tropical and tropical regions with very low soil oxidation rates; nevertheless, requiring the use of a default soil oxidation rate for baseline emissions avoids creating a perverse incentive to avoid covering landfills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential for perverse incentives for policy makers not to regulate landfills or enforcing regulations in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perverse incentives for project developers to manage landfills in ways that increase methane generation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Other issues          | Perverse incentives for policy makers not to pursue less GHG-intensive waste treatment methods, such as composting or incineration |
|                      | Some landfill gas projects exclude waste pickers and informal sector recycling, reducing overall rates of reuse and recycling |

### 4.8.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

We recommend several revisions to the CDM landfill gas methodologies to address the potential over-crediting, in particular the perverse incentives for both project owners and policy makers:

- Instead of applying one value for the soil oxidation factor to all projects, different values could be applied to different regions based on the climatic conditions and practices in that region.
• The approach of the default factors used for estimating methane capture from pre-existing collection system or landfills with regulations should be revisited. Assumptions in the default factor could be revised to be more conservative by assuming that more (rather than less) methane was captured and destroyed.

• Include specific requirements for DOEs to verify that the landfilling practice was not changed with a view to generating more methane.

• To avoid the reduction in recycling by excluding waste pickers access to the site, the methodology could be revised to be more specific about how projects should provide waste pickers with access to solid waste before it is deposited in the secure dumpsite.

• Given the long-term need to transition away from landfilling and increase composting and recycling, there could be a sunset clause considered for CDM landfill projects.

4.9. Coal mine methane

4.9.1. Overview

Methane is stored within coal as part of the coal formation process. During coal mining activities some of the methane is released. The build-up of methane in coal mines creates a potential explosive hazard and efforts before, during, and after mining are taken to reduce the safety risk by releasing methane into the atmosphere. Methane released from coal mines makes up approx. 8% of global anthropogenic methane emissions (Global Methane Initiative 2011). Methane originating in coal seams that is drained prior to mining is known as coal bed methane (CBM). Through a process of pre-mining drainage, this methane can be extracted to reduce the safety risk. During coal mining, methane can be vented from coal mines, which is known as ventilation air methane (VAM). After mining has ceased, methane can be extracted, which is known as post mining or post drainage coal mine methane (CMM). Coal mine methane projects involve installation of control technologies to collect and destroy and/or utilise methane from existing and abandoned mines, instead of releasing it to the atmosphere. Under the ACM0008 methodology of the CDM, capturing methane is eligible from pre-mining via underground boreholes and surface drainage of CBM, during mining from VAM that would normally be vented, as well as post mining from abandoned/decommissioned mines.

4.9.2. Potential CER volume

Of the 84 CMM projects that have been registered under the CDM, all are located in China, except for one project in Mexico. Projects from other countries, including India, Indonesia, Philippines and South Africa have been submitted to the UNFCCC but not registered. As of 1 May 2014, 34 million CERs have been issued from 37 projects located in China. The total volume of credits expected from the credit start dates up to 2020 is 170 million CERs (Section 2.3).

The best conditions for CMM projects are deep coal mines with high methane concentrations. Under these conditions, methane is concentrated and easy to collect. For geographic and regulatory reasons, coal mines in China have been well suited for CMM projects to date. In India, for example, most coal mines are surface mines, where methane concentrations are lower and it is harder to collect the methane. Another barrier in India is national regulation that divides permits for using coal and gas. This means that coal mines do not have a permit to utilise the methane gas generated and would be unable to authorise a CMM project. A CMM project would require an additional permit process, an added administrative barrier.

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74 There are two projects under validation from India and one from the Philippines. Projects in Indonesia and South Africa have had their validation terminated or validation replaced.
4.9.3. Additionality

All of the registered CMM projects use the large-scale ACM0008 methodology. The most recent ACM0008 Version 8 requires use of the “Combined tool to identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality” and provides further guidance on the application of the tool in the context of CMM projects. As of May 2014, no projects had been registered under version 8, which was approved in February 2014. The majority of projects are registered under versions 6 and 7. In these prior versions, the CDM additionality tool was applied, and a separate procedure was used to select the baseline scenario. Starting with version 6, the methodology was changed to allow for benchmark analysis as part of investment analysis for projects where no investment would occur in the baseline scenario.

Most CDM CMM projects apply a benchmark analysis to demonstrate additionality, as shown in Table 4-4. Benchmark analysis compares the financial performance of the project, often expressed as IRR, to a relevant benchmark or investment ‘hurdle rate’. In contrast to some other project types, CER revenue for CMM projects does make up a large portion of the return on investment on capital expenditures for projects. According to information from PDDs, the IRR without CER revenue is approx. 2% on average and increases to approx. 28% with CER revenues, the largest increase among all project types (Section 2.4). When we derive a simple indicator that puts the capital investment in relation to the number of CERs generated over ten years, as referenced in Section 2.4 in this report, we find an average ratio of about USD 4 / CER for all CMM projects. These calculations show that CMM projects have a high likelihood of additionality. They support reports from technical experts and project developers that abatement costs for CMM co-generation plants are approximately USD 3 - 5 per tCO₂ during 10 years of operation. Other reports indicate that CMM projects are usually not economically viable; according to United Nations (2010) power generation from CMM only becomes economically viable for coal mines with very large methane sources exceeding 20 m³/t (United Nations 2010).

A high likelihood of additionality is also supported by observation of common practice in the sector. Coal mines are very averse to having any combustion on-site. Combustion of any kind increases the potential risk of a methane gas explosion. Venting methane is the safest approach to avoid combustion, and miners and management are very familiar with this approach. Coal mine operators are generally averse to having a methane combustion system onsite as a result in order to avoid the risk of mine closures due to concerns around worker safety. Global Methane Initiative staff reported that in China, prior to the presence of the carbon market, efforts by the Global Methane Initiative were wholly unsuccessful in implementing CMM projects. No pilot projects or sponsored projects were able to get off the ground. Technical barriers were significant and persistent. The equipment used was unable to cope with the difficulties of the coal mine system, including the concentrations of volatile methane and the gas volumes. Only with the revenue from CERs were there sufficient incentives to develop technologies that worked well for these conditions. Now, in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additionality approach</th>
<th>Number of project</th>
<th>Average Annual CERs (1,000)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Benchmark Analysis</td>
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<td>Investment Comparison Analysis</td>
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<td>Investment Comparison Analysis and Benchmark Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simple Cost Analysis</td>
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<td>1,883</td>
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</table>

Sources: IGES 2014
China, it has become common practice for large coal mines to capture methane with revenue from a CDM project. As of 2014, there were still 2 projects in China at the validation stage; however since the technology for developing CMM projects in China is now proven, it can no longer be claimed to be first of its kind or a technology barrier. Although the CMM projects have become common practice, this has only been the case with CDM revenue. Overall, the risk for non-additionality is low for VAM projects.

4.9.4. Baseline emissions

Baseline emissions are calculated as the sum of CO₂ emissions from destruction of methane that would occur in the baseline scenario, emissions from the production of power, heat, or use of gas replaced by the project activity, and release of methane into the atmosphere that is avoided by the project activity. The baseline scenario is selected based on an examination of all the options that are technically feasible and comply with applicable regulations and elimination of all baseline scenario alternatives that face prohibitive investment, technological and/or prevailing practice barriers.

There is some concern that mines may take part in marginally more pre-mining drainage than they would have done without incentives from the CDM; however, the drained methane would likely have been emitted upon mining (and likely would have been emitted through ventilation later on). So these concerns seem limited, given that there are provisions in the methodology that emission reductions may only be credited once mining starts, ensuring that CERs are not issued in cases in which mining may not have occurred under the baseline. Our review has not identified any other concerns related to the determination of baseline emissions.

4.9.5. Other issues

The methodology includes a requirement that methane collection must exceed that which is required by applicable regulations, with the exception of cases in which it can be shown that the regulation is not enforced. A regulation was put in place in China requiring that methane captured from coal mines that exceeds 30% methane concentration must be captured and used. It has been suggested by project proponents that the Chinese government actually put this regulation in place as a result of the success of the CDM, to support the use of CDM financing to capture methane as best practice and to stimulate more CDM project development. However, interpretations vary and it has led to questions around the additionality of projects and whether or not they would have been required by regulation. As a consequence, project developers focused on projects where the methane concentration was below 30%. These projects would be avoided for safety reasons in North America or Europe, because this gets close to the explosive range of methane concentrations of 15-25%. It is better practice and safer to improve the capture rate and increase the concentration of methane, however this could run the risk of exceeding the 30% concentration regulatory requirement in China, and hence not meeting the CDM additionality requirements. This raises the risk of perverse incentives for project developers to diluting methane gas to reduce the concentration below 30% in order to be eligible for the CDM. However, no evidence is available whether this happened.
4.9.6. **Summary of findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additivity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likely to be additional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM revenue makes up a large portion of return on capital investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology for CMM in China is now well demonstrated, no longer technical barriers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Over-crediting</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential concerns regarding increased mining and/or pre drainage of coal mine methane but no evidence whether or not this occurs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other issues</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential perverse incentives to dilute methane in order to avoid that abatement is required by regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.9.7. **Recommendations for reform of CDM rules**

There are no recommendations regarding reforming the CDM rules for CMM projects. Further investigation of China’s regulations for methane capture are warranted to ensure that perverse incentives are avoided.

4.10. **Waste heat recovery**

4.10.1. **Overview**

Waste heat utilization includes generally energy efficiency measures, where the thermal content of hot waste gases that would be vented in the absence of the CDM project activity is used for heating purposes, replacing fossil fuel use. For example, hot exhaust gases from cement kilns can be used to pre-heat the raw material before entering into the kiln.

A related category of projects is waste gas utilization where the calorific value of waste gases that contain a certain fraction of hydrocarbons or hydrogen that would be flared in the absence of the CDM project activity is used to replace regular fossil fuels. For example, waste gases with a high content of carbon monoxide and hydrogen can be used as fuel for steam production in industry. This second project category has similar features than the ‘thermal’ recovery of waste gases, but the present chapter focusses on the first category.

4.10.2. **Potential CER volume**

According to our own estimates, registered CDM projects have the potential to issue 0.35 billion CERs by the end of their respective crediting periods, of which 0.22 billion CERs fall in the period from 2013 to 2020 (Table 2-1). CERs from these projects account for about 2.5% of the total CER issuance potential.

4.10.3. **Additionality**

The methodologies for waste heat utilization (AM58, AM66, AM95, AM98, ACM12, AMS-II.I., AMS-III.P.AMS-III.Q., AMS-III.BI.) generally use standard CDM additionality tests based on barrier and/or investment analysis.

The general issue with this project type is that the use of waste heat is a standard practice in many integrated industrial facilities, in particular where energy costs represent a larger fraction of production costs such as in cement production, refineries, iron and steel and chemicals. However, the extent of the use of waste heat and energy efficiency may vary significantly even within a country, as energy costs, financial resources and engineering and management skills may differ between sectors and plants. While one steel plant may define its competitive edge in systematically using all waste heat and reducing heat loss along the steelmaking process because of competitive steel markets and relatively high fuel costs, a refinery plant may vent significant amounts of waste heat and experience severe heat losses all over the refinery because its cost of fuel is very low.
In the use of investment analysis for demonstrating additionality for waste heat recovery projects involves several uncertainties: the highest uncertainties are in the in the assumptions on future fuel prices which show high variability over time (Figure 2-4 to Figure 2-6). In addition, the considerable uncertainties in investment cost for equipment and construction and the often uncertain impact of the considered measure on efficiency makes it difficult to objectively determine the profitability of the measure and the relevant hurdle rate (Section 3.2).

For projects implemented in existing plants, the methodologies require demonstrating that the waste heat or gas has been flared/vented at least three years before the project implementation. This is an important safeguard to assure at least some degree of additionality.

Some methodologies, such as ACM0012, also allow waste heat recovery projects in greenfield plants. This is very problematic, as it is very difficult to demonstrate that the waste heat utilization would not have been implemented in the absence of the CDM (Section 3.2). The methodology ACM0012 (V.5) provides for two options for demonstration additionality in the case of greenfield plants. Option 1 requires to identify similar plants; the project is deemed as additional “if more than 80 per cent of the analyzed facilities in the list do not use waste energy, it can be decided that the proposed Greenfield facility also would have wasted the energy in the absence of waste energy recovery CDM project”. While the methodology tries to be descriptive on how to identify baseline waste energy use, there remain large uncertainties and most importantly, data on the degree of waste energy usage in plants from competitors may be very difficult to obtain. Under option 2, project participants can submit a (hypothetical) alternative design without or with a lower level of waste heat recovery and demonstrate using investment analysis that the alternative design would be the baseline scenario for the waste energy generated in the greenfield facility. Given the high uncertainties in price data and hypothetical level of waste heat utilization in the absence of the CDM, this leads to significant risks of non-additionality.

The economic impact of CERs on the profitability of the waste heat recovery project is usually rather small compared to related fuel cost saving. I.e. a change in fuel costs of a few percent may have the same impact as the CER revenues (Sections 2.4 and 3.2).

Overall, the risk for non-additionality of greenfield plants seems higher than for existing plants, where the requirement for a minimum of three years of generation of waste heat prior to the start of operation of the CDM project has to be demonstrated.

4.10.4. Baseline emissions

Baseline emissions are usually derived from the amount of waste heat used in the project case. It is assumed, that this heat would be generated by fossil fuels in the baseline scenario.

However, even though the methodologies for existing facilities require demonstrating that the waste heat or gas has been flared/vented at least three years before the project implementation, in practice it may be very difficult to rule out that waste heat has not been used in some form in existing facilities before project implementation, which may inflate baseline emissions.

Also, waste heat recovery may lead to a different operation of the plant than in the baseline scenario. For example, if waste heat is used for pre-heating of a product, the plant may be run in such a way that more waste heat is generated to assure a certain temperature level of the pre-heated product, which leads to a higher fuel consumption in the boiler generating the waste heat. Therefore the amount of heat wasted in the baseline may be overestimated. Moreover, baseline usually do not capture any other autonomous energy efficiency improvements that might be implemented in the absence of the project.
In greenfield projects, the emission reduction is based on the difference in emissions in modelling a baseline and project scenario. The models build on many assumptions that are difficult to validate objectively. The results are therefore prone to high uncertainty and may lead to over-crediting.

Lastly, the methodologies do not consider emission reductions from the reduction in upstream emissions (such as from the production of natural gas or coal) which leads to a slight under-crediting, if upstream emissions occur in a non-annex I country.

4.10.5. Other issues

None.

4.10.6. Summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additivity</th>
<th>CER revenues are very small compared to cost reduction from fuel savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-ante estimation of key parameters including investment costs and fuel savings has large uncertainties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waste heat recovery is common practice in many countries and sectors (though not in all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-crediting</td>
<td>In existing facilities: It is very difficult to rule out that waste heat has not been used in some form before project implementation, which may inflate baseline emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In greenfield projects: Modelling of amount of waste heat lost in baseline is subject to very high uncertainties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waste heat recovery may lead to a different operation of the plant than in the baseline case, e.g. to assure a certain temperature level of the heat medium or to NCV level of waste gas, therefore the amount of gas wasted in the baseline may be overestimated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Other issues | None |

4.10.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

Waste heat recovery is standard practice in many energy intensive industrial sectors, though there exist barriers to the implementation of waste to energy measures. The high uncertainty in additivity demonstration make it less suitable for the CDM, the project type may be taken out of the CDM or restricted to cases with clear additinality demonstration, e.g. of a very low uptake of waste heat recovery can be demonstrated in a specific industrial sector. We recommend that option 1 in Appendix 1 of ACM0012 be maintained as it provides a more objective way of assessing the practice in the sector and country and that option 2 not be used.

4.11. Fossil fuel switch

4.11.1. Overview

Fossil fuel switch includes the switching from a fuel with higher carbon intensity (such as coal or petroleum) to a fossil fuel with lower carbon intensity (such as natural gas) in the generation of heat for industrial processes or in power plants. In this section we do not consider switching from fossil fuels to biomass. Methodologies are for existing installations only (e.g. ACM0009, ACM0011, AMS-III.AH., AMS-III.AN) or for both existing and greenfield installations (AMS-III.B and AMS-III.AG – power only).

4.11.2. Potential CER volume

According to our own estimates, registered CDM wind power projects have the potential to issue 0.46 billion CERs by the end of their respective crediting periods, of which 0.23 billion CERs fall in
the period from 2013 to 2020 (Table 2-1). CERs from wind power account for about 3.3% of the total CER issuance potential.

4.11.3. Additionality

Both fossil fuels with higher carbon intensity such as hard coal, lignite or fuel oil and fuels with lower carbon intensity such as natural gas are widely used in stationary installations in energy and manufacturing industries as well as in the buildings sector. In existing facilities, the choice of fuel is often determined by the existing fuel, because fuel changes may be costly, though there are also multi-fuel systems. In greenfield plants, the fuel choice usually depends on the economic viability of each fuel option.

Table 4-5: Examples of differences in characteristics between the use of coal and fuel oil compared to natural gas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Hard coal, lignite (fuel with high carbon intensity)</th>
<th>Natural gas (fuel with lower carbon intensity)</th>
<th>Considered in investment analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial investment for burner/boilers etc.</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Lower(^1)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel cost per energy unit</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fuel operation costs</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility in operation(^2)</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of distribution to end-user</td>
<td>Vehicle-based: by trucks, train i.e. requires access roads or rails</td>
<td>Network based: by distribution lines(^3)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price building mechanisms</td>
<td>In many countries based on world market price</td>
<td>In many countries price is based on local long term contracts, often taking into account a price index, e.g. based on oil price</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on specific supplier</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance with local air quality standards (if any)</td>
<td>More difficult: Coal based furnaces may require expensive exhaust cleaning systems</td>
<td>Less difficult: Natural gas based furnaces have generally lower air pollutant emission levels(^4)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need of space for local fuel storage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No(^5)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
\(^1\) This is the case if the (higher) investment for distribution lines necessary to connect to the natural gas grid is borne by a different entity, e.g. the natural gas supplier. In case of LNG initial investment costs may be somewhat higher for LNG terminals, local storage facilities etc. \(^2\) E.g. shorter time lag to start-up operation of power plant if dispatching system in a grid requires more power. \(^3\) Or Vehicle based in case of LNG. \(^4\) Please note that this may hold true even though local air quality standards may be stricter for natural gas than for coal-based systems. \(^5\) Except for LNG.

Sources: Author’s own research

The large-scale methodologies ACM0009 and ACM0011 require an investment analysis for demonstrating additionality, a barrier analysis (Section 3.2) is not deemed sufficient.\(^75\) This makes sense as the economic viability may be seen as one of the key aspects when deciding on a specific fuel. Requiring investment analysis may reduce the risk of non-additionality, because using this

\(^75\) Though e.g. ACM0009 allows for the additionality to be proven by claiming „prohibitive barriers“ for the project (natural gas) scenario applying step 3 of the additionality tool.
test may be more difficult in the case of very lucrative fuel switches (e.g. if cheap natural gas becomes newly available in a project site).

In general, fuel prices per energy unit are generally lower for coal than for natural gas. This is offset to a certain degree by higher initial investment and non-fuel operation costs for coal furnaces (Table 4-5). However, while the investment analysis takes these cost factors into account, there could be other factors that may lead to the choice of natural gas as a fuel, even though it may be economically somewhat less attractive than lignite or hard coal.

An issue that contributes to the high uncertainty in investment analysis are the assumptions made about future developments of fuel prices. In the investment analysis, the fossil fuel switch methodologies allow to choose between (i) keeping fuel prices at present levels for future years, or (ii) to use future prices that “have to be substantiated by a public and official publication from a governmental body or an intergovernmental institution” (ACM0009 V.5, Section 5.2.4).

For small-scale projects, however, the barrier analysis is deemed sufficient, which may considerably increase the risk of non-additionality (Section 3.3). This risk is only somewhat mitigated by some small-scale methodologies requiring that the CDM project involves at least some capital investments, ruling out projects where fuel switch can be carried out without any investment in additional fuel switching equipment, e.g. in natural gas burners. Still, small-scale fuel switching methodologies have the full set of issues that have been identified for barrier analysis (Section 3.3).

In addition, similar to other energy related project types, with fuel switch projects CER revenues are very small compared to typical fluctuations of price differences between fuels (dark-spark spread), which increases the risk of non-additionality.

4.11.4. Baseline emissions

The exploitation, transport, processing and distribution of fossil fuels results in upstream emissions, many of which may originate in non-Annex I countries. In most CDM project types, the amount of fossil fuel used is reduced with the project; therefore, it may be assumed that also upstream emissions are reduced. As a conservative simplification, the relevant methodologies usually do not consider upstream emissions. In the case of fossil fuel switch, however, upstream emissions from fossil fuels could either increase or decrease. In general, upstream emissions from natural gas tend to be higher than upstream emissions from lignite, hard coal or fuel oil (depending on source of fuel).

With fuel switch activities the amount of fuel used in terms of energy content remains more or less constant (or may slightly be reduced because of higher efficiency of natural gas burners). Because of the potentially higher upstream emissions of natural gas, switching from coal/oil to natural gas may result in an increase in upstream emissions, the so-called ‘upstream leakage’ emissions. For this reason, CDM methodologies for fossil fuel switch projects consider upstream emissions.

The procedures for estimating upstream emissions are included in the methodological Tool “Upstream leakage emissions associated with fossil fuel use” (V.1, EB69 Annex12). The tool allows project developers to use default values for upstream emissions or to come forward with their own values derived from relevant data. The default values have been substantially revised with the tool (e.g. from the values included in Table 3 of methodology ACM0009 V.4 (EB68 Annex 12)).

For instance, according to the latest version of the tool, default upstream emissions values from natural gas are 2.9 tCO₂/TJ, based on data from the US. This is comparable to the 2.6 tCO₂/TJ

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76 For example, as in the applicability requirements of small-scale methodology AMS-III.B (V.18): “The methodology is limited to fuel switching measures which require capital investments. Examples of capital investment include creating infrastructure required to use project fuel or retrofitting existing installations.”
(105 tCH₄/PJ; total) default upstream emissions in Western Europe in ACM0009 V.4 (based on IPCC), but is much lower than in e.g. the former values for Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union (23 tCO₂/TJ) or Rest of the World (7.4 tCO₂/TJ).

Also, the revised aggregated default values for natural gas (Table 1 in the tool) of 2.9 appears much lower than the sum of the default values for the different elements in the upstream chain of natural gas (Table 3 in the tool), including exploration and production (3.4 tCO₂/TJ), processing (4 tCO₂/TJ), storage (1.6) and distribution (2.2). The latter are all based on the US Department of Energy’s GREET model, which may not necessarily be representative for upstream emissions of natural gas in developing countries.

With this, the revised values become comparable to those from (underground) coal. It is unclear whether this is a reasonable assumption or an artefact because of the origin of the natural gas upstream emissions data. If the values in the upstream tool are not conservative, i.e. provide too low default values for natural gas upstream emissions, this would lead to an increased risk of over-crediting of fuel switch projects.

An additional issue is the assumptions for the default values on the share of upstream emissions that are covered by caps of Annex-I countries – and how effective these caps are in limiting upstream emissions.

**Table 4-6: Default emission factors for upstream emissions for different types of fuels reproduced from upstream tool (Version 01.0.0)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fossil fuel type x</th>
<th>Default emission factor (tCO₂e/TJ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas (NG)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas Liquids (NGL)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressed Natural Gas (CNG)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Fuel Oil (Diesel)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Fuel Oil (Bunker or Marine Type)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene (household and aviation)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPG (including butane and propane)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal/lignite (unknown mine location(s) or coal/lignite not 100%)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface mine, or any other situation</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal/lignite (coal/lignite 100% sourced from within host country)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface mine, or any other situation</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground (100% source)</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The detailed table 3 in tool does not seem to provide data for conventional NG upstream emissions.
Table 4-7: Former default emission factors for upstream emissions for different types of fuels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Default emission factor</th>
<th>Reference for the underlying emission factor range in Volume 3 of the 1996 Revised IPCC Guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equations 1 and 4, p. 1.105 and 1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>t CH4 / kt coal</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>Tables 1-60 to 1-64, p. 1.129 - 1.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground mining</td>
<td>t CH4 / kt coal</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Tables 1-60 to 1-64, p. 1.129 - 1.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface mining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, refining and storage</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA and Canada</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing, transport and distribution</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and former USSR</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing, transport and distribution</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>921</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing, transport and distribution</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other oil exporting countries / Rest of world</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing, transport and distribution</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>t CH4 / PJ</td>
<td>296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The emission factors in this table have been derived from IPCC default Tier 1 emission factors provided in Volume 3 of the 1996 Revised IPCC Guidelines, by calculating the average of the provided default emission factor range.

Sources: EB68 Annex 12, ACM0009, V.4, Table 3, [http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/r/t/4M2I7TA9GRCU5QDB0JLNHK6PY1ZOWE.pdf](http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/r/t/4M2I7TA9GRCU5QDB0JLNHK6PY1ZOWE.pdf)

4.11.5. Other issues

None.

4.11.6. Summary of findings

Additionality

- Small-scale methodologies for fuel switching do not require investment analysis but may build only on barrier analysis, which provides a high risk for non-additionality
- Even in large scale methodologies, modelling of fuel choice depends not only on prices, but also on availability/reliability, need for diversification, and operational needs (e.g. NG power plants for covering peak demand); this may imply that the investment analysis may not be sufficient to determining additionality
- CER revenues are very small compared to typical fluctuations of the price difference between fuels (dark-spark spread)

Over-crediting

- Upstream emissions need to be taken into account, but with the revised default values of the tool they may not be addressed in an adequate way anymore

Other issues

- None
4.11.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

In sum, the revision of upstream default values as documented in the tool practically eliminates the consideration of upstream emission in a fuel switch e.g. from (underground) coal to natural gas. The assumptions behind the revisions (mostly data from the US may not be representative for the situation with natural gas used in developing countries and require urgent independent analysis and revision.

4.12. Efficient cook stoves

4.12.1. Overview

Under the CDM, there are two methodologies applicable to efficient cook stoves. AMS-II.G\textsuperscript{77} applies to cases where inefficient existing cook stoves are replaced by improved-efficiency cook stoves to reduce the demand for non-renewable biomass. AMS-I.E\textsuperscript{78} applies to cases where a renewable technology, such as biogas or solar cookers, is introduced to displace existing cook stoves using non-renewable biomass. The number of projects has increased quickly since the introduction of these methodologies in 2008/2009. Most notably the introduction of PoAs, enabling multiple project activities to be registered through a single approval process, has lowered the transaction costs and increased scalability for projects like efficient cook stoves.

4.12.2. Potential CER Volume

As of 1 July 2015, a total of 102 cook stove projects have been registered under the CDM, 37 as individual CDM project activities and 65 as PoAs (along with a total of 180 individual CDM Program Activities (CPAs)).

Table 4-8: Number of efficient cook stove single CDM project activities by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of CDM project activities</th>
<th>Annual CERs (1,000)</th>
<th>Avg. CERs per CDM project activity (1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>960</strong></td>
<td><strong>1160</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNEP DTU 2015a

Project activity under the CDM peaked in 2012 and dropped sharply in 2013. As of 1 July 2015, single CDM cook stove projects are mostly located in the Asia and Pacific regions (Table 4-8), while component project activities developed under PoAs are predominantly located in Africa, as shown in Table 4-9. The annual volume of CERs estimated by project developers from PoA projects is 9.2 million, nearly 10 times the annual volume of CERs projected from single CDM project

\textsuperscript{77} AMS-II.G.: Energy efficiency measures in thermal applications of non-renewable biomass, https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/DB/UPM2Q870KFMLV071UNXDO1QG99KHEK.

\textsuperscript{78} AMS-I.E.: Switch from non-renewable biomass for thermal applications by the user, https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/DB/O799FU5XYGECUSN22G84U5SBXJVM6S.
activities of 0.96 million. Many of the registered PoAs have only 1 or a few CPAs associated with them (Table 4-9), so there is potential to scale up CPAs in these cases. In Bangladesh and Madagascar, many individual CPAs have already been developed under the one PoA registered in each of these countries (Table 4-9).

Table 4-9: Number of efficient cook stove PoAs and CERs by country and methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of PoAs</th>
<th>Annual CERs (1,000)</th>
<th>CPAs per PoA</th>
<th>Annual CERs/CPA (1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Congo DR</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>345</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>129</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMS-I.E</td>
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<td>4,657</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMS-II.G</td>
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<td>4,535</td>
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<td>2,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS-I.E + AMS II.G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9,292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNEP DTU 2015a

4.12.3. Additionality

Improved cook stove methodologies under the CDM fall under one of two types: improved energy efficiency (AMS-II.G) or fuel switching to renewable energy (AMS-I.E). Under both methodologies projects must apply the CDM “Guidelines on the demonstrating of additionality of SSC project activities” (Methodological Tool: Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities. Version 10.0). Following these CDM guidelines, projects using either of these methodologies are on
the positive list of project types and automatically considered additional so long as each unit is no larger than 5% of the small-scale CDM threshold (750 kW installed capacity or 3000MWh energy savings per year or 3,000 metric tons emission reductions per year), and end users are households/communities.

Lambe et al. (2015) reviewed PDDs for cook stove projects in Kenya and India. Although projects are considered automatically additional and were thus not required to document barriers, the study found that several did include a discussion of barriers in the PDDs. The most-cited barrier was household poverty, which makes improved stoves unaffordable. The study found that several PDDs for projects in Kenya include simple cost analysis to assess the ability of households to purchase an efficient cook stove based on their income and their costs for food and fuel; the calculations suggest that households would need to save 22–30% of their remaining income for a year to purchase a stove. This claim was supported in the pricing models the authors found used by projects in rural areas, which nearly exclusively distributed stoves for a free or subsidized price. In an urban setting, the study found that many projects were selling stoves at the retail price with microfinance options. The study noted that these PDDs suggest that since urban households are already purchasing charcoal, they have an incentive to buy an improved cook stove to reduce their fuel costs. The study authors also found that many projects also cited the lack of access to credit for working capital, low profit margins, high upfront capital costs, lack of sufficient consumer outreach and support for program operations, reduced consumer demand resulting from failure of past efforts, need for ongoing improvement and modifications of stoves to suit user needs as barriers to project implementation.

Lambe et al. (2015) also investigated what contribution offset revenues make to the overall project revenue. The study reviewed claims made in PDDs regarding the use of offset revenue and found that a majority of projects planned to use offset sale revenues to subsidize the price of improved cook stoves, as well as to cover operational costs, including maintenance and replacement of stoves, training of cook stove users, outreach and marketing to households, microcredit systems and distribution. Interviews of market actors affiliated with these projects by the authors found that while some projects were entirely dependent on offset revenue, others admitted that given the uncertainty in revenue from offsets it was advantageous not to depend on carbon revenues.

These conclusions raise substantial concerns about the additionality of improve cook stove projects under the CDM. Carbon revenues are more likely to be a primary financial enabler of projects in rural areas, where revenues are needed to subsidize the price of stoves. In urban areas, where households have a financial incentive to reduce their fuel purchasing costs, business models without carbon financing may be more viable. While these factors may reduce confidence in the additionality of cook stove projects in urban areas, low income urban households are unlikely to be able to afford more efficient and more costly cook stoves with a payback period of more than a few months.

4.12.4. Baseline emissions

In both types of cook stove projects – improved efficiency and fuel substitution – emission reductions are calculated as the product of the amount of woody biomass saved, the fraction that is non-renewable biomass, the net calorific value (NCV) of the biomass, and an emission factor for the fuel used. The net calorific value of the non-renewable biomass (NCVbiomass) is relatively straightforward – it is empirically measurable and a default value from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) exists. However, Lee et al. (2013) concluded that there is uncertainty in the approaches to estimating the other parameters: biomass fuel consumption (Bf), fraction of non-renewable biomass (fNRR), and emission factors for fuel combustion (EFPetroleum). A study by Johnson et al. (2010) assessed the relative contributions of these three variables to the overall uncertainty in
carbon offset estimation for an improved cook stove project in Mexico and found that fuel consumption ($B_y$) contributed to 28% of the uncertainty, fraction of non-renewable biomass ($f_{NRB}$) contributed 47%, and emission factors ($EF_{projected/fossil}$) accounted for 25%.

The CDM methodology AMS-I.I.G presents project developers with three options for quantifying biomass fuel savings from improved stoves: the Kitchen Performance Test (KPT), the Water Boiling Test (WBT), and the Controlled Cooking Test (CCT). The WBT and CCT are laboratory-based methods, whereas the Kitchen Performance Test is done in the field, and can thus better represent stove users' actual cooking behaviour. The primary advantage of the Water Boiling Test is its simplicity and reduced costs; the laboratory-based method is standardized and replicable. However, the laboratory results on stove performance do not necessarily translate to cooking actual meals in households, and thus the accuracy of this method is frequently called into question (Abelliotis & Pakula 2013; Johnson et al. 2007). Meanwhile, the Controlled Cooking Test protocol provides a compromise, better representing local cooking while being conducted in a controlled environment. Berrueta et al. (2008), which evaluated the performance of a stove designed primarily for tortilla-making by using all three tests and found that the WBT “gave little indication of the overall performance of the stove in rural communities”, while the CCT was somewhat more predictive of the fuel savings found by the KPT (44-65% for CCT vs. 67% for KPT). There may be options for reducing costs associated with the KPT, such as having local NGOs perform the tests rather than hiring expensive international consultants, as well as opportunities to improve the WBT. In recent years, more comprehensive and appropriate testing methods and performance standards are under development through both ANSI and ISO standardisation organisations. The CDM methodology provides default efficiency values for two traditional stove types – a three-stone fire, or a conventional system with no improved combustion – as well as a default efficiency value for devices with improved combustion air supply or flue gas ventilation. Experts interviewed by Lee et al. (2013) noted that these limited defaults do not cover the range of cook stoves in most countries. The CDM Small-Scale Working Group (CDM SSC WG) considered this in the past, but made the determination not to proceed with developing regional default efficiency values for traditional cook stoves because of the huge variability in values among the available data (UNFCCC 2012a). Lee et al. (2013) conclude that although the KPT is more logistically complicated, and time- and resource-intensive, testing stoves outside of a controlled laboratory setting and using a variety of typical cooking activities appears to be an important factor in ensuring accurate and credible results in the baseline or default analysis. Overall, evidence suggests the Water Boiling Test is not an appropriate tool for assessing baseline fuel consumption and should be removed from the CDM methodology. The methodology should require the use of either the Kitchen or Controlled Cooking Tests. AMS-I.E follows a similar approach for calculating baseline emissions from fuel substitution of cook stoves.

The factor $f_{NRB}$ represents the fraction of woody biomass saved by the project activity in year $y$ that can be established as non-renewable biomass and is a key variable in all current cook stove offset methodologies.

Based on its definition of renewable biomass (UNFCCC 2006b), the EB has identified several indicators of scarcity to help identify non-renewable biomass. Woody biomass is considered non-renewable if at least two of the following indicators are shown to exist:

- A trend showing an increase in time spent or distance travelled for gathering fuelwood, by users (or fuelwood suppliers) or alternatively, a trend showing an increase in the distance the fuelwood is transported to the project area;
- Survey results, national or local statistics, studies, maps or other sources of information, such as remote-sensing data, that show that carbon stocks are depleting in the project area;
• Increasing trends in fuel wood prices indicating a scarcity of fuel-wood;
• Trends in the types of cooking fuel collected by users that indicate a scarcity of woody biomass (UNFCCC 2011a).

In 2012, the EB issued national default factors for \( f_{\text{NBR}} \) based on a highly aggregated approach, balancing the mean annual increment in biomass growth (MAI), the annual change in living forest biomass stocks (\( \Delta F \)) and biomass growth in protected forest areas (UNFCCC 2012a). Under this approach, \( f_{\text{NBR}} \) values were calculated for nearly 100 countries, based on the total annual national biomass removals minus the portion of demonstrably renewable biomass from growth in protected reserve areas. The large majority (over four-fifths) of default values exceed 80%, with the remainder ranging from 40% to 77%. While Lee et al. (2013) noted that market actors interviewed characterized development of default \( f_{\text{NBR}} \) values as a ‘huge triumph’, there was also recognition by market actors and researchers interviewed that national-level forest growth and total forest harvest removal data alone do not necessarily capture the impact of fuelwood harvesting on carbon stocks. First, the approach does not distinguish removals for timber harvesting from those for fuelwood. Furthermore, there is no justification or validation of whether the change in national carbon stocks has any correlation to fuelwood harvesting. Second, according to this method, high values of \( f_{\text{NBR}} \) are calculated for countries with significant deforestation. However, deforestation could occur in different geographical areas and be driven by entirely other factors than fuel wood collection. In practice, renewable biomass may be extracted both from plantations and natural forests that are not under protection. The MAI approach is better suited to assess the fraction of harvested wood products that are renewable, rather than fuelwood. Using the change in carbon stocks due to harvested wood products has the potential to significantly overestimate the fraction of non-renewable biomass. Estimates published by de Miranda Carneiro et al. (2013), based on the use of a spatially-explicit land use model to examine the availability of fuelwood, suggest default values for \( f_{\text{NBR}} \) of wood-fuel on the order of 20-30%, much lower than the prior estimates. Bailis et al. (2015) estimate that 27–34% of woodfuel harvested was unsustainable, with large geographic variations, and conclude that cookstove methodologies probably overstate the climate benefits.

Under the CDM methodology AMS-II.G and AMS-I.E, the quantification of project emission reductions relies on the factor \( EF_{\text{projected_fossilfuel}} \), representing the fossil fuel emission factor of “substitution fuels likely to be used by similar users”. Since emission reductions from the LULUCF sector can only be claimed from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM, the use of fossil fuel emission factors for baseline fuels represents something of a workaround. While the short-term emission reductions actually occur from avoiding the depletion of carbon stocks, such as avoiding deforestation, emission reductions are calculated using fossil fuel emission factors. One possible argument for this approach is that kerosene or LPG cook stoves might be used by the households if they had a higher income. In this regard, the consideration of emissions from fossil fuel based cooking devices might be regarded as a suppressed demand baseline. However, the approach combines the efficiency of fuel-wood cook stoves with the CO\(_2\) emission factor of fossil fuels. This approach has been roundly criticized. Johnson et al. (2010) say it has “no scientific basis, given that wood emits approximately double the CO\(_2\) per unit fuel energy compared to LPG or kerosene thus halving possible offsets from non-renewable harvesting of fuel”. One could also argue that it leads to overestimating baseline emissions if one would assume the long-term suppressed demand baseline of using kerosene or LPG cook stoves. By combining the efficiency from inefficient fuel-wood cook stoves with the CO\(_2\) emission factors from fossil fuels, the claimed baseline emissions are higher than if the households would use kerosene or LPG cook stoves. The CDM methodology AMS-II.G suggests the use of a weighted average value of 81.6 tCO\(_2\)/TJ\(^2\), representing a mix of 50% coal, 25% kerosene, and 25% LPG. However, no justification for this fuel mix provided. Coal is not commonly used as a cooking fuel for households transitioning from traditional to modern biomass.
LPG is the dominant fossil fuel used in households transitioning to modern energy for household cooking. Assuming that households would use coal vs. LPG overestimates the emissions factor. For example, if we compare the emissions factor if the fuel mix was LPG vs. the current emission factor we find that the emissions are overestimated by 23%. For charcoal production, the simplification is stretched even further beyond reality. The methodologies permit calculating wood use by charcoal stoves by multiplying the charcoal volume by six, following the 1996 IPCC accounting guidelines to estimate total biomass consumed (IPCC/OECD/IEA 1996, p. 1.42). Then baseline emissions are estimated by applying the projected fossil fuel use emissions factor, which in effect assumes that the project displaces fossil fuel use for charcoal production, which likely significantly overestimates the baseline emissions (Lee et al. 2013).

4.12.5. Other issues

Improved cook stove projects are dependent on end users to achieve emission reductions: households must actually use the improved cook stoves instead of their traditional stoves. Carbon finance monitoring requirements include checking the efficiency of the stove and confirming at least every two years that the stove is still in use. Additional stove monitoring of the efficiency and usage rate is required annually or biannually. Monitoring requirements furthermore include sampling and surveying as specified in the applicable offset protocol. This has been a significant challenge. Carbon finance project monitoring requirements further specify that projects must either ensure that the improved stoves completely replace traditional stoves, or else the traditional stoves must be monitored and accounted for under the project calculations for emission reductions. Lambe et al. (2014) found in their review of projects in Kenya and India that this presented several challenges. In Kenya, where the predominant mode of traditional cooking is with a three-stone fire, the study found that many PDDs acknowledged that this form of traditional stove cannot really be removed or destroyed. In India, traditional stoves in several regions are known as chulhas. These stoves often have a religious significance and households often build the stoves themselves from locally available materials such as mud, brick, or cement (Lambe & Atteridge 2012). This form and construction makes it difficult to guarantee that a new chulha will not be made following the destruction of the old one. Lambe et al. (2014) found that many projects required households to destroy these existing cook stoves. In some cases, photographic evidence is used to demonstrate that the existing stoves have been destroyed. However, because of the challenges with removing traditional stoves and the barriers to ensuring adoption and sustained use of improved cook stoves, more often a stacking of stoves and fuels occurs where traditional and improved cook stoves are both used for different types of cooking (Ruiz-Mercado et al. 2011). While the methodologies contain monitoring guidance for adjusting the baseline fuel consumption if the traditional stove continues to be used, this adds further uncertainty to quantification of changes in fuel consumption. Use of temperature sensors to monitor usage of traditional and improved cook stoves have shown promising signs of helping to address this issue, but are not yet in widespread use in carbon market projects (Ruiz-Mercado et al. 2011).

There is a broader concern about crediting emission reductions from displacement of non-renewable biomass since the increased carbon storage from changes in carbon stocks may only lead to temporary reductions. The risk of non-permanence of emission reductions is addressed through appropriate accounting approaches for afforestation, reforestation, and carbon capture and storage project activities, but it is not addressed for improved cook stove project types. Under the CDM, there are projects promoting the use of biomass energy to displace fossil fuel, as well as improved cook stove projects aimed at decreasing biomass energy use. In theory, this does not present a conflict, assuming that biomass power projects are based in regions with increasing or stable carbon stocks and improved cook stove projects are located in regions with declining carbon stocks. However, looking at registered CDM projects there are several examples of provinces in which there are both biomass power and cook stove projects. This means that in the same prov-
ince, there are simultaneously CDM projects getting credit for increasing the use of biomass, as well as reducing the use of biomass. For example, in the Henei province in China there are 9 biomass energy projects fuelled by agricultural residues (rice husk and other kinds) as well as 4 improved cook stove projects.

4.12.6. Summary of findings

| Addi- | CER revenues are insufficient to fully cover project costs, confidence in additionality may be low in urban settings where households are paying for improved stoves at the retail price |
|nationality | |
| Over- | Uncertainty in some widely used approaches for estimating biomass savings |
| crediting | Significant uncertainty around the fraction of non-renewable biomass values, recent research suggests this parameter may be significantly overestimated. |
| | Emissions intensity factors of fossil fuel likely underestimate emissions relative to wood-fuel used in the baseline. |
| | Emissions factor for suppressed demand use of fossil fuel overestimate emissions; LPG is the appropriate substitute used by similar consumers, including coal and kerosene overestimate emission reductions. |
| Other | Challenges in ensuring adoption and sustained use of improved cook stoves result can lead to over-crediting if traditional stoves continue to be used. |
| issues | The use of biomass as a renewable energy sources is inconsistently accounted for under the CDM; the same region can have biomass power projects receiving credit for increasing biomass use and improved cook stove projects receiving credit for decreasing biomass use. |

4.12.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

We recommend revising the current methodologies as follows:

- Eliminate the use of the Water Boiling Test as a means of determining baseline emissions.
- Reconsider the use of default $f_{NRB}$ factors based on the MAI approach.
- Revise the emission factor for the substitution of non-renewable biomass by similar consumers to one based solely on LPG.
- Explore options for incorporating temperature sensors in monitoring plans to improve reliable assessment of the adoption and sustained use of improved vs. traditional cook stoves in households.
- Review the use of biomass as an energy source under the CDM to ensure consistent accounting across project types and regions. The $f_{NRB}$ should be considered in improved cook stove projects, as well as modern biomass energy projects to confirm that projects are not contributing to loss of carbon stocks. The CDM EB needs to provide justification for how both biomass energy and improved cook stove projects can be approved within a sub-region.

4.13. Efficient lighting

4.13.1. Overview

For energy efficient lighting, we focus our analysis on the replacement of incandescent electrical bulbs with more efficient electric lighting, such as Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs) or Light Emitting Diode (LED) lamps. This includes all projects registered under AM0046 and AMS II.J.
methodologies as well as projects registered under AMS II.C\textsuperscript{81} that are labelled as ‘lighting’ and ‘lighting in service’ in UNEP DTU (2014).\textsuperscript{82} This technology category was a late starter in the CDM – in mid-2010 there were only half a dozen registered projects and 3 registered PoAs. Recent growth in PoAs, particularly with larger PoAs, indicates a higher potential in the future – even beyond the current project activity and PoA pipeline. Energy efficient lighting projects are typically implemented by an entity (often public sector or linked to a utility) that distributes energy efficient lamps for free or for a nominal fee, and collects and disposes of the incandescent bulbs that have been displaced.

4.13.2. Potential CER volume

For CDM project activities, the 40 projects registered by the end of 2013 state that they will produce 1.4 million CERs per year. This would be 10.3 million CERs in the period of 2013 to 2020. However, the issuance success for the largest project activity, which is the only project using the large-scale methodology, amounted to only 12% in the first monitoring period. This could be related to the time required for the CFL distribution programme to reach full scale, however, and does not necessarily mean that other projects will have similar issuance rates (or that this rate will not increase over time). Other projects have been much more successful, but are considerably smaller. Project activities are dominated by a stream of small-scale projects in India and a single large-scale project in Ecuador – the only registered large-scale energy efficient lighting project – which account for almost 80% of the expected CERs. More than 80% of the small-scale projects use AMS II.J, which was designed specifically as a simplified approach to energy efficient lighting.

The largest volume of CERs for energy efficient lighting, however, could come from PoAs. Twenty-six PoAs had been registered for energy efficiency lighting by the end of 2013. Just from the CPAs already included in these registered PoAs as of the end of 2013, the volume of CERs is estimated by the project developers at 3.4 million per year, or two and a half times greater than for project activities. This could continue to grow, given that only four PoAs have more than one CPA. For PoAs, the main players are China, India, Mexico and Pakistan, with South Africa also hosting multiple PoAs (Table 4-10). The four PoAs with more than one CPA have large numbers of CPAs (e.g. 9 to 53). For some PoAs, the CPAs are delineated to have very similar emission reductions in each CPA (e.g. in Mexico, India, Bangladesh).

\textsuperscript{81} Demand-side energy efficiency activities for specific technologies --- Version 14.0.
\textsuperscript{82} This excludes one registered PoA under AMS II.C that focuses on street lighting and is labelled as sub-type “Street lighting”.

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How additional is the CDM?

**Table 4-10: Number of energy efficient lighting PoAs and CERs by country and methodology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of PoAs</th>
<th>Annual CERs (1,000)</th>
<th>CPAs per PoA</th>
<th>Annual CERs/CPA (1,000)</th>
<th>PoAs with &gt;1 CPA</th>
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</thead>
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<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1,555</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>AMS-II.C.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,431</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNEP DTU 2015b

All of the PoAs for lighting efficiency upgrades have moved to the newer methodology AMS II.J rather than AMS II.C (Table 4-10). No new energy efficient lighting PoAs have entered the pipeline since October 2012, and the new project activity pipeline largely stopped in January 2012, with only one new project activity starting validation in 2013 (in The Gambia).

**4.13.3. Additionality**

Because only one project activity uses the large-scale methodology, this entire technology area essentially uses SSC methodologies and additionality rules. For SSC projects and PoAs, additionality can be determined through several different routes: All SSC projects (or SSC CPAs within PoAs) must refer to the tool for “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities” (Tool21, ver10.0). This includes the choice of using several different barriers to justify additionality (i.e. investment barrier, technology barrier, prevailing practice barrier, or other barriers). In addition, from July 2012, projects comprised entirely of units below 5% of the small-scale CDM threshold (i.e. 3000 MWh savings for energy efficiency) were considered automatically additional without any further justification. This new ‘positive list’ additionality argument has not been used by CDM project activities but has been used extensively by PoAs, as discussed further below. Most CDM project activities applying the SSC additionality tool cite investment barriers and use simple cost analysis to prove additionality (Table 4-11). This is because the organisations distributing the efficient lamps do not receive the energy savings, so they incur only costs without any revenue (other than a nominal fee from consumers in some cases).  

As mentioned above, since July 2012, the tool for additionality of SSC activities has allowed automatic additionality based on a ‘unit threshold’ described as “project activities solely composed of isolated units where the users of the technology/measure are households or communities or Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and where the size of each unit is no larger than 5% of the small-

---

83 The organisations that charge a nominal fee would be receiving less than the wholesale cost of the CFL, so would lose money on each bulb even though there is nominal revenue. In theory, any programme implemented by an electric utility should not be able to use simple cost analysis because the utility has avoided power generation costs (and deferred capital costs) that are a benefit stream to the project. Even where the project is implemented by a utility (e.g. South Africa’s Eskom), this is not addressed because the unit threshold positive list is used to justify additionality.
scale CDM thresholds.” For energy efficiency, this threshold of 3000 MWh is roughly 46,000 CFLs. All projects and PoAs applying SSC methodologies may use this rule to qualify for automatic additionality.

Table 4-11: Additionality approaches used by efficient lighting CDM project activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additionality approach</th>
<th>Number of PAs</th>
<th>Total Annual CERs (1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment barrier: Benchmark Analysis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment barrier: Investment Comparison Analysis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment barrier: Simple Cost Analysis</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment barrier: Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive list</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.272</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

Lighting PoAs have also made extensive use of this unit threshold for automatic additionality. A report by the UNFCCC Secretariat in mid-2014 (CDM-EB85-AA-A09) found that 28 of the registered lighting-related PoAs at that time had used either micro-scale or unit thresholds to qualify for automatically additionality. As an example, all 12 of the Chinese PoAs registered in December 2012 used the unit threshold for automatic additionality.

As one of the first ‘top-down’ large-scale methodologies, the EB published an energy efficiency lighting methodology in November 2013, which included a new approach for additionality demonstration:

- In countries with limited or no regulations supporting energy efficient lighting, as evidenced by a UNEP Global Lighting Map\(^84\) survey of regulations and support for energy efficient lighting, CFLs are automatically additional.\(^85\)

- For other countries (i.e. those with more regulatory support), the “Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality” must be used, with an investment analysis and common practice analysis. While the investment analysis may still use simple cost analysis (which would mean that almost all projects would be additional), any country with a higher than 20% penetration of CFLs is not additional under the common practice test.

This new approach essentially restricted CFL CDM projects to countries with limited regulatory support or low market penetration. Given that there are no new projects or PoAs entering the pipeline, however, this more recent methodology has not yet had an impact.

In November 2014, AMS II.J was also revised to only allow for automatic additionality for CFLs when there were limited or no regulations to support energy efficient lighting. However, for countries in which there is significant support for energy efficient lighting, the methodology says that additionality should be demonstrated using the latest version of the “Guidelines on the demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities”. This difference is critical, however, because any project participant may simply use the unit threshold in the “Guidelines on the demonstration of

\(^84\) [http://map.enlighten-initiative.org/](http://map.enlighten-initiative.org/)

\(^85\) Countries coloured red on the map have limited or no support for energy efficient lighting.
additionality of small-scale project activities" to guarantee automatic additionality, whatever the market penetration in the host country.

The main concern with the additionality of energy efficient lighting in the CDM is whether some activities — at least projects involving CFLs and fluorescent tubes — were already common practice at the time of registration and therefore not additional. The use of micro-scale or unit threshold positive lists means that project methodologies and PoAs do not have to address this common practice issue at all when using the SSC methodologies. In other words, using the SSC methodologies would be a way of circumventing the higher stringency of the new large-scale methodology. Projects could simply define the size of each CPA in a way that they qualify as automatically additional, whatever the regulations and market penetration in the host country. To evaluate the additionality of the existing pipeline, it is useful to consider the two criteria from AM0113 and the revised AMS II.J: regulatory support and market penetration.

According to the ‘en.lighten’ initiative’s Global Lighting Map referenced in the methodologies, regulatory support for efficient lighting is widespread, but varies greatly by country (Figure 4-9). For the countries with the most CDM PoA activity, the level of support is generally strong:

- China has already banned incandescent lighting and implemented large state subsidy programmes since 2006.
- India does not have a ban on incandescent bulbs, but does have awareness-raising programmes, energy service company initiatives, and consumer financing options.
- Pakistan's minimum energy performance standards also still allow incandescent bulbs, but the country has awareness-raising programmes, bulk procurement and tax incentives.
- South Africa has announced that incandescent bulbs will be phased out by 2016, and has testing and certification facilities. More importantly, the national utility, Eskom, distributed 30 million free CFLs between 2002 and 2010.
- A regional report for Latin America on the en.lighten initiative’s website notes that a Mexican regulation was passed in December 2010 prohibiting the sale of 100 watt and higher incandescent lamps for the residential sector after December 2011, and similar bans for 75 watt as of December 2012 and 40-60 watt as of December 2013. The Mexican PoA was registered in July 2009, which preceded the passing of these regulations.
- In terms of their rating on minimum energy performance standards by the Global Lighting map, all of the countries with PoAs except Kenya and Malawi are orange (some/progress) or green (advanced). This means that, in terms of the new large-scale methodology (AM0113), projects in all of the countries except Kenya and Malawi would not be automatically additional, but require the use of the additionality tool with investment analysis and the common practice threshold of 20%.

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86 Imports and sales of 100-watt-and-higher incandescent lamps are banned from 1 October 2012, 60-watt-and-above from 1 October 2014, and 15 watts or higher from 1 October 2016 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/04/content_14039321.htm].
87 [http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zxq/20080508_210093.htm].
90 The reference is to regulation “NOM- 028 – ENER – 2010 Energy Efficiency of Lamps for General Use”.
In terms of assessing common practice, the available evidence suggested that CFLs are likely already common practice in most key CDM countries, and LEDs may be so in the next few years, though not in the poorest countries. The main CDM countries have the following market information:

- According to the “Regional Report on the Transition to Efficient Lighting in South Asia” prepared by the Tata Energy Research Institute in 2014, the market share of CFLs in India amounted to 29% in 2012-2013. Three of the four Indian PoAs were registered in late 2012, while one was registered in early 2010. In addition, for the largest PoA – which was registered in 2010 and has 50 CPAs – the PoA DD states that, “[t]he penetration share of incandescent lamps for lighting in commercial and residential sector put together is thus nearly 80% in India.” The market share for CFLs, therefore, was almost certainly above 20% when the PoAs were registered.

- In China, a 2012 McKinsey & Company report estimates the penetration of LEDs (the more expensive alternative to CFLs) as 12% in 2011, rising to 46% by 2016. The report also notes that, “CFL is still the dominant technology in the residential segment.” This means that, at the time of registration of the PoAs, the market share of CFLs was almost certainly above 20%. China does not have any LED PoAs yet. If they were proposed, AMS II.J and AM0113 both consider LED lamps automatically additional in all countries until at least the end of 2016. Given the McKinsey projections presented above, automatic additionality for LEDs in China would not be appropriate.

Notes: Green = Advanced/in place, Orange=In progress, Red=few/limited, white=no information available

Sources: [http://map.enlighten-initiative.org/](http://map.enlighten-initiative.org/)
The large PoA in Mexico states in the PoA DD that CFL penetration in 2007 was already at 20%, while the PoA was registered in June 2009.\textsuperscript{94} 

In South Africa, even before the start of the Eskom free CFL distribution programme, the market share of CFLs was estimated at 7% in 2002 (Nkomo 2005). With 30 million CFLs distributed after this time,\textsuperscript{95} in a country with less than 10 million households, the penetration of efficient lighting was almost certainly well above 20% when Eskom registered their CDM project activity and PoAs in 2012.

For Pakistan, the “Regional Report on the Transition to Efficient Lighting in South Asia” cited above estimates the CFL market share at 8%, but also notes that linear fluorescent lamps make up 32% of the market.

For Bangladesh, the same report puts the CFL market share at 25%, with linear tube fluorescent lamps at 18%. This market share could be for 2013 and the PoA was registered in May 2011, so there is a reasonable likelihood that the market share of CFLs was 20% at the time of registration.

This information suggests that the largest CDM PoA countries for energy efficient lighting would not pass the common practice test if the large-scale AMO013 methodology were applied, and so these PoAs would not qualify as additional. Bangladesh, China, India, South Africa and Mexico account for almost 80% of the expected CERs from PoAs, and yet these countries were likely above the 20% market share for CFLs when the PoAs were registered.

For off-grid lighting (AMS III.AR), the situation is quite different. Access to electricity in rural households in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is less than 10% (IEA et al. 2010; Legros et al. 2009). Between 2010 and 2015, the estimated number of unelectrified households in Africa was estimated to grow from 110 million to 120 million (Dalberg Global Development Adv. 2010). The off-grid solar lamp market is expanding to address the 1.5 billion people who do not (and, in many cases, will not) have access to electricity (IFC 2012). While solar lantern and solar kit prices are decreasing, they still face major barriers in terms of distribution challenge, upfront costs (and lack of consumer financing), and successful business models for scaling up (ESMAP 2013; IFC 2012).

Assessing the economics of energy efficient lighting faces the classic problem of ‘split incentives’ (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2004). From an economic point of view, upgrades to energy efficient electric lighting are unquestionably economically beneficial (i.e. have large positive IRRs) (McKinsey & Company 2009) but the benefits do not accrue to those who pay for the additional costs if the project is funded by outside agencies. The economics of efficient lighting are more likely to be driven by electricity prices than carbon prices. For example, a 15 W CFL replacing a 60W incandescent lamp operated 3.5 hours per day could save 57 kWh per year. With a relatively carbon-intensive grid (e.g. \(0.8 \text{ tCO}_2/\text{MWh}\)), this would be 0.05 tCO\(_2\)e savings per year. Electricity prices to the consumer in developing countries vary widely, from $50/MWh in heavily subsidized economies to more than $170/MWh in more competitive emerging economies (EIA 2010; Winkler et al. 2011). This means an energy savings of $2.87 to $9.77/year. CFL costs have also declined rapidly, with current costs of $1.50-$2.50 in many countries (UNEP 2012). This would mean a typical payback period of much less than one year, before any carbon revenue was received. At current CER prices, carbon revenue would be less than two cents per year only, while at $3-5/CER, revenue would be $0.15-0.25, or less than 5% of energy savings.

\textsuperscript{94} http://cdm.unfccc.int/ProgrammeOfActivities/poa_db/17BH6AJX524TYQUZ68KGWV3QIPSE9/view

\textsuperscript{95} http://www.eskom.co.za/OurCompany/SustainableDevelopment/ClimateChangeCOP17/Documents/The_Eskom_National_Efficient_Lighting_Programme_Compact_Fluorescent_Lamps_Clean_Development_Mechanism_Project.pdf.
In summary, CDM rules on additionality of efficient lighting projects vary considerably. Using market penetration and regulatory support as indicators for the likelihood seems a reasonable approach. The large-scale AM0113 methodology uses market penetration and regulatory support as indicators for demonstrating additionality; this approach seems reasonable and reflects the varying circumstances of host countries. AM0046 may provide for a suitable alternative by monitoring the market penetration of CFLs and LEDs in a control group outside the project boundary; however, the complexity and cost of monitoring under this methodology means that only one project has even chosen to utilise it – so the additionality approaches may not be relevant for the overall impact of this project category. In contrast, under small-scale methodologies, including the revised AMS II.J, this project type is, in practice, considered automatically additional, even if the use of CFLs is required by regulations and is widespread. However, for countries with regulations that have phased out incandescent bulbs or large subsidy programmes for CFLs, these existing registered projects are unlikely to be additional. If we take the 20% market share used in AM0113 as the point at which CFL programmes are no longer likely to be additional, then this would apply to most of the current CDM pipeline for energy efficient lighting.

4.13.4. Baseline emissions

In AMS II.J, AM0113 and AMS II.C (when used for lighting) the baseline is simply the use of the existing incandescent lamps – those which are collected and replaced within the project boundary. Both AMS II.J and AM0113 take similar approaches, where emissions reductions are related to the difference in power between a CFL and baseline bulb, operating hours, lamp failure rates, a ‘net-to-gross’ adjustment, and the grid emissions factor (taking technical losses into account). As a default, 3.5 operating hours per day are assumed. If project participants want to use operating hours greater than 3.5 per day, they must conduct a once-off survey at the start of the project to justify this. The lamp failure rates are also based on periodic surveys of the first group of bulbs installed, up to the end of their rated life. The methodologies require project participants to explain how they will collect and destroy baseline lamps. For off-grid lighting, an innovative ‘deemed consumption’ approach assigns a standard emissions reduction to each off-grid lighting unit, based on the fossil fuel alternative. The parameters and assumptions are conservative. Overall, the approaches to baseline emissions for efficient lighting are straightforward and conservative, and the improvements over the last two years have also simplified or clarified many of the sampling procedures.

4.13.5. Other issues

At 3-5 hours of use per day, a typical CFL would last anywhere from 3 to 10 years. This means that a crediting period of 10 years is almost certainly too long, unless the CDM project guarantees free replacements throughout the programme or restricts crediting to the measured life. The latter approach has been adopted under the CDM. Emission reductions do not accrue once the lamp failure rate reaches 100%, so if all lamps fail before the end of the crediting period and are not replaced, then no CERs would be issued. These provisions seem appropriate.

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96 AM46 also includes the possibility of some efficient lighting in the baseline, as a form of “autonomous efficiency improvement”, but this methodology has only been used once and is unlikely to be used in the future.

97 AMS II.C is not so specific, because the guidance was for all energy efficiency technologies, but the approach elaborated by the project participant would essentially be the same.
4.13.6. Summary of findings

| Additio-nality | • Granting automatic additionality under small-scale methodologies to all energy efficient lighting programmes in the past was highly problematic because there were large PoAs in countries in which the move away from incandescent bulbs was well underway; the new large-scale AM0113 methodology appropriately addresses these problems but is not mandatory, while the remaining small-scale methodology could still allow for automatic additionality for CFL programmes, so it is unlikely that the large-scale methodology will be used.  
• In many countries with lower income or less regulatory support, however, efficient lighting still faces major barriers, even if it is potentially economically beneficial, and so projects may need the support of the CDM to be implemented; these projects currently form a very small part of the project pipeline but could grow in the future. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over-crediting</td>
<td>• Over-crediting is unlikely, given the robust monitoring procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>• None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.13.7. Recommendations for reform of CDM rules

AMS II.J should be revised so that CFL programmes in countries with significant regulatory support may use the tool for “Demonstration of additionality of small-scale project activities” but may not use the paragraph referring to automatic additionality based on small unit size.

5. How additional is the CDM?

Based on the detailed analysis of individual project types in the previous chapter, this chapter provides an overall assessment of the environmental integrity of the CDM project portfolio available for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Table 5-1 provides an overview of the summary of findings for each of the analyzed project types.
## Table 5-1: Evaluation of project types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Additionality 1)</th>
<th>Over-crediting 2)</th>
<th>Other issues</th>
<th>Overall environmental integrity 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HFC-23 (up to version 5)</td>
<td>Likely to be additional</td>
<td>Risk of perverse incentives</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFC-23 (version 6)</td>
<td>Likely to be additional</td>
<td>Risk of perverse incentives largely addressed</td>
<td>Low CER prices could jeopardize continued operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipic acid</td>
<td>Likely to be additional</td>
<td>Most recent methodology could lead to slight under-crediting</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid</td>
<td>Likely to be additional</td>
<td>Most recent methodologies lead to under-crediting</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>CER revenue has only limited impact on profitability</td>
<td>Methodological assumptions may lead to both over- and under-crediting</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro power</td>
<td>Common practice in many countries</td>
<td>Methodological assumptions may lead to both over- and under-crediting; over the lifetime of the project likely under-crediting</td>
<td>Methane emissions from reservoirs may be important and may not be fully reflected by CDM methodologies</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass power</td>
<td>Significant impact of CER revenues on profitability for projects claiming methane avoidance</td>
<td>Demonstration of biomass decay/abundance of biomass is key</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project type</td>
<td>Additionality 1)</td>
<td>Over-crediting 2)</td>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>Overall environmental integrity 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Landfill gas         | Likely to be additional | • Default assumptions for the rate of methane captured historically have the potential to overestimate emission reductions  
                      |                   | • Default soil oxidation rates may underestimate emission reductions for uncovered landfills in humid subtropical and tropical regions  
                      |                   | • Perverse incentives for project developers to increase methane generation | Medium                           |
| Coal mine methane    | Likely to be additional | • Potential concerns regarding increased mining | • Potential perverse incentives to dilute methane in order to avoid that abatement is required by regulations | Medium                           |
| Waste heat recovery  |                  | • CER revenues small compared to fossil fuel cost savings  
                      |                  | • Future fuel cost savings uncertain  
                      |                  | • Widespread in many countries | • Brownfield: risks for inflated baselines  
                                                                                   | • Greenfield: modelling uncertain  
                                                                                   | • Plant operation under the project different to baseline | None                            |
| Fossil fuel switch   |                  | • Use of barrier analysis allowed for small-scale projects not appropriate  
                      |                  | • Investment analysis insufficient as choice of fuel depends not only on prices  
                      |                  | • CER revenues have a small impact | • Default values for upstream emissions not appropriate | None                            |

1) Likely to be additional 
2) Over-crediting 
3) Overall environmental integrity
How additional is the CDM?

### Efficient cook stoves
- CER revenues are insufficient to fully cover project costs
- Additionality questionable in urban areas
- Fraction of NRB likely to be overestimated
- Water boiling test not appropriate
- Emission intensity factors of fossil fuel likely underestimated emissions relative to wood-fuel used in the baseline
- Emissions factors used for suppressed demand are unrealistic
- Unrealistic assumptions for charcoal use
- Over-crediting if traditional stoves continue to be used
- Inconsistent accounting: CDM credits in the same region both reduction and increase of biomass use

### Project type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Additionality 1)</th>
<th>Over-crediting 2)</th>
<th>Other issues</th>
<th>Overall environmental integrity 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting (AMS II.C, AMS II.J)</td>
<td>Shift to EE lighting well underway and/or mandates in most common PoA countries, and PoAs allowed to use SSC additivity 'loophole'</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting (AM0113, AM0046)</td>
<td>Likely to be additional</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
1) High/medium/low likelihood of projects being additional under current rules;  
2) High/medium/low likelihood of avoiding over-crediting under current rules;  
3) High/medium/low likelihood of emission reductions being additional and not over-credited under current rules.

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

Overall, the table shows considerable differences between project types. Most energy-related project types (wind, hydro, waste heat recovery, fossil fuel switch and efficient lighting) are unlikely to be additional, irrespectively of whether they involve the increase of renewable energy, efficiency improvements or fossil fuel switch. An important reason that these projects types are unlikely to be additional is that for them the revenue from the CDM is small compared to the investment costs and other cost or revenue streams, even if the CER prices would be much higher than today. In addition, technological progress was much faster than expected, so that investment and generation costs have fallen considerably. Moreover, some project types are, in many instances, economically attractive (e.g. waste heat recovery, fossil fuel switch, hydropower), or supported through policies (e.g. wind power, efficient lighting), or mandatory due to regulations (e.g. efficient lighting). Some of these project types also have a medium likelihood of overestimating emission reductions, mainly due to risks of inflated baselines.

Industrial gas projects (HFC-23, adipic acid, nitric acid) can generally be considered likely to be additional as long as they are not promoted or mandated through policies. They use end-of-pipe-technology to abate emissions and thus do not generate revenues other than CERs. HFC-23 and adipic acid projects triggered strong criticism because of their relatively low abatement costs, which provided perverse incentives and generated huge profits for plant operators. In the case of HFC-
23, perverse incentives were addressed with the adoption of version 6 of AM0001, which uses an ambitious baseline that could lead to a net mitigation benefit. Similarly, concerns with perverse incentives for nitric acid plant operators not to use less GHG-intensive technologies were addressed. With regard to adipic acid projects, the risks of carbon leakage were not addressed.

Methane projects (landfill gas, coal mine methane) also have a high likelihood of being additional. This is mainly because carbon revenues have, due to the GWP of methane, a relatively large impact on the profitability of these project types. However, both project types face issues with regard to baseline emissions and perverse incentives and may thus lead to over-crediting.

Biomass power projects have a medium likelihood of being additional since their additionality very much depends on the local conditions of individual projects. In some cases, biomass power can already be competitive with fossil generation while in other cases domestic support schemes provide incentives for increased use of biomass in electricity generation. However, where these conditions are not prevalent, projects can be additional, particularly if CER revenues for methane avoidance can be claimed. Biomass projects also face other issues, in particular with regard to demonstrating that the biomass used is renewable.

The additionality efficient lighting project using small-scale methodologies is highly problematic because there were large PoAs in countries in which the move away from incandescent bulbs was well underway. The new methodologies address these problems but they are not mandatory and the small-scale methodologies are while the remaining small-scale methodology could still allow for automatic additionality for CFL programmes.

For cook stove projects, CDM revenues are often insufficient to cover the project costs and to make the project economically viable. In urban areas, however, the additionality of these project types is questionable. Cook stove projects are also likely considerably over-estimate the emission reductions due to a number of unrealistic assumptions and default values.

Based on these considerations we can estimate to which extent the CDM is likely to deliver additional emission reductions during the period of 2013 to 2020 (Table 5-2).
How additional is the CDM?

Table 5-2: How additional is the CDM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDM projects</th>
<th>Potential CER supply 2013 to 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFC-23 abatement from HCFC-22 production</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Version &lt;6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Version &gt;5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipic acid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>2.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro power</td>
<td>2.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass power</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mine methane</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste heat recovery</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook stoves</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.C, AMS II.J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM0046, AM0113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own calculations

Our analysis covers three quarters (76%) of the CDM projects and 85% of the potential CER supply during that period. 85% of the covered projects and 73% of the potential CER supply have a low likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity (i.e. ensuring that emission reductions are additional and not over-estimated). Only 2% of the projects and 7% of potential CER supply have a high likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity. The remainder, 13% of the projects and 20% of the potential CER supply, involve a medium likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity.

Has the performance of the CDM in terms of additionality improved over time? Several EB decisions have certainly improved the performance, particularly those which introduced ambitious baselines and/or addressed perverse incentives. However, Schneider (2007) estimated, “that additionality is unlikely or questionable for roughly 40% of the registered projects. These projects are expected to generate about 20% of the CERs”. Schneider’s methodological approach is not identical with the approach applied in this study but is, nevertheless, similar enough for a comparison of the overall results. Compared to earlier assessments of the environmental integrity of the CDM, our analysis suggests that the CDM’s performance as a whole has anything but improved, despite improvements of a number of CDM standards. There are several reasons for this:

- The main reason is a shift in the project portfolio towards projects with more questionable additionality. In 2007, CERs from projects that do not have revenues other than CERs made up about two third of the project portfolio, whereas the 2013-2020 CER supply potential from these project types is only less than a quarter. This is mainly due the registration of many energy projects between 2011 and 2013, including both fossil and renewable projects, which represent the largest share of CDM projects and of potential CER supply today, many of which are unlikely to be additional. It can therefore be questioned whether the CDM is the appropriate incentive scheme for those project types, or more generally, whether these project types are appropriate for crediting schemes at all.
• A second reason is that the CDM EB not only improved rules but also made simplifications that undermined the integrity. For example, positive lists were introduced for many technologies, for some of which the additionality is questionable and some of which are promoted or required by policies and regulations in some regions (e.g. efficient lighting). Another example is biomass residue projects, for which requirements to demonstrate that the biomass is available in abundance were strongly simplified, making an over-estimation of emission reductions more likely.

• A third reason is that the CDM EB did not take effective steps to exclude project types with a low likelihood of additionality. While positive lists were introduced, project types with more questionable additionality were not excluded from the CDM. The common practice test is not effective as it stands. Standardized baselines can be optionally used as an alternative to project-specific baselines, which provides a further avenue for demonstrating additionality but does not reduce the number of projects wrongly claiming additionality. In conclusion, the improvements to the CDM mainly aimed at simplifying requirements and reducing the number of false negatives (projects that are additional but do not qualify under the CDM) but did not address the false positives (projects that are not additional but qualify under the CDM).

Our analysis of the environmental integrity of the CDM has focused on the quality of CERs in terms of ensuring emission reductions that are additional and not over-credited. The overall environmental outcome of the CDM is, however, also influenced by several overarching and indirect effects:

• **Awareness raising and capacity building**: The CDM has drawn attention to climate change and to options of how it can be mitigated and thus contributed to the issue of climate change being better understood and taken more seriously in many parts of the world. In this way it has helped to pave the way towards the global agreement achieved at COP 21 in Paris in December 2015.

• **Technological innovation**: The CDM has helped to spread and reduce costs of many GHG mitigation technologies such as renewable energy technologies or technologies to avoid methane emissions in many developing countries. This may have helped developing countries to avoid locking in carbon-intensive technologies. The increased application of these technologies has contributed to reducing their total cost, and the CDM has contributed to building the capacity on how these technologies can domestically be applied in many developing countries.

• **Length of crediting periods**: Certain projects may continue their operation beyond their crediting period and will not receive credits for the respective GHG reductions. This effect has been estimated to have a significant potential for under-crediting (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012). However, over time the respective technologies often become economically viable without support and thus the common practice in many circumstances. The CDM may thus have contributed to advancing an investment, which would anyhow be conducted some years later, so that even the additionality of CERs generated in the late years of a crediting period could be questioned.

• **Rebound effects**: For CDM project developers and host countries, CER revenues are similar to subsidies, which often lower the cost of the product or service provided (e.g. electricity, cement, transportation), thereby inducing greater demand for the product or service. In contrast, carbon taxes or auctioning of allowances under the ETS generally provide incentives to reduce the demand for products or services. Calvin et al. (2015) show that ignoring such system-wide rebound effects in the power sector can lead to significant over-
How additional is the CDM?

crediting compared to the actual reductions at system level. The overall mitigation outcome of crediting could be systematically over-estimated, even if projects are fully additional and the direct GHG emission impact of a project is quantified appropriately. This is mainly because credits subsidize the deployment of technologies with lower emissions instead of penalising the use of more emitting technologies and because CDM methodologies draw the boundary around a project and do not consider the wider rebound effects.

- **Perverse policy incentives:** In some instances, the CDM may provide an incentive to governments not to implement domestic policies to address emissions. For example, policy makers may have disincentives to introduce regulations requiring the capture of landfill gas or to further pursue landfilling instead of less GHG-intensive waste treatment methods, since they would otherwise lose revenues from CERs.

All these effects somehow influence the environmental outcome of the CDM, partly for the better and partly for the worse. The overall effect can hardly be determined. However, it is unlikely that these overarching and indirect effects fully compensate for the overall low environmental integrity of many projects and CERs. On the contrary, in a forward-looking perspective, comparing the situation in which the CDM continues to be used with a situation in which this would not be the case, it is rather likely that these overarching effects further undermine the environmental outcome of the CDM overall.

The result of our analysis suggests that the CDM still has fundamental flaws in terms of environmental integrity. It is likely that the large majority of the projects registered and CERs issued under the CDM are not providing real, measurable and additional emission reductions. Therefore, the experiences gathered so far with the CDM should be used to improve both the CDM rules for the remaining years and to avoid flaws in the design of new market mechanisms being established under the UNFCCC. In the following chapters we summarise how the existing CDM should be improved (Chapter 6) and what can be learned from the CDM experience for the future of market mechanisms in general (Chapter 7).

6. Summary of recommendations for further reform of the CDM

The recommendations for the further reform of the CDM can be distinguished according to improvements of the general rules and approaches how to determine additionality and to project type-related recommendations.

6.1. General rules and approaches for determining additionality

As mentioned above, for an additionality test to function effectively, it must be able to assess, with high confidence, whether the CDM was the deciding factor for the project investment. However, additionality tests can never fully avoid wrong conclusions. They cannot fully reflect the complexity of investment decisions. Additionality tests always look at part of the full picture and use simplified indicators, such as economic performance or market penetration, to make a judgment on whether or not a project is truly additional. Information asymmetry between project developers and regulators, combined with the economic incentives for project developers to qualify their project as additional, are a major challenge. The key policy question is how confident regulators should be that a project is additional. In other words, how should the number of false positives (projects that qualify as additional but are not) and false negatives (projects that are additional but do not pass the test) be balanced? We assessed the current additionality tests from the perspective that a high degree of confidence is required. The main reason is that the implications of false positives are much more severe than the implications of false negatives. A false positive leads to both an increase in global
GHG emissions and higher global costs of mitigating climate change, whereas a false negative does not affect global GHG emissions but only leads to higher costs of mitigating climate change (Schneider et al. 2014).

In Chapter 3 we thoroughly scrutinised the four main approaches used to determine additionality. Our analysis shows:

- **Prior consideration** is a necessary and important but insufficient step for ensuring additionality of CDM projects. This step works largely as intended (Section 3.1.4).

- The subjective nature of the **investment analysis** limits its ability to assess with high confidence whether a project is additional. It is possible that improvements could further decrease this subjectivity, e.g. by applying more complicated tests to assess the financial performance of the project. However, especially for project types in which the financial impact of CERs is relatively small compared to variations in other parameters such as large power projects, doubts remain as to whether investment analysis can provide a strong 'signal to noise' ratio (Section 3.2.4).

- To reduce the subjectivity of the **barrier analysis**, the ‘Guidelines for objective demonstration and assessment of barriers’ require that barriers are monetized to the extent possible and integrated in the investment analysis. As a result of this, the barrier analysis has lost importance as a stand-alone approach of demonstrating additionality. However, barriers which are not monetized remain subjective and often difficult to verify by the DOEs (Section 3.4.4).

- In general, the **common practice analysis** can be considered a more objective approach than the barriers or investment analysis due to the fact that information on the sector as a whole is considered rather than specific information of a project only. It reduces the information asymmetry inherent in the investment and barrier analysis (Section 3.3.4). In this regard, expanding the use of common practice analysis could be a reasonable approach to assessing additionality more objectively. However, the presented analysis shows that the way common practice is currently assessed needs to be substantially reformed to provide a reasonable means of demonstrating additionality. Moreover, when expanding its use, it is important to reflect that market penetration is not a good proxy for all project types for the likelihood of additionality. The fact that few others have implemented the same project type is only an indication of the actual attractiveness. It should thus be only applied to those project types for which market penetration is a reasonable indicator.

Against this background we recommend that

- the **prior consideration** grace period for notification after the start of a CDM project should be shortened from 180 to 30 days to reduce the risk that projects apply for the CDM having only learned about this option after the start of the project,

- the **common practice analysis** is significantly reformed and receives a more prominent role in additionality determination,

- the **investment analysis** is excluded as an approach for demonstrating additionality for projects types for which the ‘signal to noise’ ratio is insufficient to determine additionality with the required confidence; while for those project types for which investment analysis would still be eligible, project participants must confirm that all information is true and accurate and that the investment analysis is consistent with the one presented to debt or equity funders, and
• the **barrier analysis** is entirely abolished as a separate approach in the determination of additionality at project level (though it may be used for determining additionality of project types); barriers which can be monetized should be addressed in the investment analysis while all other barriers should be addressed in the context of the reformed common practice analysis.

A prerequisite for expanding the use of the common practice analysis is significant improvements of its current shortcomings, most notably with regard to the following issues (Section 3.3.4):

- The project types and sectors covered by the CDM are very different in their technological and market structure. Determining what is deemed to be common practice must take into account these differences. Therefore, the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of determining common practice should be abandoned and be replaced by **sector or project-type specific guidance**, particularly with regard to distinguishing between different and similar technologies (appropriate level of dis-/aggregation) and with regard to the threshold for market penetration, which can have very different implications for the number of projects passing the test, depending on the features of the sectors or project types.

- The **technological potential** of a certain technology should also be taken into account in order to avoid that a project is deemed additional although the technological potential is already largely exploited in the respective country. However, results of studies on the technological potential depend strongly on their assumptions and may thus vary significantly. The exploitation rate should therefore only be considered one criterion among others in determining whether a technology is common practice; it should not form the only decisive criterion.

- The common practice analysis should at least cover the **entire country**. However, to ensure statistical confidence, the control group needs a minimum absolute number of activities or installations. If the observations in the host country do not exceed that minimum threshold, the scope needs to be extended to other countries (e.g. the neighbouring countries or the entire continent).

- Last but not least, all CDM projects should be included into the common practice analysis as a default, unless a methodology includes different requirements.

In addition to the above-mentioned improvements of general approaches for determining additionality, we recommend further improvements to key general CDM rules:

- **Renewal and length of crediting periods:** At the renewal of the crediting period, not merely the validity of the baseline but the validity of the baseline scenario should be assessed for CDM projects that are potentially problematic in this regard. This is the case if the baseline is the ‘continuation of the current practice’ or if changes such as retrofits could also be implemented in the baseline scenario at a later stage. Crediting periods of project types or sectors that are highly dynamic or complex such as urban transport systems or data centres should be limited to one single period of 10 years maximum. Moreover, generally abolishing the renewal of crediting periods but allowing a somewhat longer single crediting period for project types which require a continuous stream of CER revenues to continue operation (e.g. landfill gas flaring) may also be considered (Section 3.5.4).

- **Positive Lists:** Some of the positive lists are now reviewed regularly, and have a clear basis for determining whether a technology should still be included in the lists. This review of validity should also be extended to project types covered by the microscale additionality tool. In addition, positive lists must address the impact of national policies and measures to
support low emissions technologies (so-called E- policies). For positive lists to avoid the possibility of ‘false positives’ driven by national policies, some objective measure of renewable energy support may be needed as part of the evaluation process. A positive list that included renewables, for example, could be qualified by restricting its applicability to countries that did not have any support policies in place for that specific technology. Finally, to maintain environmental integrity of the CDM overall, positive lists should be accompanied by negative lists (Section 3.7).

- **Programmes of activities**: PoA rules allow that the total project size exceeds the small-scale or micro-scale thresholds while using the automatic additionality provision established for small-scale and micro-scale projects. This may increase the risk of registering non-additional projects. Reform of the CDM rules related to additionality for particular project types (Chapter 4) and positive lists (Section 3.7) will address any concerns about additionality of PoAs (Section 3.6.3). However, as long as these rules are not reformed accordingly, PoA have the potential to boost the number of non-additional project activities and CERs.

- **Standardized baselines**: These were introduced to reduce transaction costs while ensuring environmental integrity. In contrast to the general expectation, they do not increase the environmental integrity of the CDM. On the contrary, as long as they are not mandatory, once established, they lower the environmental integrity because they allow for increasing the number false positive projects. Therefore, their use should be made mandatory. Moreover, all CDM facilities should be included in the peer group used for the establishment of standardized baselines and clearer guidance needs to be provided for DNAs on how to determine the appropriate level for disaggregation. Finally, the practice of using the same methodological approach for the establishment of standardized baselines for all sectors, project types and locations should be abolished (Section 3.8).

- **Consideration of domestic policies (E+/E-)**: The risk of undermining environmental integrity through over-crediting of emission reductions is likely to be larger than the creation of perverse incentives for not establishing E- policies. Therefore, adopted policies and regulations reducing GHG emissions (E-) should be included when setting or reviewing crediting baselines while policies that increase GHG emissions (E+) should be discouraged by their exclusion from the crediting baseline where possible (Section 3.9).

- **Suppressed demand**: In many cases, the Minimum Service Levels may be reached during the lifetime of CDM project. However, even if the suppressed demand does lead to some over-crediting, the overall impact is very small. An expert process should be established to balance the risks of over-crediting with the potential increased development benefits. In addition, the application of suppressed demand principles in methodologies could be restricted to countries in which development needs are highest and the potential for over-crediting is the smallest, such as LDCs (Section 3.10).

### 6.2. Project types

We note that even with ‘perfect’ rules for determining additionality as recommended in Section 6.1, many project types have fundamental problems with this determination. Drawing upon our findings for specific project types (Section 4), this section provides recommendations of which project types should remain eligible in the CDM. In doing so, we not only consider the environmental integrity under current rules, but also whether improvements of general or project type-specific rules could be implemented to ensure overall environmental integrity. We also include other considerations, such as whether the emission sources can be addressed more effectively by other policies.
Industrial gas projects: In contrast to conventional wisdom and their perception in the general public, our analysis shows that industrial gas projects provide for a high or medium environmental integrity. After issues related to perverse incentives have been successfully addressed through ambitious benchmarks, HFC-23 and nitric acid projects now provide for a high degree of environmental integrity. They are very likely to be additional because they involve so-called ‘end-of-the-pipe’ technologies and do not have significant income other than CERs and because revenues from CERs have a large impact on the economic feasibility. Moreover, they partially use emission benchmarks as baselines which underestimate the actual emission reductions. The methodologies for HFC-23 and nitric acid projects have already been improved in the past and do not require further improvements (Sections 4.2.7 and 4.4.7). For adipic acid, the situation is different; this project type is also likely to be additional but concerns about carbon leakage due to high CER revenues have never been addressed. Adipic acid production is a highly globalised industry and all plants are very similar in structure and technology. A global benchmark of 30 kg/t applied to all plants would prevent carbon leakage, considerably reduce rents for plant operators, and allow the methodology to be simplified by eliminating the calculation of the N₂O formation rate (Section 4.3.7). Industrial gas projects provide for low cost mitigation options. Under current rules, HFC-23 and adipic acid projects may generate large rents for plant operators. These emission sources could therefore also be addressed through domestic policies, such as regulations or by including the emission sources in domestic or regional ETS, and help countries achieve their NDCs under the Paris Agreement. For example, China is introducing a domestic results-based finance policy aiming at incentivising HFC-23 emissions reductions. Parties to the Montreal Protocol also consider regulating HFC emissions. We therefore recommend that HFC-23 projects are not eligible under the CDM. A transition to address these emissions domestically may also be supported by bilateral or multilateral initiatives of (results-based) carbon finance.

Energy-related project types: Our analysis suggests that many energy-related project types provide for a low likelihood of overall environmental integrity, particularly wind and hydropower (Sections 4.5.7 and 4.6.7), fossil fuel switch (Section 4.11.7) and supply-side energy efficiency project types such as waste heat recovery (Section 4.10.7). The main reason for this assessment is that CER benefits are often relatively small compared to fuel cost savings, so that the impact of CER revenues on the economic feasibility is marginal (Section 2.4). Many projects are also supported through other policies, such as feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity or emerging ETSS. The costs for renewable power technologies are decreasing rapidly. In our assessment, the potential for addressing additinality concerns through improved tests are rather limited for these project types. Many projects are economically viable and even an improved investment analysis or common practice test may not be suitable to clearly distinguish additional from non-additional projects. We therefore recommend that these project types should be no longer eligible in principle under the CDM. However, in least developed countries, some project types, particularly wind and small-scale hydropower plants, may still face considerable technological and/or cost barriers (Section 4.5.3). These project types may thus remain eligible in least developed countries.

We recommend that some other energy-related project remain eligible if methodologies are improved. Biomass power projects can be competitive with fossil generation technologies under certain but not all circumstances. In cases in which power generation from biomass is not competitive with fossil generation technologies, CER revenues can have a significant impact on the profitability of a project, particularly if credits for methane avoidance are claimed as well. In these cases, the demonstration of abundance of biomass as well as of the claim that biomass is left to decay is key for avoiding any over-crediting of emissions. We therefore recommend that only biomass power projects avoiding methane emissions remain eligible under the CDM provided that the corresponding provisions in the applicable methodologies are revised appropriately (Section 4.7.7).
With regard demand-side energy efficiency project types with distributed sources – cook stoves and efficient lighting – we have identified concerns which question their overall environmental integrity. However, environmental integrity concerns could be addressed if cook stove methodologies were revised considerably, including more appropriate values for the fraction of non-renewable biomass (Section 4.12.7), and if approaches for determining the penetration rate of efficient lighting technologies as already established in AM0113 were made mandatory for all new projects and CPAs under these project types and the older methodologies were withdrawn (Section 4.13.7). As CER revenues can have a considerable impact and as barriers persist these projects, we recommend that they should remain eligible, subject to the improvements recommended.

**Methane projects:** Landfill gas and coal mine methane projects are likely to be additional. However, there are concerns in terms of over-crediting, which should be addressed through improvements of the respective methodologies, particularly by introducing region-specific soil oxidations factors and by requesting DOEs to verify that landfilling practices are not changed (Sections 4.8.7 and 4.9.7). For both project types, the CER revenues have a considerable impact on their economic performance. With regard to landfill gas, an important concern is that continued incentives for landfilling could delay the implementation of more sustainable waste management practices, such as recycling or composting. We therefore recommend that this project type only be eligible in countries that have policies in place to transition to more sustainable waste management practices.

Table 6-1 summarises our recommendations for the specific project types assessed above.
Table 6-1: CDM eligibility of project types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project type</th>
<th>Environmental integrity under current rules</th>
<th>Environmental integrity if rules were improved</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HFC-23</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipic acid</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Eligible (with benchmark of 30 kg / t AA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind power</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass power</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>Eligible (projects avoiding methane emissions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landfill gas</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>Eligible (subject to transition arrangements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mine methane</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste heat recovery</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel switch</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient cook stoves</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient lighting</td>
<td>Low / High</td>
<td>Medium / High</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

7. Implications for the future role of the CDM and crediting mechanisms

In this section, we consider the implications of our analysis for the future role of the CDM and crediting mechanisms generally. We situate these implications not only in the context of the CDM but also the Paris Agreement and draw general conclusions for the design of international crediting mechanisms under the Paris Agreement as well as crediting policies established at national level.

The CDM has provided many benefits. It has brought innovative technologies and financial transfers to developing countries, helped identify untapped mitigation opportunities, contributed to technology transfer and may have facilitated leapfrogging the establishment of extensive fossil energy infrastructures. The CDM has also helped to build capacity and to raise awareness on climate change. It also created knowledge, institutions, and infrastructure that can facilitate further action on climate change. Some projects have provided significant sustainable development co-benefits. Despite these benefits, after well over a decade of considerable experience, the enduring limitations of GHG crediting mechanisms are apparent.

- Firstly, and most notably, the elusiveness of additionality for all but a limited set of project types is very difficult, if not impossible, to address. Our analysis shows that many CDM project types are unlikely to be additional. Information asymmetry between project participants and regulators remains a considerable challenge. This challenge is difficult to address through improvements of rules. Further standardisation can be helpful for reducing transaction costs but has a limited scope, particularly within the CDM, for resolving additionality concerns. The scope for added standardisation is limited by the number of amenable project types and the wide variation of conditions across CDM host countries. Standardisation approaches have been most successful in regional crediting programs such as California or...
Australia, where they have focused on a limited number of suitable and largely non-energy project types, such as landfills or coal mines. The overall integrity of the CDM could only be improved significantly if the mechanism were limited to those project types that have a high likelihood of providing additional emission reductions. In our assessment, this would require excluding most of the current CDM project types and focusing mainly on projects that abate other GHGs than CO$_2$.

- Secondly, international crediting mechanisms involve an inherent and unsolvable dilemma: either they might create perverse incentives for policy makers in host countries not to implement policies or regulations to address GHG emissions – since this would reduce the potential for international crediting – or they credit activities that are not additional because they are implemented due to policies or regulations. This well-known dilemma has been discussed by the CDM EB without a resolution.

- Thirdly, for many project types, the uncertainty of emission reductions is considerable. Our analysis shows that risks for over-crediting or perverse incentives for project owners to inflate emission reductions have only partially been addressed. It is also highly uncertain how long projects will reduce emissions, as they might anyhow be implemented at a later stage without incentives from a crediting mechanism – an issue that is not addressed at all under current CDM rules.

- A further overarching shortcoming of crediting mechanisms is that they do not make all polluters pay but rather subsidize the reduction of emissions. This lowers the cost of the product or service, inducing rebound effects that are not considered under CDM rules and that lead to over-crediting. Most of these shortcomings are inherent to using crediting mechanisms, which questions the effectiveness of international crediting mechanisms as a key policy tool for climate mitigation.

It should be noted that the results of the analysis provided here for the CDM are to a large extent also relevant and valid for other international carbon offset or crediting programs, such as the Japanese Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), the Climate Action Reserve (CAR), the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) or the Gold Standard (GS). The results are also relevant for the mechanisms to be implemented under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, any mechanism to be used for compliance under the Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and to a certain extent for the Joint implementation (for an overview see Kollmuss et al. 2015a). Even though the programs differ in many aspects, generally speaking, the CDM has been the origin and the role model for these offset programs. In particular, the CDM’s approaches to additionality testing and baseline setting have served as the main blueprint for most other programs. With the aim of reducing transaction costs, rules and methodologies for additionality that have been borrowed from the CDM have been simplified, which did not generally strengthen their environmental integrity. Therefore, the issues raised here in the context of the CDM will remain relevant for other international offset programs.

The future role of crediting mechanisms should be revisited in the light of the Paris Agreement. The CDM in its current form will end with the conclusion of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Several elements of the CDM could, nevertheless, be used when implementing the mechanism established under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement or when implementing (bilateral) crediting mechanisms under Article 6.2. However, the context for using crediting mechanisms has fundamentally changed. The most important change to the Kyoto architecture is that all countries have to submit NDCs that include mitigation pledges or actions. As of 15 December 2015, 187

countries, covering around 95% of global emissions in 2010 and 98% of global population, have submitted NDCs (CAT 2015). Many mitigation pledges in NDCs cover economy-wide emissions or large parts of the economy. This implies that much of the current CDM project portfolio will fall within the scope of NDCs.

The Paris Agreement requires countries to adjust their reported GHG emissions for international transfers of mitigation outcomes in order to avoid double counting of emission reductions. This implies that the baseline, and therefore additionality, may be determined in relation to the mitigation pledges rather than using a ‘counterfactual’ scenario as under the CDM, and that countries could only transfer emission reductions that were beyond that which they had pledged under their NDCs. Double counting can occur, inter alia, if the same emission reductions are accounted for both the host country – as reflected in its GHG inventory – and the country using these credits towards achieving its mitigation pledge. Avoiding such double counting could imply that host countries will have to add internationally transferred credits to their reported GHG emissions if the emission reductions fall within the scope of their mitigation pledges. This has several important implications.

Firstly, issuing and transferring credits that do not represent additional emission reductions or are under- or over-credited has other implications for global GHG emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, non-additional CDM projects or over-crediting increase global GHG emissions, whereas under-crediting from additional projects provides a net mitigation benefit. The implications are different and more complex when the emission reductions fall within the scope of the NDC of the host country: they depend on whether the credited activities are additional, whether they are over- or under-credited, the ambition of the mitigation pledge of the host country, i.e. whether or not it is below BAU emissions, and whether the emission reductions are reflected in the host country’s GHG inventory. (Kollmuss et al. 2015b). Compared to the situation in which international transfers of credits would not be allowed, global GHG emissions could not be affected, decrease or increase due to the transfer of credits, depending on the circumstances. For example, if the host country has an ambitious NDC, non-additionality and over-crediting may not necessarily increase global GHG emissions because the country would have to reduce other GHG emissions to compensate for the adjustments to its reported GHG emissions. For the same reasons, under-crediting would not necessarily lead to a global net mitigation benefit. Additionality and over-crediting mainly matter when host countries have weak mitigation pledges above BAU emissions.

A second important implication relates to the incentives for host countries to ensure integrity and participate in international crediting mechanisms. If mitigation pledges are ambitious, host countries might be cautious to ‘give away’ non-additional credits. To achieve its mitigation pledge, the host country would need to compensate for exports of non-additional credits, by further reducing its emissions. Host countries with ambitious and economy-wide mitigation pledges would thus have incentives to ensure that international transfers of credits are limited to activities with a high likelihood of delivering additional emission reductions. However, our analysis showed that only a few project types in the current CDM project portfolio have a high likelihood of providing additional emission reductions, whereas the environmental integrity is questionable and uncertain for most project types. For those project types with a high likelihood of additionality, the potential for further emission reductions is limited and it is unclear whether host countries would be willing to engage in crediting for this ‘low-hanging fruit’ mitigation potential. The experience with Joint Implementation showed that most credits originated from countries with ‘hot air’, i.e. where the emission pledge is less ambitious than BAU emissions, while the potential for crediting was quite limited in countries

99 Some emissions reductions may not be reflected in the country-wide GHG inventory, for example, because the country uses simple Tier 1 methods to estimate an emissions source which do not account for the emission reductions achieved through CDM projects or because the reductions occur in a sector that is not covered by the host country’s GHG inventory.
with ambitious mitigation targets, also due to overlap with other climate policies (Kollmuss et al. 2015b). In conclusion, this suggests that the future supply of credits may mainly come either from emission sources not covered by mitigation pledges or from countries with weak mitigation pledges. In both cases, host countries would not have incentives to ensure integrity and credits lacking environmental integrity could increase global GHG emissions.

At the same time, demand for international credits is also uncertain. Only a few countries, including Japan, Norway and Switzerland, have indicated that they intend to use international credits to achieve their mitigation pledges. An important source of demand could come from the market-based approach pursued under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and possibly from an approach pursued under the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For these demand sources, avoiding double counting with emission reductions under NDCs will be a challenge that is similar to that of avoiding double counting between countries.

A number of institutions are exploring the use of crediting mechanisms as a vehicle to disburse results-based climate finance without actually transferring any emission reduction units. This way of using crediting mechanisms could be more attractive to developing countries; they would not need to add exported credits to their reported GHG emissions, as long as the credits are not used by donors towards achieving mitigation pledges. The implications of non-additional credits are also different: they would not directly affect global GHG emissions, but could lead to a less effective use of climate finance, which could indirectly increase global GHG emissions compared to using the available resources more effectively. However, donors of climate finance aim to ensure that their funds be used for actions that would not go ahead without their support. They need to show that their investments ‘make a difference’. Given the considerable shortcomings with the approaches for assessing additionality, we recommend that donors should not rely on current CDM rules to assess the additionality of projects considered for funding.

Some countries pursue domestic crediting policies. South Korea allows companies to convert CERs from Korean projects into units eligible under its domestic emissions trading system. The Chinese and California-Quebec ETS allow the use of credits from domestic offsetting projects. Mexico, South Africa and Switzerland are pursuing policies that allow using domestic credits to meet tax or other obligations (see also the paragraph above on other offsetting programs). In these cases, using non-additional credits has no direct implication on global GHG emissions but will increase the country’s costs towards achieving its NDC. In the long run, this provides incentives for these countries to limit crediting to project types with a high likelihood of additionality. However, meeting the ambitious long-term climate change mitigation goals of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement requires much stronger action and a rapid bridging of the emissions gap (UNEP 2015). It is hard to imagine that such ambitious goals could be achieved on a global level in a timely manner without a sharing of effort or burdens that could encompass some form of transfer of mitigation outcomes and/or results-based climate finance.

Taking into account this context and the findings of our analysis as well as other evaluations, we recommend that policy makers revisit the role of crediting in future climate policy:

- **Moving towards more effective climate policies:** We recommend focusing climate mitigation efforts on forms of carbon pricing that do not rely extensively on credits, and on measures such as results-based climate finance that do not necessarily serve to offset other emissions. If well designed, emission trading systems and carbon taxes have several advantages over crediting mechanisms: they do not require additionality to be assessed or hypothetical baselines to be set but rather rely on information on actual emissions for which information asymmetry is more manageable; in principle, they make the polluter pay rather than providing subsidies; and they expose all regulated entities to a carbon price, enabling
up-scaled, sector-wide emission reductions. We recommend that international crediting mechanisms play a limited role after 2020 to address specific emission sources in countries that do not have the capacity to implement broader climate policies. Crediting should not be further pursued as a main tool for GHG mitigation.

- **Fundamental and far-ranging changes to the CDM:** To enhance the integrity of international crediting mechanisms such as the CDM and to make them more attractive to both buyers and host countries with ambitious NDCs, we recommend limiting the mechanism to project types that have a high likelihood of delivering additional emission reductions. We recommend reviewing methodologies systematically to address risks of over-crediting, as identified in this report. We further recommend revisiting the current approaches for additionality, with a view to abandoning subjective approaches and adopting more standardized approaches where possible. We also recommend curtailing the length of the crediting periods with no renewal. A larger question is whether the UNFCCC and CDM processes can create the consensus needed to make the fundamental changes needed to improve the integrity of the CDM in significant ways.

- **Purchase of CERs:** We recommend potential buyers of CERs to limit any purchase of CERs to either existing projects that are at risk of stopping GHG abatement (‘vulnerable projects’) or the few project types that have a high likelihood of ensuring environmental integrity. Continued purchase of CERs should be accompanied with a plan and support to host countries to transition to broader and more effective climate policies that ensure GHG abatement in the long-run. Purchase of CERs could also be used to deliver results-based finance in this context. Further, we recommend pursuing the purchase and cancellation of CERs, as a form of results-based climate finance, rather than using CERs for compliance towards meeting mitigation targets.

- **Mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:** Given the high integrity risks of crediting mechanisms, we recommend that Parties consider provisions that provide strong incentives to the Parties involved to ensure integrity of international transfers of mitigation outcomes. This includes robust accounting provisions, inter alia, to avoid double counting of emission reductions, but should also extend to other elements, such as comprehensive, transparent and ambitious mitigation pledges as a prerequisite to participating in international mechanisms.

In conclusion, we believe that the CDM had a very important role to play, in particular in countries that were not yet in a position to implement domestic climate policies. However, our assessment and other evaluations confirm the strong shortcomings inherent to crediting mechanisms. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, implementing more effective climate policies including international cooperative actions becomes key to bringing down emissions quickly to a pathway consistent with well below 2°C. Our findings suggest that crediting approaches should play a time-limited and niche-specific role, where additionality can be relatively assured, and the mechanism can serve as stepping-stone to other, more effective policies to achieve cost-effective mitigation. In doing so, continued support to developing countries will be key. We recommend using new innovative sources of finance, such as revenues from auctioning of ETS allowances, rather than international crediting mechanisms, to support developing countries in implementing their NDCs.
8. Annex

8.1. Representative samples of CDM projects

8.1.1. Task

The population consists of 7,418 CDM projects which have 4 characteristics (location, technology, size, time), from which representative samples for three additionality approaches (investment analysis, barrier analysis and common practice analysis) should be drawn. One challenge consists of the fact that the additionality approaches are not directly known before the analysis. After some preliminary analyzes, we decided on a two-step approach.

1. Draw a representative sample with regard to all strata of the 4 characteristics of size 300. The additionality approaches are determined for the projects in this sample.

2. Draw sub-samples from the projects belonging to each of the three additionality approaches, which are representative for the strata of the 4 characteristics, as they occur for the projects of each additionality approach. The sub-samples shall consist of 50 projects each, which are to be further divided into one 30-project sample and two 10-project samples. The 30- and 10-project sample should each be representative of the strata and combine to the 50-project sample.

8.1.2. Approach

The challenge consists of the fact that the small sample sizes lead to less than one draw for many strata. In a first step, therefore, a randomised procedure is necessary to identify the strata from which to draw, such that the frequencies of the strata are best preserved from the population to the samples.

Drawing the 300-project sample

1. Randomly select strata from which to draw

   a) Calculate the target number of draws for each stratum as (stratum frequency) (population size) (sample size). These are decimal numbers and often below.

      In order to obtain an integer number of draws for a stratum, discretise its corresponding target number to the enclosing integers, e.g. 2.1 is randomly assigned either 2 or 3, where the probability of the assignment of the higher enclosing integer is weighted with (target number)^(lower enclosing integer). In the example, the probability that 2.1 becomes 3 is therefore weighted with 2.1 2 0.1. The number of target numbers assigned to the higher enclosing integer is determined such that the sum of all assigned lower enclosing integer and all assigned higher enclosing integer is as close as possible to the rounded sum of all respective target numbers.

      For example, assume 3 target numbers between 2 and 3, namely (2.1, 2.3, 2.9). Their rounded sum is 7. Drawing twice from two strata and three times from one strata yields the targeted 7 total draws. The third strata with the target number 2.9 has the highest chance of being chosen for the three draws.

   b) Strata with 0 frequency in the population have of course 0 frequency in the samples as well.

2. Randomly draw from the strata with the discretised target numbers of the previous steps.
Drawing sub-samples of the 300-project sample with the added additionality approach information

From the 300-project sample, we extract the projects that belong to each additionality approach, yielding three sub-samples. From each of these sub-samples, we draw samples of 50 projects, which are representative with regard to the strata of the 4 characteristics in the respective sub-sample. We employ the same approach as for drawing the 300-project sample (Section 2.1).

These three samples of 50 projects are ordered with respect to the strata of the 4 characteristics. Then we extract two sub-sets of 10 projects, one consisting of the 1st, 6th, 11th, 15th... project, the second consisting of the 3rd, 8th, 13th, 18th... project of the ordered sample. The 30-project sample consists of the remaining projects. This ensures that the strata within the 30-project sample are preserved in the smaller samples as well as possible.

8.1.3. Samples

**Investment analysis:**

69, 544, 1436, 1906, 2007, 2075, 2229, 2525, 3068, 3490, 3703, 4042, 4317, 4657, 5047, 5659, 5661, 5707, 5757, 6052, 6899, 7073, 7185, 7843, 7974, 8057, 8523, 8615, 8801, 9002

1875, 2315, 3033, 3186, 3799, 4600, 4687, 5843, 7024, 7551, 8903

1795, 2931, 4817, 5555, 6173, 6440, 7540, 8291, 8818, 8821

**Barrier analysis:**

244, 348, 582, 644, 1053, 1408, 1578, 1738, 2180, 2561, 3174, 3191, 3639, 3739, 3856, 4468, 4478, 4508, 4748, 5099, 5749, 5961, 6012, 6302, 6636, 7242, 7392, 7651, 8680, 9419

534, 831, 937, 1151, 1827, 2098, 4147, 5234, 7595, 8319

544, 2077, 2975, 3393, 4089, 5888, 6246, 7578, 8927, 9100

**Common practice analysis:**

69, 1227, 1602, 1737, 2007, 2075, 2098, 2109, 2302, 2315, 3068, 3186, 3642, 3670, 3799, 4687, 5006, 5359, 5659, 5843, 6173, 6553, 6899, 7648, 7936, 8125, 8140, 8506, 8636, 9699

588, 2486, 3994, 4317, 6440, 7400, 8093, 8505, 8523, 8879

366, 544, 1661, 1875, 3703, 4042, 4310, 5487, 7494, 8818
8.2. Information on suppressed demand in CDM methodologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meth No.</th>
<th>Definition of baseline technology</th>
<th>Definition of MSL</th>
<th>Definition of baseline activity level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACM0014</td>
<td>Methane Correction Factor of 0.4 for domestic wastewater</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of wastewater treated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.A</td>
<td>Allows AMS I.L approach</td>
<td>Allows AMS I.L approach</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of electricity consumed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.AR</td>
<td>Fossil fuel powered lamp</td>
<td>3.5 hrs per day x 2 CFL lamps (240 lux)</td>
<td>Deemed savings with fossil fuel lamp to match MSL, with annual growth in kerosene consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS II.G</td>
<td>Mix of fossil fuel cooking technologies</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of biomass saved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.F</td>
<td>Unmanaged waste disposal with &gt; 5m depth (methane Correction Factor of 0.8)</td>
<td>MSL is having a waste disposal site</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of waste converted to compost)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.E</td>
<td>Mix of fossil fuel cooking technologies</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of renewable energy used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM0022</td>
<td>Unmanaged waste disposal with &lt; 5m depth (methane correction factor of 0.4)</td>
<td>MSL is having a waste disposal site</td>
<td>Project activity level, although project proponent may propose another baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS I.L</td>
<td>Kerosene pressure lamp for lighting; car battery for appliances; diesel generator for larger loads</td>
<td>240 lux for lighting (50 kWh/yr using CFL), 195 kWh/yr for other appliances</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of electricity consumed) but with emissions factor of baseline technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.BB</td>
<td>Kerosene pressure lamp for lighting; car battery for appliances; diesel generator for larger loads</td>
<td>240 lux for lighting (50 kWh/yr using CFL), 195 kWh/yr for other appliances</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of electricity consumed) but with emissions factor of baseline technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS III.AV</td>
<td>Fossil fuel or non-renewable biomass to boil water (only requires justification if share of total population without access to improved drinking water is &gt; 60%)</td>
<td>No minimum, but sets maximum level of 5.5 litres per person-day for crediting</td>
<td>Project activity level (i.e. quantity of water purified by project), but capped at 5.5 litres per person per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ own compilation

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